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CHAPTER I 
 
PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH: THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will introduce the subject of the thesis from a theoretical perspective and 
outline the research questions to be discussed. The definition of privacy will be 
narrowed, for the purposes of this thesis, to the right to informational autonomy, or 
control over private information. The term ‘balancing’, used in the title, refers to the 
values underlying both privacy and free speech which are considered in this chapter. 
Discussion of the justifications for effective legal protection of privacy and free speech, 
in this context, will develop a suggested theoretical model for privacy protection. Having 
presented both privacy and free speech as strongly supported in theory, and often 
furthering the same goals, the chapter will conclude by considering the utility of the 
model when the two rights appear to clash. Given that much privacy-invading speech is 
not strongly supported at the theoretical level, the model will provide a means of 
critiquing the balance struck by domestic courts and the ECtHR within current ‘privacy’ 
law. 
 
Privacy Theory 
 
As one commentator notes, privacy is a ‘sweeping concept’1 covering issues as varied as 
the storage of personal information by organisations, protection from searches of the 
home and interception of communications, protection of reputation and control over 
what is done to one’s body. The potential breadth of privacy has led some writers to 
conclude that ‘the quest for a singular essence of privacy leads to a dead end. There is no 
overarching conception of privacy’.2 In the case of media invasions of privacy, the 
concern of the law is with misuse of personal information.3 The term privacy, within this 
                                                 
1 D J Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2008) 1. 
2 ibid ix. For a similar view see R Wacks, The Protection of Privacy (Sweet & Maxwell 1980) 21. 
3 R Wacks, Privacy and Press Freedom (Blackstone Press Limited 1995) 23. 
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thesis, will therefore denote informational autonomy, a concept discussed in greater 
detail below. To draw out the philosophical arguments in favour of the protection of 
informational autonomy this chapter will take the view that privacy is best understood, in 
this context, by identifying the values promoted by its protection.4 Exploring these 
principles reveals that the legal protection of privacy is essential to the development of 
both individuals and society collectively. 
 
Informational Autonomy 
 
As mentioned, the concern of the law to protect individuals against press invasions of 
privacy is rooted in the notion of informational autonomy. Often described as the right 
to ‘selective disclosure’,5 informational autonomy refers to the right to control the flow 
of information about oneself.6 The term is used to suggest the right to determine 
whether, in what manner, and to whom the dissemination of personal information may 
occur. Substantive autonomy, in contrast, refers to the ability to make decisions regarding 
personal life and exercise choice. Substantive autonomy, in terms of its connection with 
informational autonomy, will be considered in greater detail below. A number of issues 
related to substantive autonomy, such as the right to abortion and the right to die, are not 
relevant in this particular context and so will not be considered. 
 
A further interesting aspect of informational autonomy is that in protecting one’s right to 
select certain information to be disclosed, the concept might cover the inaccurate 
presentation of oneself to others. Rachels takes the view that people often construct an 
image to be portrayed depending on the audience and situation.7 This has also been 
termed control over ‘editing one’s self’.8 He concludes that ‘[t]here need be nothing 
dishonest or hypocritical in any of this, and neither side of his personality need be the 
                                                 
4 Gavison’s reasoning will be employed here; ‘[t]he strength of…justifications depends on the extent to 
which other goals promoted by privacy are considered important, and on the extent to which the 
relationship between the two is established’. R Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89(3) The 
Yale Law Journal 421, 441. An alternative view is that privacy is merely an aspect of the right of property; a 
number of distinctive rights may have elements of privacy but they lack a common foundation. See J Jarvis 
Thomson, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1975) 4(4) Philosophy & Public Affairs 295. 
5 E L Beardsley, ‘Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure’ in J Roland Pennock and J W Chapman 
(eds), Privacy (Nomos XIII) (Atherton Press 1971) 56. See also C Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77(3) The Yale Law 
Journal 475, 483; D Feldman, ‘Secrecy, Dignity, or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty’ (1994) 
47(2) CLP 41, 53. 
6 C Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77(3) The Yale Law Journal 475, 482; D Feldman, ‘Secrecy, Dignity, or 
Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty’ (1994) 47(2) CLP 41, 53.  
7 J Rachels, ‘Why Privacy is Important’ (1975) 4(4) Philosophy and Public Affairs 323, 327. 
8 R Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (1980) 89(3) The Yale Law Journal 421, 450. 
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“real him”, any more than any of the others’.9 Moreover, people frequently present and 
perceive false impressions in the course of daily social interactions. In domestic law, 
celebrities have often been termed role models and, consequently, a public interest has 
been found in publishing information exposing their false image.10 This concept will be 
reconsidered in chapter 4, concerning the balance of privacy and free speech, but for 
present purposes, it is enough to say that informational autonomy appears to be 
furthered by protecting the right to project a public image, even when it does not mirror 
private life.11 Moreover, a privacy claim need not automatically be defeated by a false 
image, in the balance with free speech. 
 
The concept of informational autonomy, as a sub-set of the right to privacy, gains 
support from the other related values of self fulfilment, dignity and substantive 
autonomy, considered in the following discussion. These values, it will be argued, are 
threatened by failure to protect informational autonomy.  
 
Self-Fulfilment and Dignity 
 
As Feldman observes; ‘[a]ny attempt to identify a single interest at the core of privacy is 
doomed to failure, because privacy derives its weight and importance from its capacity to 
foster the conditions for a wide range of other aspects of human flourishing’.12  
Another way of putting it might be that ‘privacy is essential to the creation and 
maintenance of selves’.13 One aspect of the self-fulfilment argument is that privacy 
creates space for the development of intimate relationships. As Fried suggests: 
 
[A] threat to privacy seems to threaten our integrity as persons. To respect, love, trust, feel 
affection for others and to regard ourselves as the objects of love, trust and affection is at the 
                                                 
9 Rachels, ‘Why Privacy is Important’ (n 7) 327. Griffin makes a similar argument; ‘[n]ot all persons whose 
appearance differs from their reality are thereby hypocrites. A homophobe, whether homosexual or not, 
who acts hostilely towards homosexuals solely because they are homosexuals is unjust. The injustice 
deserves exposure. That is the public interest. But if the homophobe is himself also homosexual, to 
publicise that further fact is protected neither by the other’s freedom of expression not the public’s right of 
information. On the contrary, it is an outrageous infringement of the homophobe’s right to privacy. It is 
not that a person’s sex life is never of public interest, but that usually it is not’. J Griffin, On Human Rights 
(OUP 2008) 240. 
10 See chapter 4 at p 91. 
11 H Fenwick and G Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP 2006) 804. 
12 D Feldman, ‘Privacy-Related Rights and their Social Value’ in P Birks (ed), Privacy and Loyalty (Clarendon 
Press 1997) 21. 
13 J H Reiman, ‘Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood’ (1976) 6(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 26, 41. 
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heart of our notion of ourselves as persons among persons, and privacy is the necessary 
atmosphere for these attitudes and actions.
14
 
 
Without privacy Fried finds the existence of such relationships ‘simply inconceivable’.15  
 
The connection between selective disclosure and the formation of close relationships is 
clear; ‘intimacy is the sharing of information about one’s actions, beliefs, or emotions 
which one does not share with all, and which one has the right not to share with 
anyone’.16 The formation of relationships of differing levels of intimacy is also dependent 
on control over disclosure of information; more information might be shared with a 
spouse than a friend, more with a friend than a colleague. Moreover, there may be 
differences in the types of information disclosed to different people. Informational 
autonomy confers the ability to choose the audience for information about oneself and 
the content of that information, enabling the maintenances of ‘degrees of intimacy’.17 
The fact that such relationships are, many would argue, a vital aspect of a life worth 
living provides strong support for effective protection of informational autonomy. 
 
The risk of violations of dignity, without the security of privacy protection, might inhibit 
the development of intimate relationships. As Griffin notes; ‘the richness of personal 
relations depends on our emerging from our shells, but few of us would risk emerging 
without privacy’.18 Parent makes clear that ‘intimacy involves much more than the 
exclusive sharing of information. It also involves the sharing of one’s total self—one’s 
experiences, aspirations, weakness, and values’.19 Thus when personal information is 
placed before the public, human dignity is violated20 regardless of the public reaction to 
that information.21 The sense of humiliation, mortification and degradation, likely to be 
experienced by anyone suffering such exposure, captures the offence to dignity. Again, a 
                                                 
14 C Fried, ‘Privacy’ (1968) 77(3) The Yale Law Journal 475, 477-478. For similar arguments see Rachels, 
‘Why Privacy is Important’ (n 7); T Gerety, ‘Redefining Privacy’ (1977) 12(2) Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review 233; F D Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom (CUP 1992) 18. 
15 Fried, ‘Privacy’ (n 14) 477. 
16 ibid 484.  
17 ibid 485. See also D Feldman, ‘Secrecy, Dignity, or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty’ 
(1994) 47(2) CLP 41, 81. 
18 J Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP 2008) 226. 
19 W A Parent, ‘Privacy, Morality, and the Law’ (1983) 12(4) Philosophy and Public Affairs 269, 275. 
20 E J Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser’ (1964) 39(6) New 
York University Law Review 962, 1006. 
21 ‘It matters not whether the public is repulsed or sympathetic; the harm is that one’s dignity has been 
affronted and his private life has been forcibly subjected to public scrutiny’. S M Scott, ‘The Hidden First 
Amendment Values of Privacy’ (1996) 71(3) Washington Law Review 683, 722. 
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particular affront to dignity is having control over private information taken away from 
the individual.22 Feldman makes a similar argument; ‘[d]ignity…is essential to the forms 
of human flourishing which depend on the exercise of autonomy’.23 Effective protection 
of informational autonomy would appear, therefore, to respect the dignity of individuals 
and promote their self-fulfilment.  
 
Substantive Autonomy 
 
One powerful justification for privacy might be its role in providing the ‘social and legal 
space to develop the emotional, cognitive, spiritual and moral powers of an autonomous 
agent’.24 Another privacy justification is its role in fostering autonomy in its substantive 
form; the ability to act on those beliefs. Substantive autonomy refers to human behaviour 
and actions; the ways in which an individual chooses to live their life. In this way privacy 
protection appeals to the wider concerns of liberty; ‘our pursuit of our conception of a 
worthwhile life’,25 whilst maintaining those other values that warrant specific laws 
regulating the (mis)use of private information.  
 
There is widespread acceptance of the connection between the above interests and 
substantive autonomy.26 The threat posed by invasions of privacy could inhibit 
engagement in certain types of behaviour, particularly those considered to be 
controversial in terms of prevailing social attitudes; ‘privacy permits individuals to do 
what they would not do without it for fear of an unpleasant or hostile reaction from 
others’.27 Thus the substantive autonomy of individuals may be constrained and their 
self-fulfilment similarly impeded if privacy is not protected. Gavison argues that ‘respect 
for privacy will help a society attract talented individuals to public life. Persons interested 
in government service must consider the loss of virtually all claims and expectations of 
privacy in calculating the costs of running for public office. Respect for privacy might 
                                                 
22 Bloustein refers, specifically, to physical isolation, but the point can easily be extended to selective 
disclosure of personal information; ‘personal isolation and personal control over the conditions of its 
abandonment is the very essence of personal freedom and dignity’. Bloustein, ‘Privacy as an Aspect of 
Human Dignity’ (n 20) 973. 
23 D Feldman, ‘Secrecy, Dignity, or Autonomy? Views of Privacy as a Civil Liberty’ (1994) 47(2) CLP 41, 
55. 
24 F D Schoeman, Privacy and Social Freedom (CUP 1992) 13. 
25 Griffin, On Human Rights (n 18) 233. 
26 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (n 11). See also J Wagner DeCew, ‘The 
Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics’ (1986) 5(2) Law and Philosophy 145; Feldman, ‘Secrecy, Dignity, or 
Autonomy?’ (n 23); Griffin, On Human Rights (n 18). 
27 Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (n 8) 451. 
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reduce those costs’.28 This argument might be extended to include talented musicians, 
actors and entertainers who, in some cases, may be deterred from pursuing a career in the 
public eye if effective privacy protection is lacking. The result is an unreasonable curb on 
the substantive autonomy of individuals, and the possible loss to society of having such 
individuals shy away from public roles.   
 
In contemporary society, the need for effective laws protecting privacy has never been 
plainer. Writing in 1989, Warren and Brandeis signalled the challenges posed to privacy 
by a combination of new technology and a press increasingly driven to expose and 
disseminate gossip and trivia.29 Such comments have only grown more accurate in recent 
years:  
 
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private 
and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 
‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops’.
30
 
 
In addition: 
 
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bonds of propriety and of decency. 
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is 
pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual 
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column 
upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the 
domestic circle.
31
 
 
As the recent Leveson Inquiry32 highlights, recourse to criminal and unethical behaviour 
has also been detected in some areas of the press as a means of obtaining personal 
information. Thus the motivation of media organisations to provide readers with the 
most intimate detail about the private lives of celebrities and public figures, to ensure 
their commercial success, is clear. Against this background, it is essential therefore that 
                                                 
28 ibid 456. 
29 S D Warren and L D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4(5) Harvard Law Review 193. 
30 ibid 195. 
31 ibid 196. 
32 The Leveson Inquiry, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press – Report (2012) 
<http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780.pdf> accessed 3 December 
2012. 
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privacy law provides practical and effective protection if it is to respond to the theoretical 
justifications outlined above.  
 
Free Speech Theory 
 
As the title suggests, a theme central to this thesis is the balance struck between privacy 
and free speech. Chapter 4 will provide a full discussion of the influence of Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, and the structure and principles utilised by the judiciary when balancing 
privacy and free speech. This section will consider free speech justifications from a 
philosophical perspective. Again, a greater understanding of the underlying principles will 
be used to develop the theoretical model for privacy protection. The rationales 
introduced here will be of crucial importance in critiquing the UK judiciary’s approach to 
privacy protection when faced with arguments in favour of press freedom. Furthermore, 
analysis of privacy and free speech theory will be used to challenge the argument 
commonly used in favour of restricting the development of privacy law; namely that 
privacy law is necessarily a threat to press freedom, or that the two concepts are ‘mutually 
exclusive’.33 This section will therefore not seek to comprehensively analyse the free 
speech theories but will consider the points at which they might engage with privacy, and 
identify how any conflict may be resolved. 
 
Argument from Democracy 
 
The argument from democracy is based on the idea of self-government; this means that 
‘ultimate political power resides in the population at large, that the people as a body are 
sovereign, and that they, either directly or through their elected representatives, in a 
significant sense actually control the operation of government’.34 Freedom of speech is 
then justified to give the sovereign population access to the information required to carry 
out their democratic role. As Schauer points out; ‘[b]ecause we cannot vote intelligently 
without full information…denying access to that information is as serious an 
infringement of the fundamental tenets of democracy as would be denying the right to 
vote’.35 Another facet of the argument from democracy is that uninhibited speech allows 
for criticism of leaders and exposure of corruption; ‘since citizens’ votes matter so much 
                                                 
33 T Gerety, ‘Redefining Privacy’ (1977) 12(2) Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 233, 291. 
34 F Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (CUP 1982) 36. 
35 ibid 38. 
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in a liberal democracy, the importance of their being informed of government 
misconduct is particularly great under that form of government’.36 Given the power of 
the media to disseminate information to masses, the argument from democracy is often 
used to justify particular protection for the press; ‘if public opinion acts as a check on 
governmental power, then a medium that can inform or mobilize the public is notably 
important’.37 As mentioned, however, the press may, for commercial reasons, be 
particularly motivated to invade privacy, providing a powerful reason for considering 
competing privacy and speech claims on an equal footing, rather than allowing an 
automatic presumption in favour of freedom of speech. 
 
Clearly the argument from democracy provides strong support for the protection of 
political speech,38 but perhaps little or no justification for the protection of privacy-
invading speech, when no political element is present. As Fenwick and Phillipson point 
out: 
In many cases [political speech] will not raise privacy issues, as where it consists of the discussion 
of political ideas, institutions, and policies. Where political speech does concern individuals, as 
where it reveals abuse of state power, the conflict is more likely to be with reputation than 
privacy…Thus, it will only be in a fairly narrow category of cases that any real conflict will arise – 
those where a publication relates to the personal life of a particular figure, but there is a serious 
argument that it serves a valuable purpose in revealing a matter relevant to that person’s fitness 
for office, or in furthering public knowledge or debate about matters of legitimate public 
concern.
39
  
 
The difficulty with making a distinction between political speech and privacy-invading 
speech is that it may not always be easy to distinguish between political and non-political 
speech in practice; ‘speech that is not explicitly political often has political implications’.40 
Arguably, any aspect of the private life of a politician, or political candidate, could impact 
upon the political process.41 While those in public office may be considered to have 
impliedly accepted a level of intrusion into their private life,42 ‘the argument that adopting 
                                                 
36 K Greenawalt, ‘Free Speech Justifications’ (1989) 89(1) Columbia Law Review 119, 146. 
37
 Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (n 34) 107. 
38 The argument from democracy is reflected in the Strasbourg and domestic Article 10/free speech 
jurisprudence. See chapter 4. 
39 H Fenwick and G Phillipson, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ 
(2000) 63(5) MLR 660, 685. 
40 K Greenawalt, Speech, Crime and the Uses of Language (OUP 1989) 45. 
41 See discussion below at p 16. 
42 Warren and Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (n 29) 215. 
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a public life forfeits a private life’ is, according to one commentator; ‘ridiculous.43 In 
addition, the press may argue that publications raise important political issues, despite 
invading the privacy of celebrities or others in the public eye. As Neill observes, ‘in 
addition to acting as watchdogs the organs of the media are commercial organisations 
and are part of the entertainment industry’.44 Thus particular articles may often consist of 
speech that serves to both attract the reader and discuss contemporary issues such as 
moral and social values. Stories drawing on examples from the celebrity world, or 
‘infotainment’, may therefore have the dual purpose of providing entertaining speech 
which contributes to important debates, with political implications.45 Chapter 4 will 
expand upon the role of the domestic judiciary in balancing privacy and free speech, and 
analyse the current resolution of such cases. From a theoretical perspective, however, it 
would appear that there are no grounds for prioritising either free speech or privacy; a 
theoretical model of privacy striving to deliver both effective privacy protection and 
preserve free speech would not privilege political speech without careful scrutiny of the 
competing privacy interests, but nor should it be automatically assumed that intrusive 
articles about the private lives of celebrities have no political speech value.  
 
Argument from Truth 
 
One leading commentator on free speech theory has suggested that: 
  
Of all [the free speech justifications] the predominant and most persevering has been the 
argument that free speech is particularly valuable because it leads to the discovery of truth. Open 
discussion, free exchange of ideas, freedom of enquiry, and freedom to criticize…are necessary 
conditions for the effective functioning of the process of searching for truth.
46
 
 
The argument from truth, derived largely from Milton’s Areopagitica and Mill’s On 
Liberty,47 is premised on the twin assumptions that truth is a goal worth pursuing,48 and 
                                                 
43 Griffin, On Human Rights (n 18) 240. 
44 B Neill, ‘Privacy: A Challenge for the Next Century’ in B S Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (OUP 1999) 
27. 
45 See discussion below at p 17. 
46 Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (n 34) 15. 
47 ibid. 
48 As Barendt suggests; ‘[t]ruth may be regarded as an autonomous and fundamental good, or its value 
maybe supported by utilitarian considerations concerning progress and the development of society’. E 
Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 7. Clearly, there is overlap between the argument from truth 
and the argument from democracy on this point. 
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that it will ‘emerge victorious from the competition among ideas’49 provided the 
conditions of free discussion are present. 
 
Compared with the law of defamation, which is concerned with false claims, privacy law 
aims to restrict some speech despite its content being true. The argument from truth 
would therefore appear to conflict with any law protecting privacy. This apparent conflict 
may be resolved by a number of arguments. Firstly, Mill’s argument from truth fails to 
explicitly distinguish between stated opinions and true facts,50 leading esteemed 
commentators to conclude that ‘Mill’s truth argument…applies most clearly to speech 
stating beliefs and theories about political, moral, aesthetic, and social matters’, rather 
than facts about an individual’s private life.51 It might be said, then, that arguments in 
favour of privacy protection might easily overcome those supporting free speech, based 
on the argument from truth.  
 
Moreover, Mill never intended to prioritise the search for truth above all other legitimate 
societal goals. As Marshall points out, Mill recognised the difficulty posed by the 
protection of privacy and found that it might be possible to accommodate such 
protection without disturbing the argument from truth, provided the speech in question 
is not in the public interest.52 Schauer comes to a similar conclusion: 
 
Any strong version of the argument from truth must elevate the search for knowledge to a 
position of absolute priority over other values. In this form the argument is so powerful as to be 
unworkable. If [the argument is weakened] to take account of other interests that may at times 
predominate…the argument from truth [says] little more than that the quest for knowledge is a 
value that ought to be considered.
53
 
 
If, as this chapter has suggested, privacy is an important interest, furthering both 
individual and societal goals,54 there is clearly scope for a carefully reasoned balance to be 
made between privacy and free speech. The argument in favour of free speech would be 
bolstered by the importance of the speech in terms of the public interest it serves, in line 
                                                 
49 Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (n 34) 16. 
50 G Marshall, ‘Press Freedom and Free Speech Theory’ [1992] PL 40, 51-52. 
51
 E Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 10; Greenawalt, ‘Free Speech Justifications’ (n 36) 121. 
52
 Marshall, ‘Press Freedom and Free Speech Theory’ (n 50) 51-52. 
53 Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (n 34) 28. 
54 The preceding section demonstrates the wealth of academic literature in favour of such an interpretation. 
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with Mill’s own concession.55 It appears therefore that the argument from truth, on its 
true construction, would not bar the application of the law to protect intrusive, but true, 
private facts.  
 
Arguments from Self-Fulfilment and Autonomy 
 
The argument from self-fulfilment is based on the idea that ‘restrictions on what we are 
allowed to say and write, or…to hear and read, inhibit our personality and its growth. A 
right to express beliefs and political attitudes instantiates or reflects what is it to be 
human’.56 At this point it is possible to distinguish between the interests of the speaker 
and receiver of information. In terms of the speaker; ‘communication is a crucial way to 
relate to others; it is also an indispensable outlet for emotional feelings and a vital aspect 
of the development of…personality and ideas’.57 Although this is a powerful argument 
for the protection of various forms of expression, in the context of press invasions of 
privacy, it is less clear how such an argument may be successfully deployed. As Barendt 
persuasively argues: 
 
While an unlimited, or at least very wide, freedom to communicate one’s own views may be 
considered an integral aspect of self-development or human dignity, it is surely far-fetched to 
make the same claim for the disclosure of news and information, unless perhaps the 
communicator has assembled or is in some way responsible for it.
58
 
 
Consequently, the argument from self-fulfilment ‘makes little sense [when applied to] the 
press and other media’.59 Again it would appear that any conflict between privacy and 
protection and free speech, based on the argument from self-fulfilment, is likely to be 
only slight and relatively easily resolved in favour of privacy interests.  
 
In terms of the receiver of information, the argument in favour of free speech relates to 
personal autonomy. The ability to receive a breadth of information, ideas and opinions 
enhances an individual’s ability to form their own opinions and make life-choices 
                                                 
55 As Fenwick and Philipson point out; ‘whether truth is valued instrumentally—for example, as essential 
to self-development—or as a good in itself, some kinds of truths must be regarded as more important that 
others.’ The argument from truth therefore ‘provides sharply differentiated support for different classes of 
speech’. Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (n 11) 15-16. 
56
 E Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 13. 
57
 Greenawalt, ‘Free Speech Justifications’ (n 36) 144. 
58
 Barendt, Freedom of Speech (n 56) 15.  
59 ibid. 
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accordingly. As Scanlon states; ‘an autonomous person cannot accept without 
independent consideration the judgement of others as to what he should believe or what 
he should do’.60 This argument is clearly also important in terms of autonomy to form 
political views and make political decisions, engaging the powerful argument from 
democracy. Furthermore, ‘any restriction on what an individual is allowed to read, see, or 
hear clearly amounts to an interference with [their] right to judge such matters for 
[themselves]’.61 In this way free speech fosters individual autonomy. It could be suggested 
that the argument from autonomy can be applied to a very wide range of speech; virtually 
all information is potentially relevant to the formation of views of some sector of the 
population. 
 
Given that both informational autonomy and substantive autonomy are supported by 
privacy protection,62 the better argument is that, in the privacy context, autonomy is 
furthered, rather than sacrificed, by laws granting privacy rights. As Fenwick and 
Phillipson argue: 
 
It is immediately apparent that much privacy-invading speech, by both directly assaulting 
informational autonomy and indirectly threatening the individual’s freedom of choice over 
substantive issues, far from being bolstered by the autonomy rationale, is in direct conflict with it. 
The state, in restricting what one citizen may be told about the private life of another, is not 
acting out of a paternalistic desire to impose a set of moral values thereby, but rather to assure an 
equal freedom to all to live by their own values.
63
  
 
Furthermore, if political autonomy is an important aspect of the arguments from 
democracy and autonomy, then ‘without the possibility of a self-subsistent critical 
standpoint from which to judge the will of the community, politics becomes corrupt and 
unable to transform itself…privacy [is] precisely the condition through which one can 
experience that inner independence from the social [and] political…realm’.64 Privacy 
therefore supports the aims of the arguments from democracy and autonomy. If privacy 
and free speech are accepted as sharing a common goal, the debate is clearly more 
                                                 
60 T Scanlon, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’ in R M Dworkin (ed), The Philosophy of Law (OUP 
1977) 163. 
61 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (n 11) 14. 
62 See above at p 3. 
63 Fenwick and Phillipson, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (n 
39) 682. Scott similarly observes that privacy and free speech ‘both are critical to autonomy’; S M Scott, 
‘The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy’ (1996) 71(3) Washington Law Review 683, 723. 
64 S Scoglio, Transforming Privacy: A Transpersonal Philosophy of Rights (Greenwood Press 1998) 36. 
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nuanced than a simple play-off between two opposed principles. Instead, the resolution 
of cases becomes a more complex balancing exercise, with privacy clearly being capable 
of standing up against free speech arguments. 
 
Further Free Speech Justifications 
 
A further free speech justification is considered separately here, although it can be rightly 
viewed as aspects of the arguments from democracy, self-fulfilment and autonomy. Raz 
argues that free speech is a public good because it validates a diversity of views, opinions 
and lifestyles.65 Furthermore, freedom to express a plurality of views would appear to 
promote tolerance of different ways of life.66 Raz, however, explicitly states that his 
justification is not aimed at speech relating to specific individuals, except perhaps the 
narrow exception of public officials and candidates.67 As with the argument from truth, 
this justification appears to provide stronger support for the expressions of opinions, 
especially those that might be controversial or unpalatable to many members of society. 
It is possible to argue that the ‘personal identification’ argument could be used to support 
freedom of privacy-invading speech; reading about the personal troubles of celebrities 
and other public figures could enable individuals to find themselves ‘reflected in the 
public media’ and give them a ‘feeling that their problems and experiences are not freak 
deviations’.68 However, as mentioned above, a fundamental justification for effective 
privacy protection is its indirect support of substantive autonomy. Again it appears that 
privacy and free speech are ‘mutually supportive’,69 in that ‘this justification for speech 
argues also for its restriction where required to ensure a reasonable degree of privacy’.70 
Furthermore, a better way to promote tolerance is arguably the provision of a private 
sphere in which an individual can make autonomous choices without intrusion.71  
 
                                                 
65 J Raz, ‘Free Expression and Personal Identification’ in W J Waluchow (ed), Free Expression: Essays in Law 
and Philosophy (Clarendon Press 1994) 4-10. Barendt concurs; ‘[f]reedom of speech reflects and reinforces 
pluralism, ensuring that different types of life are validated and promoting the self-esteem of those who 
follow a particular lifestyle’. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (n 56) 34. 
66 K I Kersch, Freedom of Speech: Rights and Liberties under the Law (ABC-CLIO 2003) 24. 
67 Raz, ‘Free Expression and Personal Identification’ (n 65) 18. 
68 ibid 12. 
69 C Emerson, ‘The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press’ (1979) 14(2) Harvard Civil Rights-Civil 
Liberties Law Review 329, 331. 
70 Fenwick and Phillipson, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (n 
39) 683. 
71 Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of Law’ (n 8) 455. 
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To conclude this section on the theory underlying privacy and free speech, the analysis 
has revealed that in many instances both are supported by the same justifications. The 
argument made by Emerson is borne out; [a]t most points the law of privacy and the law 
sustaining a free press do not contradict each other. On the contrary, they are mutually 
supportive, in that both are vital features of the basic system of individual rights. At other 
points there is only a minor likelihood of conflict.72 So far, the points made have been 
based on theoretical and philosophical arguments, before the discussion of domestic and 
Convention case law. The final section of this chapter will therefore consider the 
possibility of using this theory in developing privacy law and resolving cases. 
 
Utility of Theory in Privacy Law: A Basic Theoretical Model 
 
As this chapter has argued, informational autonomy (supported by its connection with 
substantive autonomy) is at the core of the right to privacy in this context. A legally 
enforceable right based on this concept could potentially be framed so widely as to be 
unworkable. As Moreham notes, a subjective approach encompassing ‘any information 
which x wishes to keep to him or herself’ would be too broad to form the basis of a legal 
right.73 Instead, it would seem to be appropriate to incorporate objectivity or 
‘reasonableness’ when determining the types of information attracting privacy protection. 
Some categories of information would clearly satisfy such a test; information relating to 
sexuality, relationships, health and the home are generally recognised as very intimate, 
personal information. Such information captured in visual form (photographs or videos) 
would be likely to increase the sense of intrusion, given the added detail conveyed to the 
audience, and accordingly could strengthen a claim that the information was private in 
nature.  
 
On this basis, distinguishing between private and non-private information by reference to 
whether it was obtained in a private/secluded location or a public location would not 
give strong protection to informational autonomy.74 The potential for obviously private 
information to be revealed in public is clear; the existence of an intimate relationship, an 
individual’s sexual orientation or treatment for a health condition could be discovered 
                                                 
72 Emerson, ‘The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press’ (n 69) 331. 
73 N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis’ (2005) 121 LQR 
628, 641. 
74 E Paton-Simpson, ‘Private Circles and Public Squares: Invasion of Privacy by the Publication of “Private 
Facts”’ (1998) 61(3) MLR 318, 320. 
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and recorded while an individual carries out their activities in a public location. Failure to 
restrict the mass dissemination of such information would not only interfere with 
informational autonomy; substantive lifestyle choices could also be affected. In an 
attempt to conceal private information certain individuals could resort to editing their 
behaviour in public; modifying their movements and associations with potentially 
harmful consequences (if, for example, an individual refrained from seeking medical 
assistance). However, information acquired in a public place may not concern one of the 
core aspects of private life. Although publication of photographs of a celebrity going 
about their daily life may not appear to strongly engage the right to privacy, the result 
may be a similar impact on substantive autonomy and lifestyle choices. Therefore, in 
theory, to give maximum protection to the principles of informational and substantive 
autonomy (and the other related privacy interests of self-fulfilment and dignity) the 
categories of private information potentially attracting protection should be widely 
drawn, encompassing obviously private, and anodyne, information obtained in public 
locations.  
 
Such a definition of private information may seem overly-inclusive, thus presenting a 
threat to press freedom and possibly resulting in a chilling effect on important forms of 
speech. However, the shared aims of privacy and free speech, highlighted in this chapter, 
call for a presumption of equality between the two rights. Therefore, even if a wide range 
of information attracts the initial protection of the law, the competing rights should 
always be balanced against each other and the claims on either side scrutinised, avoiding 
the unnecessary restriction of valuable speech. Both the privacy and free speech 
justifications discussed in this chapter might be utilised to inform the balancing act 
carried out between the rights, leading to ‘consistent, principled and reasonably 
foreseeable resolutions…rather than amounting merely to ad hoc exercises of judicial 
“common sense”’.75  
 
It has been suggested that the argument from democracy supports the protection of 
political speech. It would seem arbitrary to create a general presumption in favour of free 
speech in cases of threatened disclosure of information about politicians’ private lives; 
those contemplating entering public office may be deterred from taking such a course to 
protect their personal privacy and that of their family and associates. However, as 
                                                 
75 Fenwick and Phillipson, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (n 
39) 681. 
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Schauer persuasively argues, there is a strong competing interest in allowing the 
electorate to make informed voting decisions based on whatever criteria they deem fit: 
 
If there is…a right to vote, and if voting decisions are essentially individual decisions that embody 
an important dimension of individual autonomy, then it seems wrong to contend that the 
information that some voters require for making their voting decisions should be subject to 
majoritarian control.
76
  
 
Therefore, speech relating to aspects of politicians’ private lives would seem to fall into 
an exceptional category, requiring very strong reasons to justify its restriction.  
 
As mentioned, ‘infotainment’ (entertaining speech which may draw on the private lives 
of celebrities and other public figures to stimulate debate on contemporary issues) is, 
arguably, also a form of political speech. As well as the argument from democracy, 
speech genuinely contributing to such debate would also appear to engage the arguments 
from self-fulfilment and autonomy; furthering the audience’s ability to form opinions, 
make lifestyle choices and have these validated.77 Such justifications defend a wide range 
of speech, potentially including ‘revelations relating to matters as diverse as eating 
disorders, abortion, attitudes to sexuality, education and the like; it will often concern not 
politicians, but celebrities, their relatives and those who for a short time and for a 
particular reason only are thrust into the public gaze’.78 As Phillipson persuasively argues, 
however, it is difficult to justify an approach which allows the non-consensual disclosure 
of private information to promote debate: 
 
It posits an extraordinarily weak utilitarian argument against a powerful principle – that privacy-
invading disclosures are a gross violation of individual autonomy. Such media stories amount in 
effect to forcing a person to provide highly personal information for the purposes of fuelling public 
debate; they thus amount to one of the clearest breaches one could imagine of the Kantian 
imperative to treat persons as ends in themselves. It is a little like a group of friends who want to 
discuss the topic of monogamy, and decide to read an absent friend’s letter to his wife, confessing 
                                                 
76 F Schauer, ‘Can Public Figures have Private Lives?’ (2000) 17(2) Social Philosophy and Policy 293, 308-
309. 
77 See above at p 14 for discussion of Raz’s ‘personal identification’ argument.  
78 Fenwick and Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (n 11) 694. 
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infidelity, in order to lend the discussion some focus and bite. It treats the person as a mere 
means – something to stimulate discussion.
79
  
 
Therefore, while ‘infotainment’ should be recognised as potentially having some speech 
value, it may often have to give way to a competing privacy claim. Given that many 
individuals might be found who are willing to share their stories and images, thus 
satisfying the need to stimulate public debate, invasions of privacy of this kind may often 
be unnecessary; the public interest could be served by an alternative route. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has suggested a basic theoretical model for the legal protection of private 
information, based on the theoretical justifications for privacy and free speech. Both 
rights are supportive of important philosophical goals, particularly personal autonomy 
and self-fulfilment, so, at the theoretical level, there would appear to be no reason to 
afford either right automatic priority over the other. The model outlined in the ‘utility’ 
section does not purport to resolve the vast array of factual situations that can potentially 
arise in privacy litigation. Instead, it considers the important general principles that might 
be used to determine both the types of information attracting legal protection and the 
balance between competing privacy and speech claims.  
 
As argued, the protection of informational and substantive autonomy calls for privacy 
protection being extended to innocuous information acquired in a public place, as well as 
more obviously private categories of information. In seeking to resolve the clash between 
privacy and free speech at the theoretical level, the argument from democracy would 
generally lend itself towards the protection of directly political speech (that relating to 
those in public office) and some indirectly political speech (‘infotainment’). However, in 
line with Phillipson’s view, the interest in stimulating debate on contemporary issues 
would, in general, not be strong enough to outweigh a competing privacy claim. 
 
As the following chapters will demonstrate, the ECtHR in the seminal decision of Von 
Hannover v Germany80 provided the level of privacy protection argued for in this chapter. 
                                                 
79 G Phillipson, ‘Memorandum to the Leveson Inquiry’ (28 March 2012) 
<http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Submission-by-Professor-Gavin-
Phillipson-Durham-Law-School.pdf> accessed 10 August 2012, [15]. 
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The thesis will therefore come to a conclusion as to whether the protection currently 
achieved in domestic law for private information does now reach the level of protection 
offered at Strasbourg in the light of the very recent decisions there. But, bearing in mind 
the influence of the margin of appreciation doctrine at Strasbourg,81 the thesis will go on 
to ask whether the domestic level of protection aligns to an acceptable extent with the 
level of protection that the justifications underpinning the concept of informational 
autonomy (as set out above) would demand. The thesis will also seek to determine 
whether the current protection for expression at both the Strasbourg and domestic level 
is in line with the theoretical model, or whether trivial expression with no real public 
interest value, receives a level of protection it does not deserve. Finally, if disparity 
between the Strasbourg and domestic levels of privacy protection is found, the thesis will 
question why the instruments of the HRA (particularly sections 2 and 6) have not been 
utilised by English courts to afford greater protection to informational autonomy, based 
on current understandings of their operation. Given that the central aim of the thesis is 
to intensively discuss speech/privacy balancing, remedies for misuse of private 
information in UK domestic law will not be considered.82 
 
Route-Map 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the subject of the thesis from a theoretical perspective, setting out a 
basic model for the legal protection of private information against which the level of 
protection achieved by English domestic courts, and the ECtHR, can be compared and 
critiqued. Chapter 2 considers the impact of the HRA on common law breach of 
confidence through the development of indirect horizontal effect. Chapter 3 discusses 
the tests used to determine the types of information attracting legal protection both at 
Strasbourg and in English domestic courts, with particular emphasis upon whether 
innocuous information obtained in public locations is afforded the level of protection 
required by the theoretical model. Chapter 4 examines the balancing exercise carried out 
by the Strasbourg and domestic courts, considering whether, in line with the theoretical 
                                                                                                                                            
80 [2004] EMLR 21. 
81 See discussion at p 67. 
82 See H Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 981. The most 
recent debates on the effectiveness of privacy remedies, in this context, are discussed in G Phillipson, ‘Max 
Mosley Goes to Strasbourg: Article 8, Claimant Notification and Interim Injunctions’ (2009) 1(1) JML 73; 
A Scott, ‘Prior Notification in Privacy Cases: A Reply to Professor Phillipson’ (2010) 2(1) JML 49; K 
Hughes, ‘Privacy Injunctions: No Obligation to Notify Pre-Publication’ (2011) 3(2) JML 179; K Hughes, 
‘Parliament Reports on the Law of Privacy and Injunctions’ (2012) 4(1) JML 17. 
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model, informational autonomy is adequately protected by the restriction of speech that 
is unsupported by the values discussed in chapter 1. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by 
evaluating the balance currently struck between privacy and free speech by the ECtHR 
and English domestic courts, and considering the future development of privacy law. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIRECT HORIZONTAL EFFECT 
IN THE CONTEXT OF PRIVACY LAW UNDER THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT 
 
Introduction 
 
Prior to enactment of the HRA, the potential remedies available to an individual for non-
consensual disclosure of personal information were limited. As Lord Justice Glidewell 
stated in Kaye v Robertson;1 ‘[i]t is well-known that in English law there is no right to 
privacy, and accordingly there is no right of action for breach of a person’s privacy’.2 
Thus, when the actor Gorden Kaye was interviewed and photographed by a journalist 
while in hospital recovering from surgery, only a limited injunction was granted under 
the doctrine of malicious falsehood, despite Lord Justice Bingham finding that there had 
been a ‘monstrous invasion of [Kaye’s] privacy’.3 The laws of trespass and nuisance may 
have provided some redress for physical intrusions by information-seeking journalists,4 
but clearly failed to provide any protection for the revelation of private facts when the 
information was obtained by other means. Pre-HRA, breach of confidence was often the 
most useful remedy for protecting informational autonomy but, as this chapter will 
argue; effective protection was only achieved in certain confined circumstances.5 The 
second part of this chapter will suggest that, as a result of the indirect horizontal effect of 
the HRA, informational privacy is protected to a far greater extent than in the pre-HRA 
era; the tort of misuse of private information now grants remedies for the unauthorised 
publication of private information on the basis of the private nature of the information 
itself. The chapter will go on to argue that, whilst English judges have failed to endorse 
any of the horizontal effect models suggested in the academic literature, the most 
                                                 
1 [1991] FSR 62. 
2 ibid 66.  
3 ibid 70. It is possible, however, that breach of confidence might have provided more complete protection 
for Kaye’s privacy in the light of pre-HRA developments to the doctrine (see below), had the argument 
been raised. See R Scott, ‘Confidentiality’ in J Beatson and Y Cripps (eds), Freedom of Expression and Freedom 
of Information (OUP 2000) 270; H Fenwick and G Phillipson, ‘Confidence and Privacy: A Re-Examination’ 
(1996) 55(3) CLJ 447, 454. 
4 Following enactment of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 it has also become possible to obtain 
injunctions and claim damages for anxiety and financial loss resulting from harassment.  
5 See Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Limited below at p 22. 
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persuasive interpretation of the courts duty under section 6, the ‘constitutional 
constraint’ model,6 theoretically empowers the judiciary, in the context of informational 
privacy, to develop the common law, incrementally, to meet the current demands of 
Articles 8 and 10 ECHR. 
 
Breach of Confidence in the Pre-HRA Era 
 
Traditionally, breach of confidence was comprised of three elements. ‘First, the 
information itself…must have the necessary quality of confidence about it. Secondly, that 
information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of 
confidence. Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of that information to the 
detriment of the party communicating it’.7 The action for breach of confidence could fail 
if publication was deemed to be in the public interest. The first element of the test 
(information with the necessary quality of confidence) could be satisfied if the 
information was more than ‘trivial tittle-tattle’,8 and was not already in the public 
domain.9 As mentioned in Coco; ‘[s]omething which is public property and public 
knowledge cannot per se provide any foundation for proceedings for breach of 
confidence’.10 The third limb (unauthorised use of the information) would invariably be 
made out in the paradigm case of press publication of private facts; consent would not 
have been given and detriment would be established by the non-consensual disclosure of 
the information.11  
 
The main barrier to the utilisation of the action for breach of confidence to create 
comprehensive privacy protection was the second limb; the need for information to be 
imparted in circumstances imposing an obligation of confidence. This requirement could 
                                                 
6
 G Phillipson and A Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 74(6) MLR 
878. 
7 Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Limited [1969] RPC 41, 47-48. Affirmed by the House of Lords in A-G v 
Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109. 
8 ibid 48 (Megarry J). 
9 In Woodward v Hutchins, activities carried out by a group of musicians on a jumbo jet was not confidential 
because it was found to be in the public domain; [1977] 1 WLR 760. However, in the later case of Stephens v 
Avery Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C held that ‘information only ceases to be capable of protection as 
confidential when it is in fact known to a substantial number of people’; [1988] Ch 448, 454. 
10 [1969] RPC 41, 47 (Megarry J). 
11 A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 265 (Lord Keith). The case of X v Y suggests that 
detriment is not required at all; [1988] 2 All ER 659, 651. 
  23 
be satisfied by the existence of a confidential relationship12 or an agreement of 
confidentiality (express or implied), between confider and confidant.13 Therefore, while a 
limited range of private information could gain protection from the doctrine of 
confidence, no redress could be awarded in the case of a journalist acquiring the 
information without having any kind of communication or relationship with the 
claimant.14 As Wacks puts it; ‘[t]he action is inappropriate because it is, quite simply, 
based on a different theory. Its main purpose is to protect the business interests of the 
plaintiff rather than his interests in preserving privacy’.15 Clearly, traditional breach of 
confidence was ill-equipped to respond to the theoretical justifications for privacy 
protection set out in chapter 1, leaving, as Kaye illustrated, a considerable gap in English 
law. 
 
Prior to the HRA, the common law doctrine of breach of confidence had undergone 
significant development, extending the types of confidential information covered and 
shedding the requirement of circumstances imposing an obligation of confidence.16 As to 
the first development, though breach of confidence was initially used mainly for the 
protection of trade secrets,17 the ‘necessary quality of confidence’ limb was found to 
cover private information disclosed during the course of a marriage in Argyll v Argyll.18 
Then later, in Stephens v Avery,19 the sexual orientation of the claimant, and details of a 
homosexual relationship, were found to constitute confidential information, a step 
further than providing protection for the institution of marriage.20 The fact of having a 
particular medical condition was covered in X v Y,21 and details of Lady Archer’s 
                                                 
12 Such relationships include those arising between doctors and patients (W v Edgell [1990] Ch 59) and 
spouses (Argyll v Argyll [1965] 1 All ER 611). 
13 As might arise in commercial dealings, for example. 
14 This was recognised by the Law Commission; Breach of Confidence (Law Com No 110, 1981).  
15 R Wacks, The Protection of Privacy (Sweet & Maxwell 1980) 16. 
16 H Fenwick and G Phillipson, ‘Confidence and Privacy: A Re-Examination’ (1996) 55(3) CLJ 447; H 
Fenwick and G Phillipson, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ 
(2000) 63(5) MLR 660; G Phillipson, ‘Privacy: The Development of Breach of Confidence – The Clearest 
Case of Horizontal Effect?’ in D Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (CUP 
2011).  
17 For example, the invention of a tool used in manufacturing; Ackroyds (London) Ltd v Islington Plastics Ltd 
[1962] RPC 97. See W Wilson, ‘Privacy, Confidence and Press Freedom: A Study in Judicial Activism’ 
(1990) 53(1) MLR 43, 44. 
18 [1965] 1 All ER 611. For further discussion of this limb of the action see R Wacks, Personal Information: 
Privacy and the Law (Clarendon Press 1989); H Fenwick and G Phillipson, ‘Confidence and Privacy: A Re-
Examination’ (1996) 55(3) CLJ 447. 
19 [1988] 1 Ch 449. 
20 Confirmed in Barrymore v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] FSR 600. 
21 [1990] 1 QB 220. 
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cosmetic surgery, disclosed by an employee, were protected in Archer v Williams.22 The 
extension of the first limb of confidence meant that, pre-HRA, it could potentially be 
applied to a wide range of scenarios in which privacy was invaded. 
 
Reform of the second requirement of breach of confidence probably began with Stephens 
v Avery.23 As mentioned, information relating to the claimant’s sexual orientation was 
revealed by her close friend. It was held that although an ‘express statement that the 
information is confidential is the clearest possible example of the imposition of a duty of 
confidence’, a duty was nevertheless imposed because it would be ‘unconscionable’ for a 
confidant to impart information received ‘on the basis that it is confidential’.24 The 
relationship between the parties was not the determining factor’.25  
 
In Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers26 an action for breach of confidence succeeded 
when the defendant acquired private information by tapping the home telephone of 
sportsman John Francome. Clearly, no confidential relationship was in existence and 
there was no communication between the parties: the information was simply taken 
without the knowledge of the claimant. A breach of confidence was found when 
photographs were taken on the film set of Frankenstein, in the absence of communication 
between the film-maker and photographer.27 On similar facts, an injunction was granted 
when photographs of a new Oasis album cover were obtained on set.28 In both cases the 
test applied was whether a reasonable man in the position of the defendant would have 
assumed an obligation of confidentiality. These cases demonstrate that, even in the pre-
HRA era, an action for breach of confidence no longer required a pre-existing 
relationship, an express promise of confidentiality or communication between the 
parties.29 Thus it is possible to discern a move towards protecting privacy, as opposed to 
confidence, values; greater emphasis was placed on the private nature of the information 
itself as the significance of the relationships concerned fell away. 
  
                                                 
22 [2003] EMLR 38. 
23 [1988] 1 Ch 449. 
24 ibid 482. 
25 ibid. 
26 [1984] 1 WLR 892. 
27 Shelley Films v Rex Features Limited [1994] EMLR 134. 
28 Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] EMLR 444. 
29 H Fenwick and G Phillipson, ‘Confidence and Privacy: A Re-Examination’ (1996) 55(3) CLJ 447, 452. 
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The communication element had not been completely dispensed with, however. In both 
Shelley Films and Creation Records the presence of signs expressly forbidding photography 
made it possible to find that the reasonable man was aware of the obligation of 
confidentiality. Such a requirement, in addition to the private nature of the information,  
would clearly restrict the reach of confidence as a privacy remedy because individuals ‘do 
not carry warning signs upon their person, expressly putting journalists on notice that 
they consider what they are doing as confidential’.30 Nevertheless, breach of confidence 
had reached a point at which one judge felt able to make the following (obiter) comments:  
 
If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance, and with no authority, a picture of 
another engaged in some private act, his subsequent disclosure of the photograph would in my 
judgment as surely amount to a breach of confidence as if he had found or stolen a letter or diary 
in which the act was recounted, and proceeded to publish it. In such a case the law would protect 
what might reasonably be called a right of privacy, though the name accorded to the cause of 
action would be breach of confidence.
31
 
 
The next phase in the development of breach of confidence would follow the enactment 
of the HRA.32 In 1998 the European Commission on Human Rights (now abolished) 
found a claim lodged by Earl and Lady Spencer to be inadmissible.33 The News of the 
World had published photographs of Lady Spencer, taken with a long-lens camera, 
walking in the grounds of a private clinic. The accompanying article revealed that Lady 
Spencer was receiving treatment for alcoholism and bulimia. The newspaper apologised 
after an adverse finding by the Press Complaints Commission but, with no ability to 
                                                 
30 H Fenwick and G Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP 2006) 730. 
31 Hellewell v The Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804, 807 (Laws J). 
32 In 1998 Parliament also passed the Data Protection Act; a statute designed to regulate the processing of 
personal data. In addition to breach of confidence, the Act has some potential to protect informational 
privacy (as recognised by the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457). Private 
information/data is broadly defined in the Act to include information and photographs of a particular 
individual (section 1(1), interpreted in the case of Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 
1746). Moreover, data ‘processing’, including media dissemination, must be in accordance with the Data 
Protection Principles (Schedules 1-3). For example, processing must be fair and legal, and consent is 
required in a range of situations. In addition, post-2000, the DPA would have to be interpreted compatibly, 
so far as possible, with Articles 8 and 10 ECHR, by virtue of section 3 HRA. However, the potential for 
the DPA to provide effective protection of informational privacy is undermined by the exemptions 
provided for in Act. Data controllers are exempt from the Data Protection Principles if the processing was 
undertaken with a view to the publication for any journalistic purposes and the date controller reasonably 
believed publication would be in the public interest (section 32). Furthermore, while compensation is 
available for wrongful processing of personal data; injunctions are not. Thus, the DPA has not proven to 
be a popular route taken by celebrities claiming invasion of privacy and hence its limited significance for 
the purposes of this thesis.  
33 Earl Spencer v United Kingdom 25 EHRR CD 105 (1998). 
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obtain an injunction or damages,34 the Spencers petitioned the Strasbourg Court, 
claiming a breach of their Article 8 right to privacy. Their application was refused by the 
Commission because the domestic remedy of breach of confidence had not been 
exhausted; the Spencers had not shown that it was ‘insufficient or ineffective in the 
circumstances of their case’.35 The Commission concluded that ‘the matter should be put 
to the domestic courts for consideration in order to allow those courts, through the 
common law system in the United Kingdom, the opportunity to develop existing rights 
by way of interpretation’.36 This decision of the Commission represented an early (if 
implicit) indication that the facts of Spencer would require an effective legal remedy for 
breach of Article 8 at Strasbourg,37 but also found that breach of confidence could 
provide that remedy and should continue to be developed in the future. Speaking extra-
judicially in 1996, Lord Bingham appeared to concur with this view:  
 
To a very large extent the law already does protected personal privacy; but to the extent that it 
does not, it should…My preference would be for legislation, which would mean that the rules 
which the courts applied would carry the imprimatur of democratic approval. But if, for whatever 
reason, legislation is not forthcoming, I think it almost inevitable that cases will arise in the courts 
in which the need to give relief is obvious and pressing; and when such cases do arise, I do not 
think the courts will be found wanting.
38
 
 
When the HRA came into force in October 2000 it became clear that it would have a 
considerable impact on the development of privacy law in the UK. The question of what 
exactly that effect would be sparked a significant (and continuing) academic debate. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 The Press Complaints Commission, established in 1991, is a regulatory body consisting of newspaper 
editors and public members. Claimed breaches of the Privacy Code (available at  
<http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/practice.htmlare>) are adjudicated by the PCC. Operating alongside the 
developing tort of misuse of private information, the PCC offers a fast and inexpensive method to have 
privacy violations recognised. However, the lack of power to award damages or grant injunctions has led to 
the system becoming marginalised in recent years. See H Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4th edn, 
Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 846. 
35 25 EHRR CD 105 (1998) 117-118. 
36 ibid. 
37 R Singh, ‘Privacy and the Media after the Human Rights Act’ (1998) 6 EHRLR 712, 720; H Fenwick and 
G Phillipson, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ (2000) 63(5) MLR 
660, 666.  
38 T Bingham, ‘Should there be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal Privacy?’ [1996] EHRLR 450, 461-462. 
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The Academic Debate on Horizontal Effect 
 
The introductory text to the HRA states that its aim is to give ‘further effect to rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the [ECHR]’, which, significantly for this thesis, includes the 
right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), and the right to freedom of 
expression (Article 10). What exactly ‘further effect’ entails would be determined by the 
provisions of the HRA. Judicial interpretation of sections 2, 3 and 6 would clearly be 
significant in terms of the domestic application of the Convention.39 Section 6(1) makes 
it ‘unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right’. Were it not for sub-section 6(3) it would appear, therefore, that the 
HRA is limited to creating vertical effect between state actors and individuals. In such 
circumstances private bodies including newspapers and magazines—those often 
responsible for privacy invasions—would not be bound by section 6 and could not be 
liable for breach of Convention rights. However, the inclusion of courts within the 
definition of public authorities,40 even when deciding cases between two private parties, 
clearly had the potential to create some form of horizontal effect because the courts 
would have to develop the common law in light of section 6.41 This potential was 
expressly recognised during the passing of the Human Rights Bill in response to fears 
that it would result in the development of privacy law. Lord Wakeham, then Chairman of 
the PCC, attempted to introduce amendments to the HRA so that courts would not fall 
within the definition of public authorities if neither party to the proceedings was a public 
authority itself. In response, Lord Irvine made the following comments: 
 
[I]t is right as a matter of principle for the courts to have the duty of acting compatibly with the 
Convention not only in cases involving other public authorities but also in developing the 
common law in deciding cases between individuals. Why should they not? In preparing this Bill, 
we have taken the view that it is the other course, that of excluding the Convention altogether 
from cases between individuals which would have to be justifiable.
42
 
 
                                                 
39 Dealing with the interpretation of Convention jurisprudence, interpretation of domestic legislation, and 
the acts of public authorities respectively. 
40 Section 6(3) HRA. 
41 For an opposing view see R Buxton, ‘The Human Rights Act and Private Law’ (2000) 116 LQR 48. 
Buxton LJ argued that no private law rights would be created by the HRA based, in part, on the argument 
that the ECHR does not create rights between private citizens capable of enforcement in domestic law. 
Subsequent cases under the HRA show that this view has now been refuted by the judiciary (see below at p 
33) so it will not be considered further.  
42 HL Deb 24 November 1997, vol 583 col 783. 
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The ‘matter of principle’ Lord Irvine spoke of presumably concerns the general debate 
over whether human rights should only apply vertically or whether, on principle, it is not 
appropriate to draw a distinction between state power and private power. In the context 
of privacy invasions by private media bodies there would seem to be strong justifications 
favouring the interpretation of the HRA envisaged by Lord Irvine. As Phillipson notes: 
 
The main argument for allowing a degree of horizontal effect is the recognition that powerful 
private bodies are sometimes in a position to inflict upon those basic human interests which 
rights seek to protect harms equivalent to those which the state could perpetrate. This may be 
taken further: in some cases private bodies may be able to inflict a greater harm …Newspapers 
actually have more power than Governments to disseminate abroad private information and near-
equal powers to obtain it surreptitiously in the first place. They also have greater motivation to 
carry out such dissemination.
43
 
 
In light of Lord Irvine’s comments, and the fact that the proposed amendments did not 
become part of the enacted HRA, some form of horizontal effect was clearly intended by 
the government and Parliament.44 This view is consistent with section 3(1) HRA, which 
imposes a duty on the courts to interpret legislation so that it is compatible, so far as it is 
possible, with the Convention.45 The duty applies regardless of whether such 
interpretation impacts upon private parties, giving rise to ‘statutory horizontality’.46 Given 
that the HRA is, other than section 6, silent regarding its effect on private law and the 
common law generally, the form that such horizontal effect should take became a matter 
of fierce academic debate soon after the inception of the HRA. 
 
Before determining the duty imposed by the HRA in a case concerning two private 
parties, the courts must examine whether the Convention requires positive state action in 
the particular context.47 This is as a result of section 2 HRA, which requires that relevant 
Strasbourg jurisprudence be taken into account ‘in determining any question…in 
connection with a Convention right’, including the potential horizontal effect of the 
                                                 
43 G Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and the Common Law: A Bang or a 
Whimper?’ (1999) 62(6) MLR 824, 847. Markesinis concurs; ‘[o]f all the (private) oppressors, the press 
stands out most for criticism and as a source of concern’; B S Markesinis, ‘Privacy, Freedom of Expression, 
and the Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Bill: Lessons from Germany’ (1999) 115 LQR 47, 78.  
44 B S Markesinis, ‘Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Bill: 
Lessons from Germany’ (1999) 115 LQR 47, 72-73. 
45 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30. 
46 A L Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal Effect’ in D Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on 
Private Law (CUP 2011) 21. 
47 G Phillipson ‘Clarity Postponed: Horizontal Effect after Campbell’ in H Fenwick, G Phillipson and R 
Masterman (eds), Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2007) 149. 
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Convention.48 Once it is found that a positive obligation is placed on the State, the 
interpretation of the HRA governs the way in which that obligation is discharged 
domestically. The first stage of the analysis (interpretation of the Convention) in the 
privacy context will be discussed in the following chapter. In this chapter the focus will 
be on the second level; how the Convention should be given effect in domestic law via 
section 6. 
 
Wade predicted that section 6 HRA would result in full indirect horizontal effect.49 By 
making it unlawful for the courts (as public authorities) to act incompatibly with the 
Convention, the HRA imposes a duty upon them to protect Convention rights regardless 
of whether the parties to a case are public or private. In Wade’s view the spirit of the 
HRA reflects ‘a new culture of human rights…in the Western world’, and therefore ‘the 
citizen can legitimately expect that his human rights will be respected by his neighbour as 
well as by his government’.50 The practical effect of this interpretation would be that the 
courts, through their development of the common law, would have to create new causes 
of action if parties argued that their Conventions rights had been violated.51 In addition, 
there would be no need to enquire as to whether either party was a public authority 
because it would make no difference to the outcome of the case.52 A similar argument in 
favour of full indirect horizontal effect is made by Beyleveld and Pattinson.53 Given that, 
at stage one, conceptually, the Convention rights apply horizontally as well as vertically, 
the courts must ‘in all cases before them give horizontal effect to the Convention rights’ 
as a result of section 6 HRA.54 According to these commentators the absence of an 
existing cause of action does not prevent the Convention rights being directly actionable; 
the HRA itself creates a cause of action in horizontal situations,55 as it does under Wade’s 
model. Other proponents of this model suggest that the creation of a new cause of 
action would not be an instance of the courts taking on an illegitimate legislative role, but 
that they would be simply exercising their traditional power to develop the common law 
                                                 
48 In X v Y the Court of Appeal found that s 2(1) HRA required it to examine relevant Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in deciding the horizontal effect point; [2004] ICR 1634. 
49 H W R Wade, ‘Horizons of Horizontality’ (2000) 116 LQR 217. Although there is a technical distinction 
between full indirect horizontal effect (a duty on the court to developing existing law to give effect to the 
Convention) and direct horizontal effect (a statutory cause of action), both concepts, in practice, result in 
new Convention based causes of action. See S Gardbaum, ‘Where the (State) Action is’ (2006) IJCL 760. 
50 ibid 224. 
51 ibid 221-222. 
52 ibid 223-224. 
53 D Beyleveld and S D Pattinson, ‘Horizontal Applicability and Horizontal Effect’ (2002) 118 LQR 623. 
54 ibid 634. 
55 ibid 642-643.  
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only, under the HRA, they would have Parliament’s seal of approval.56 This argument, of 
course, depends on acceptance of the view that Parliament intended to create full indirect 
horizontal effect, a view which, as will be seen, is strongly contested by advocates of 
weaker versions of indirect horizontal effect. 
 
One of the central criticisms levelled at the full/direct horizontal effect models is that the 
HRA makes clear that only public authorities are to be liable for acting incompatibly with 
a Convention right.57 If any party could be so liable, this wording of the HRA would be 
redundant. As Lester and Pannick note: 
 
It would frustrate this carefully designed statutory scheme to ignore the distinction between 
claims against public authorities under section 7(1)(a) for breach of the section 6 duty, and 
reliance on the Convention rights in any other legal proceedings against a public authority (under 
section 7(1)(b)). The only causes of action created by the Act are direct actions against public 
authorities for the new public law tort.
58
 
 
Furthermore, the HRA does not incorporate Article 1 ECHR, or an equivalent provision, 
stating that the Convention rights shall be secured to everyone within the jurisdiction.59  
Nor does the HRA incorporate Article 13 ECHR, granting the right to an effective 
remedy for violations of rights under the Convention. These features suggest that direct 
or full indirect horizontal effect are not options under the HRA. Those supporting 
indirect horizontal effect therefore argued that breaches of Convention rights are not 
directly actionable against private individuals, but, as public authorities themselves, the 
courts must not act incompatibly with the Convention when a cases involving private 
parties, based on an existing cause of action, arises. The Convention may, in this way, 
‘govern or at least influence the interpretation and application of existing law’.60 
 
The ‘strong’ version of indirect horizontal effect, advocated by Hunt, means that: 
                                                 
56 T D C Bennett, ‘Horizontality’s New Horizons - Re-Examining Horizontal Effect: Privacy, Defamation 
and the Human Rights Act: Part 2’ (2010) 21(4) Entertainment Law Review 145, 148.  
57 This suggests that there are ‘persons who are not bound to act compatibly with the Convention’; M 
Hunt, ‘The “Horizontal Effect” of the Human Rights Act’ [1998] PL 423, 438. In addition, statements 
made during the passing of the Human Rights Bill do not appear to envisage direct horizontal effect. See 
Lord Irvine’s comments; ‘[w]e have not provided for the Convention rights to be directly justiciable 
between private individuals. We have sought to protect the human rights of individuals against the abuse of 
power by the state, broadly defined, rather than to protect them against each other’.  
58 A Lester and D Pannick, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Private Law: The Knight’s Move 
(2000) 116 LQR 380, 382. 
59 Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and the Common Law’ (n 43) 835. 
60 Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed’ (n 47) 151. 
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[C]ourts will not merely have a power to ‘consider’ the Convention when interpreting the 
common law in private disputes, nor will they merely have an obligation to take into account 
Convention ‘values’. Rather they will be under an unequivocal duty to act compatibly with 
Convention rights. In some cases, this will undoubtedly require them actively to modify of 
develop the common law in order to achieve such compatibility.
61
 
 
Though this model does not authorise judges to create new causes of action, once an 
existing cause of action is established they are obliged to act compatibly with the 
Convention. To ensure compatibility, courts would have to apply the Convention right(s) 
in question, only allowing interference with a Convention right to be justified by the 
express exceptions to it.62 A weaker version of indirect horizontal effect would require 
the courts to take account of the values or principles underpinning Convention rights.63 
Convention values would provide ‘a reason for deciding a case in a particular way’ but 
could be ‘overridden by any other interest that the court finds compelling in a particular 
case’.64 A weaker model would therefore enable the judiciary to retain the flexibility it has 
traditionally had in common law adjudication; the interest in protecting the Convention 
right(s) at stake could be outweighed by consideration of any other factor.  
 
Another possible model for horizontal effect is the ‘constitutional constraint’ model, 
suggested by Phillipson and Williams.65 Under this model, the courts are obliged to 
develop the common law compatibly with the Convention, provided this can be achieved 
by incremental development.66 Thus, respect for the foundational constitutional 
principles of parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law and the separation of powers 
restrain the judiciary from carrying out legislative-style law reform, even when this 
appears to be what is required by the Convention.67 In terms of the strength of the 
judicial obligation, the constitutional constraint model sits between strong indirect 
horizontal effect and weak indirect horizontal effect. This is because: 
 
[T]he Convention principles always function as…‘fundamental mandatory principles’; that is, 
principles which the court must consider and which presumptively prevail unless displaced by 
                                                 
61 M Hunt, ‘The “Horizontal Effect” of the Human Rights Act’ [1998] PL 423, 441. 
62 Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and the Common Law’ (n 43) 832-833. 
63 ibid 832-830. 
64 Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed: Horizontal Effect after Campbell’ (n 47) 154. 
65 Phillipson and Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (n 6). 
66 ibid 879. 
67 ibid 880. 
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countervailing factors – in this case, the constitutional constraint. [The constraint] model thus 
requires courts to develop the common law, subject only to incrementalism.
68
 
 
When considered in light of the HRA’s overall sovereignty preserving mechanisms, there 
would seem to be merit in the inference that there are some limits on the judicial 
development of the common law.69 As the only model to take into consideration the 
courts’ duty to develop the common law incrementally, and in accordance with 
fundamental constitutional principles, the constitutional constraint model offers a 
persuasive new interpretation of the section 6 obligation.  
 
As the following chapters will argue, until very recently, the level of privacy protection 
provided at Strasbourg, in terms of both the scope of Article 8 and the balance struck 
between privacy and free speech, aligned with the level of protection demanded by the 
justifications underpinning informational autonomy, set out in chapter 1.70 Given that, 
pre-HRA, breach of confidence failed to provide full protection for informational 
autonomy (discussed in the first part of this chapter), in theory, it would appear that 
direct, full indirect, or strong indirect horizontal effect would result in the development 
of a strong privacy remedy. In contrast, weak indirect horizontal effect would not 
necessarily result in as strong a protection. If the Convention rights count only as values 
or principles, the courts are given less guidance for how to resolve cases, and could take 
account of a wider range of factors than the Strasbourg Court, in striking the balance 
between privacy and free speech. For example, the historic importance attached to free 
speech in the common law (compared with that attached to informational privacy) could 
lead to inadequate protection of privacy. However, under a weak model, it would also be 
open to domestic courts to recognise the importance of informational autonomy, and 
protect it accordingly. Deviation from the Strasbourg standard would be less likely under 
the constitutional constraint model because Convention principles could only be 
discounted by the constraint of incrementalism. Therefore, given that the courts had 
already developed breach of confidence to some extent in the pre-HRA era, and could 
continue to develop it without necessarily resorting to legislative-style law reform,71 
                                                 
68
 ibid 888. 
69 ibid 892. For example, the judiciary are not empowered, under the HRA, to strike down incompatible 
primary legislation and must continue to apply it following a declaration of incompatibility (sections 3(2) 
and 4(6)). 
70 See chapters 3 and 4. 
71 Legislative style law reform in this context was ruled out in 2004 when the House of Lords declined to 
develop a comprehensive, ‘blockbuster’, privacy tort; Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406. However, 
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judicial interpretation of section 6 HRA under the constitutional constraint model could 
meet the demands of Articles 8 and 10, thus, in theory, providing a strong measure of 
privacy protection.  
 
The following analysis of the privacy cases will argue that although indirect horizontal 
effect has had a significant impact on the development of privacy law, providing much 
greater protection of informational autonomy than in the pre-HRA era, the judiciary 
have not clearly endorsed any of the horizontal effect models discussed.  
 
The Contribution of the Privacy Cases to the Resolution of the Horizontal Effect 
Debate 
 
The Pre-Campbell Cases 
The first significant privacy case to be heard following enactment of the HRA, and the 
Commission admissibility decision in Spencer,72 was the Court of Appeal decision in 
Douglas v Hello!73 The case concerned Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones’ attempt 
to restrict publication of their wedding photographs. The couple had made clear to their 
guests that photography was prohibited and security checks were carried out at the event 
to safeguard the exclusivity of the deal they had made with OK! magazine. No extension 
of the current action for breach of confidence would have been needed to grant the 
Douglases relief. Creation Records, for example, made clear that, even pre-HRA, a duty of 
confidence could be implied if it was sufficiently clear that the information concerned 
was confidential.74 The security arrangements and warning signs in Douglas put the 
photographer on notice that the information was to be treated as confidential. However, 
the Court did consider the issue of horizontal effect. Lord Justice Brooke and Lord 
Justice Keene appeared to favour a weak indirect approach; as a result of section 6 HRA 
the courts would be obliged to ‘take account’ of Article 8 when interpreting the common 
law.75 Lord Justice Sedley took a stronger stance: 
                                                                                                                                            
as the discussion of Campbell in this chapter indicates, significant modifications could be made to breach of 
confidence without violating the principle of incrementalism. See below at p 37. 
72 See above at p 25. 
73 [2001] QB 967. 
74 See above at p 24. 
75 [2001] QB 967, [167] (Keene LJ), [91] (Brooke LJ). 
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[B]y virtue of section 2 and section 6 of the Act, the courts of this country must not only take 
into account jurisprudence of both the Commission and the [ECtHR]…they must themselves act 
compatibly with that and the other Convention rights. This…arguably gives the final impetus to 
the recognition of a right of privacy in English law.
76
 
Lord Justice Sedley also found that section 12(4) HRA, requiring the courts to have 
‘particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression’ 
when considering whether to grant relief, ‘puts beyond doubt the direct applicability of at 
least one Article of the Convention as between one private party to litigation and 
another—in the jargon, its horizontal effect’.77 Given the qualified nature of Article 10 it 
would not be possible to have particular regard to Article 10 ‘without having equally 
particular regard at the very least to Article 8’.78 The Court of Appeal therefore 
recognised that the HRA would have some horizontal effect but the nature of the courts’ 
duty under section 6 was left unclear. 
In Venables79 an injunction was granted against the world to prevent the publication of 
information that could lead to the identification of those convicted of the murder of 
James Bulger upon their release. The injunction would apply however the information 
was acquired: it would not be necessary to point to the breach of a relationship of 
confidence or circumstances in which the reasonable man would have assumed an 
obligation of confidentiality (the second limb of traditional breach of confidence). The 
nature of the information itself was enough to import an obligation of confidentiality. 
Significantly, there was a real risk that the Article 2 and 3 rights of the claimants would 
be violated if the injunction was not granted. Although Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss 
recognised that breach of confidence was being extended in this case,80 it was clear that 
this was an exceptional case in which it was unnecessary for her to assess the weight of 
the Article 8 claim alone. The court had not yet protected information based on privacy 
values alone, without the probable grave consequences present in Venables. Moreover, 
the discussion of section 6 in the case failed to resolve the horizontal effect debate. The 
suggestion that the courts must ‘act compatibly with Convention rights in adjudicating 
upon existing common law causes of action’,81 without explanation of what is meant by 
                                                 
76 ibid [111].  
77 ibid [133].  
78 ibid [133].  
79 Venables and Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] Fam 430.  
80 ibid 462. 
81 ibid 446. 
  35 
‘acting compatibly’, does not distinguish between strong and weak indirect horizontal 
effect. Nor does it rule out, or endorse, the constitutional constraint model of indirect 
horizontal effect.  
 
An injunction was granted in Theakston82 restricting publication of covertly taken 
photographs of Jamie Theakston in a London brothel. Although the information itself 
was not protected (on the basis that a transient relationship between a prostitute and 
client could not been confidential) the photographs were protected. Theakston had not 
given any kind of notice that the activities were confidential, and had no pre-existing 
relationship with the photographer; it was the nature of the information that persuaded 
the court to grant relief. The judge made no significant findings regarding horizontal 
effect.  
 
The issue of the ‘obligation of confidentiality’ was expressly considered by the Court of 
Appeal in A v B plc,83 a case concerning exposure of the extra-marital affairs of a 
premiership footballer. In setting out guidelines for lower courts on the granting of 
interim injunctions, Lord Woolf, giving the judgment of the court, stated that ‘[t]he need 
for the existence of a confidential relationship should not give rise to problems as to the 
law…A duty of confidence will arise whenever the party subject to the duty is in a 
situation where he either knows or ought to know that the other person can reasonably 
expect his privacy to be protected’.84 Had this principle been applied in practice, the 
effect would have been to transform breach of confidence into a remedy capable of 
protecting information based on its private nature. However, the continued emphasis on 
the relationships between the parties, a breach of confidence requirement, tempered any 
conclusions that might be drawn from the more radical statements made by the court. 
The injunction was set aside because the relationships concerned were not found to be 
protected by the doctrine of confidence. Therefore, Lord Woolf’s comments were 
technically obiter. In terms of horizontal effect, Lord Woolf suggested a form of indirect 
horizontal effect: 
 
[U]nder section 6 of the 1998 Act, the court, as a public authority is required not to act ‘in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right’. The court is able to achieve this by absorbing the 
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rights which Articles 8 and 10 protect into the long-established action for breach of confidence. 
This involves giving a new strength and breadth to the action so that it accommodates the 
requirements of those Articles.
85
 
 
Clearly, his Lordship took the view that an existing cause of action would be required for 
section 6 to operate in the private sphere, but defining the courts’ duty in such vague 
terms means that it is unclear whether Lord Woolf had weak or strong indirect 
horizontal effect in mind (or something akin to the constitutional constraint model). The 
potentially important obiter comments from A v B plc were not followed by the Court of 
Appeal in D v L,86 which, again, concerned intimate personal information but failed to 
consider the impact of Article 8. 
 
The pre-Campbell cases demonstrate that, in general, the lower courts viewed section 6 
HRA as requiring them to give some influence to the Convention in common law 
adjudication, but the precise obligation was not clear. Moreover, the courts had not fully 
dispensed with the second limb of breach of confidence; the need for circumstances 
importing a duty of confidentiality. As Fenwick and Phillipson note; ‘[t]he law stood in a 
state of uneasy ambivalence between its desire to protect privacy and the continuing pull 
of its roots in confidence…The maintenance in practice of confidentiality requirements 
meant that the courts’ attempts to fulfil their duty to mould the common law into a 
remedy in order to fulfil their duty of acting compatibly with the Article 8 were proving a 
failure’.87 The hesitancy may be partly attributed to the fact that during this transitional 
phase there was no clear imperative for Member States to provide a remedy for the 
disclosure of private information, as required by the first stage of the horizontal effect 
analysis.88 However, as mentioned, the Commission decision in Spencer implied that such 
a remedy may be required.89 In addition, the Strasbourg decision in Peck v United Kingdom90 
demonstrated that Article 8 could be violated by media dissemination of intrusive images, 
and that breach of confidence would probably not have provided Peck with a satisfactory 
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remedy.91 Peck concerned a local authority but it was fairly clear that liability would have 
been found if the recording had been made and released by a private company.92  
 
The Language and Values of Privacy in Campbell 
 
The Campbell case concerned the publication in the Mirror of details of supermodel 
Naomi Campbell’s treatment at Narcotics Anonymous for drug addiction, together with 
photographs, covertly taken, of her leaving the clinic and saying goodbye to the other 
patients. Campbell accepted that the newspaper was entitled to publish the fact of her 
addiction and treatment to correct her previous denials that she was a drug addict, her 
claim in breach of confidence was regarding the publication of the additional details. The 
details of Campbell’s treatment had probably been disclosed to the newspaper in breach 
of confidence by either a member of Campbell’s staff or a fellow attendee at NA. 
Liability for the publication of those facts would not therefore require an extension of 
the law. In terms of the photographs, however, there was clearly no pre-existing 
relationship between Campbell and the photographer (the pictures were taken covertly), 
no communication between them, and nothing to put the photographer on notice that 
the activities were of a confidential nature. The House of Lords, by a majority of three to 
two, nevertheless found that protection could be extended to the photographs; breach of 
confidence had ‘firmly shaken off the limiting constraint of the need for an initial 
confidential relationship’.93 The only circumstances creating liability in Campbell were that 
the photographs depicted obviously private information, the second element of breach 
of confidence was no longer required. Lord Hope made clear that ‘[i]f the information is 
obviously private, the situation will be one where the person to whom it relates can 
reasonably expect his privacy to be respected’.94 This comment also serves to highlight 
the discarding of the language of confidence in Campbell. Thus, Lord Nicholls found that: 
 
[T]the description of the information as ‘confidential’ is not altogether comfortable. Information 
about an individual’s private life would not, in ordinary usage, be called ‘confidential’. The more 
natural description today is that such information is private. The essence of the tort is better 
encapsulated now as misuse of private information.
95
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Lord Hoffmann went further, emphasising that the human right of privacy had become 
the underlying concern of the law in this area: 
 
Instead of the cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith applicable to confidential 
personal information and trade secrets alike, it focuses upon the protection of human autonomy 
and dignity—the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the 
right to the esteem and respect of other people.
96
 
 
What role did horizontal effect play in the ‘transformation’ of breach of confidence into 
a full privacy remedy in Campbell? Lord Hope, in the majority, did not take a clear stance 
on the issue of horizontal effect: 
The language has changed following the coming into operation of the [HRA] and the 
incorporation into domestic law of Article 8 and Article 10 of the Convention…The 
jurisprudence of the European Court offers important guidance as to how these competing rights 
ought to be approached and analysed. I doubt whether the result is that the centre of gravity, as 
my noble and learned friend Lord Hoffmann says, has shifted. It seems to me that the balancing 
exercise to which that guidance is directed is essentially the same exercise, although it is plainly 
now more carefully focussed and more penetrating.
97
  
Lord Hope seemed expressly to deny that the HRA would have any significant impact on 
the common law, yet, in Campbell, he extensively cited Convention jurisprudence to 
inform the new privacy/speech balancing exercise.98 This could indicate acceptance of 
either strong or weak indirect horizontal effect, or the constitutional constraint model. 
Lord Hope could have been acting on an assumed obligation to give effect to 
Convention principles but, alternatively, he may have been exercising choice over the 
principles to be applied. Moreover, his development of the law may have been within the 
constraint of incrementalism, as required by the constitutional constraint model. 
Baroness Hale’s statements were equally unclear; ‘[t]he 1998 Act does not create any new 
cause of action between private persons. But if there is a relevant cause of action 
applicable, the Court as a public authority must act compatibly with both parties’ 
Convention rights. In a case such as this, the relevant vehicle will usually be the action 
for breach of confidence’.99 Although Baroness Hale expressly rejected the Wade model, 
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by failing to explain what acting compatibly means, her comments cannot be taken to 
endorse either strong or weak indirect horizontal effect, or the constitutional constraint 
model. Lord Carswell did not make any independent findings on horizontal effect. 
Therefore, the discussion of horizontal effect by the majority judges cannot be taken to 
endorse any particular model of indirect horizontal effect. 
Lord Nicholls, in the minority, initially suggested a weak version of indirect horizontal 
effect, in which Article 8 and 10 values could be applicable in disputes between two 
private parties,100 while the tests he applied were in Convention terms; ‘[w]hen both 
[Article 8 and 10] are engaged a difficult question of proportionality may arise’.101 His 
stance could therefore be taken to indicate strong, weak, or constitutional constraint 
indirect horizontal effect. The other dissenting judge, Lord Hoffmann, expressly denied 
that the HRA would lead to horizontal effect102 and yet found that there was no ‘logical 
ground for saying that a person should have less protection against a private individual 
than he would have against the State for the publication of personal information for 
which there is no justification’.103 It is clear, however, that, as with the other judges, the 
Convention had some influence on his reasoning in the case but, again, this may be as a 
result of strong, weak, or constitutional constraint, indirect horizontal effect.104 
Overall, Campbell demonstrates no clear resolution of the horizontal effect debate. The 
Convention was used by all of the judges, in varying degrees of strength, to guide their 
development of breach of confidence, but, contrary to Baroness Hale and Lord 
Hoffmann’s comments,105 there was no consensus on the courts’ duty under section 6. It 
seems fairly clear that Wade’s model was not favoured by any of the judges (and was 
discounted by Baroness Hale) but the failure to clarify the matter further may indicate an 
early preference for flexibility in judicial decision-making and the development of the 
common law as under a weak model,106 or may suggest some restriction on the extent on 
the judicial power to modify the common law, as under the constitutional constraint 
model. The post-Campbell privacy cases, contrary to the views of a number of 
                                                 
100 ibid [17].  
101 ibid [20].  
102 ‘Although the Convention, as an international instrument, may impose upon the United Kingdom an 
obligation to take some steps (whether by statute or otherwise) to protect rights of privacy against invasion 
by private individuals, it does not follow that such an obligation would have any counterpart in domestic 
law’; ibid [49]. 
103 [2004] 2 AC 457, [50]. 
104 ibid [53].  
105 ibid [36] (Lord Hoffmann), [126] (Baroness Hale). 
106 Phillipson, ‘Clarity Postponed: Horizontal Effect after Campbell’ (n 47). 
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commentators, do not appear to have provided any further resolution of the horizontal 
effect debate.  
The Post-Campbell Privacy Cases 
In the 2005 Douglas v Hello!107 decision the Court of Appeal confirmed the transformation 
of breach of confidence into a privacy remedy for the unauthorised publication of private 
facts; ‘in so far as private information is concerned, we are required to adopt, as the 
vehicle for performing such duty as falls on the courts in relation to Convention rights, 
the cause of action formerly described as breach of confidence’.108 In terms of horizontal 
effect, Lord Phillips, on behalf of the Court of Appeal, commented that ‘[s]ome, such as 
the late Professor Sir William Wade…and Jonathan Morgan…contend that the [HRA] 
should be given full, direct, horizontal effect. The courts have not been prepared to go 
this far’.109 Lord Phillips went on to state that, in the privacy context, ‘the court should, 
insofar as it can, develop the action for breach of confidence in such a manner as will 
give effect to both Article 8 and Article 10 rights’.110 These comments do not indicate any 
kind of resolution of the horizontal effect issue; Lord Phillips merely stated that the 
courts had not so far given the Convention direct horizontal effect.111 However, the 
second comment suggests the existence of some restriction on the power of the courts to 
apply Convention rights, as well as the need for an existing cause of action, and so is 
more indicative of weak indirect horizontal effect or the ‘constitutional constraint’ 
model. 
Since Douglas, the language used by the courts when discussing the framework of the 
misuse of private information tort has become more suggestive of strong indirect 
horizontal effect, or even of direct effect. Lord Justice Buxton in the Court of Appeal in 
McKennit v Ash112 considered that ‘in order to find the rules of the English law of breach 
of confidence we now have to look in the jurisprudence of Articles 8 and 10. Those 
Articles are now not merely of persuasive or parallel effect, but…are the very content of 
the domestic tort that the English court has to enforce’.113 Sir Anthony Clark, giving the 
                                                 
107 [2006] QB 125.  
108 ibid [53]. This was an appeal following the trial of the action. 
109 ibid [50].  
110 ibid [53].  
111 Moreover, Lord Phillips was drawing on the comments of Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale in Campbell 
which, as has been shown, were not in harmony.    
112 [2006] EWCA Civ 1714. 
113 ibid [11].  
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judgment of the Court of Appeal in Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd,114 found that the court 
must first ask ‘whether the information is private in the sense that it is in principle 
protected by Article 8 (i.e. such that Article 8 is in principle engaged) and, secondly, if so, 
whether in all the circumstances the interest of the owner of the information must yield 
to the right to freedom of expression conferred on the publisher by Article 10’.115 In 
subsequent cases the courts have followed a similar trend, usually referring to either 
McKennitt or Murray, and framing their enquiry, at least initially, in Articles 8 and 10 
terms.116 In this way, the courts may have given the impression that they are duty bound 
to give overriding status to the Convention rights in this context. As Clayton and 
Tomlinson observe; ‘the strong approach is now well established in the case law’.117 
Other commentators argue that the recent cases in fact demonstrate direct horizontal 
effect because Articles 8 and 10 were applied to the disputes with very little regard to the 
common law.118 Bennett suggests that McKennitt makes ‘clear beyond doubt that the 
HRA, and the Convention rights it protects, is being given direct horizontal effect’.119 
Murray, according to Bennett, ‘effectively confirms that English privacy law is now to be 
regarded as completely in line with ECtHR jurisprudence. The effect of this is that it 
almost goes so far as to make the jurisprudence of the ECtHR…binding on English 
courts when assessing privacy claims’.120 
The following chapter will assess the claims of these commentators against the 
substantive law,121 however, as Phillipson argues, there are a number of clear weaknesses 
in the arguments used.122 Importantly, Lord Justice Buxton’s comments in McKennitt were 
partly derived from the earlier Court of Appeal decision in A v B plc.123 As mentioned, in 
that case Lord Woolf spoke of ‘absorbing the rights which Articles 8 and 10 protect into 
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the long-established action for breach of confidence’.124 He then set out guidelines 
directing lower courts to avoid determining whether a privacy cause of action existed125 
and decided the case purely on confidence grounds.126 The other authorities cited by 
Lord Justice Buxton do nothing to support his claim. Baroness Hale in Campbell stated 
that ‘[t]he 1998 Act does not create any new cause of action between private persons’127 
and, as shown, Lord Phillips in Douglas denied that direct horizontal effect had been 
interpreted by the courts.128 Therefore, to suggest that Lord Justice Buxton in McKennitt 
resolved the horizontal effect issue in favour of direct horizontal effect would appear to 
be inaccurate; the authorities cited clearly referred to indirect horizontal effect. As 
Phillipson notes; ‘this purported announcement in favour of full or direct horizontal 
effect…in McKennitt and…[Murray] merely amounts to Sir Anthony repeating an 
inaccurate summary of Buxton LJ of previous dicta, which in fact rule out direct and full 
horizontal effect’.129  
Leaving aside Phillipson’s argument about the origins of these judicial statements, and 
before considering the substantive law, it should be noted that the undoubted influence 
of the Convention in these cases, without more, does not indicate a duty to give it direct 
horizontal effect, or strong indirect horizontal effect. It could equally be the result of the 
courts finding strong reasons to give effect to the protection of privacy, an important 
human right, and using the Convention as a source of inspiration, under a weak model. 
Moreover, similar developments could occur under the ‘constitutional constraint’ model. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, pre-HRA, the incremental development of common 
law breach of confidence had enhanced its capacity to protect private information. 
Further development along these lines would probably not, therefore, raise constitutional 
concerns in the minds of the judiciary, enabling them to apply Convention principles 
when deciding privacy cases. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the transformation of breach of confidence, from a limited 
privacy remedy in the pre-HRA era, into a full privacy remedy, protecting individuals 
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from the unauthorised disclosure of private information, following the House of Lords’ 
decision in Campbell. As well as the practical significance of dispensing with the second 
limb of the confidence action, the case marked a shift in the law towards the values 
underpinning the protection of privacy. Thus, as a result of the indirect horizontal effect 
of the HRA, informational privacy is now protected to a far greater extent than in the 
pre-HRA era. As noted in chapter 1, one of the aims of this thesis is to identify areas of 
disparity between the levels of privacy protection at Strasbourg and in English domestic 
courts, and to question why the instruments of the HRA (particularly sections 2 and 6) 
have not been utilised by English courts to afford greater protection to informational 
autonomy. Although only an interim conclusion can be drawn at this stage, this chapter 
has suggested that the courts have not resolved the horizontal effect debate by endorsing 
any of the models suggested in the academic commentary. The following chapters, by 
identifying a number of areas in which the balance struck between privacy and free 
speech falls short of the Strasbourg standard, will provide further evidence to refute the 
claim that the most recent privacy cases show judicial endorsement of direct horizontal 
effect or strong indirect horizontal effect. However, if, as this chapter has argued, the 
constitutional constraint model, suggested by Phillipson and Williams, most persuasively 
captures the duty of the court under section 6 HRA, there would not appear to be any 
reason for the domestic courts to dilute the level of privacy protection afforded by 
Strasbourg, given that already, both pre- and post-HRA, breach of confidence has been 
developed, incrementally, into the tort of misuse of private information in order to fill a 
clear lacuna in the law. Chapter 5 will therefore consider why English courts have, to 
some extent, failed to utilise indirect horizontal effect to maximise the protection of 
informational privacy.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
 
Introduction 
 
The basic theoretical model outlined in chapter 1 suggested that the types of information 
attracting the legal protection of privacy should include both obviously intimate 
information (for example, that relating to sexuality, relationships, health and the home), 
but also more innocuous information (such as photographs of an individual going about 
their daily life). Moreover, whether the information was acquired in a private or public 
location should not form the basis of a distinction between the kinds of information 
afforded protection. As chapter 1 argued, if the law is to respond to the core principles 
of privacy, the interpretation of ‘private information’ must be widely drawn, 
encompassing information which, if widely disseminated, would necessarily involve a loss 
of an individual’s right to informational autonomy and possibly a significant impact on 
their substantive autonomy.1 
 
This chapter will begin by examining the first stage of the privacy analysis carried out by 
the ECtHR—whether the disclosed information falls within the scope of Article 8 in this 
context—as set out in the leading decision of Von Hannover (No. 1),2 now potentially 
modified by Von Hannover (No. 2),3 demonstrating that the approach of the Strasbourg 
Court, particularly the pre-Von Hannover (No. 2) approach, closely adheres to the 
theoretical model. In contrast, in the years following the Von Hannover (No. 1) decision, 
domestic courts, while giving a strong influence to Convention jurisprudence, do not 
appear to have considered themselves bound to bring UK privacy law into line with the 
Convention. As one leading commentator has suggested, the circumstances in which an 
individual might have a reasonable expectation of privacy is ‘[o]ne of the most difficult 
questions facing English courts as they develop the common law right to privacy’.4 In 
answering this question the courts must not only ensure that the law is sufficiently 
certain, by coming to a consensus on the breadth and depth of privacy protection, but 
                                                 
1 See chapter 1 at p 15. 
2 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 21. 
3 Von Hannover v Germany (No. 2) App no 40660/08 (ECHR, 7 February 2012). 
4 N A Moreham, ‘Privacy in Public Places’ (2006) 65(3) CLJ 606. 
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must also grapple with the equally controversial issue of how strong an influence the 
Convention is to have in UK domestic law through their interpretation of the HRA. 
Therefore, in light of the discussion in chapter 2 of the significant impact of sections 2 
and 6 of the HRA on the development of breach of confidence into the misuse of 
private information tort, this chapter will provide further evidence that the domestic 
jurisprudence, in this context, does not, contrary to the opinion of a number of 
commentators, indicate an acceptance of strong indirect horizontal effect5 or direct 
horizontal effect.6 It will be argued that British judges are not, in fact, using Strasbourg 
jurisprudence to provide the content of the new privacy tort and, instead, appear to be 
preserving a degree of autonomy in privacy adjudication. Clearly the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is only the first stage of the courts’ analysis, therefore only 
interim conclusions will be drawn about the courts’ reasoning under sections 2 and 6 
HRA, until the ‘parallel analysis’ has been considered in the following chapter. 
 
The Facts and Findings of Von Hannover v Germany 
 
The background to the Von Hannover case is that since the early 1990s Princess Caroline 
of Monaco had been trying to prevent newspapers and magazines from publishing 
photographs of her private life in a number of European countries. In the German 
courts, the Princess had succeeded in preventing further publication of photographs in 
which she was shown with her children, and where she had sought seclusion at the far 
end of a restaurant courtyard. Being classified as a ‘figure of contemporary society par 
excellence’ meant that publication of other photographs taken in public places, showing 
scenes from her daily life,7 could not be restrained. The public had a legitimate interest in 
knowing how she behaved in public and so she had to tolerate this kind of publicity. 
Having exhausted all domestic remedies in Germany, Princess Caroline applied to the 
ECtHR alleging that her Article 8 right to respect for private and family life had been 
infringed. 
 
                                                 
5 R Clayton and H Tomlinson (eds), The Law of Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP 2009) 276; H Fenwick, Civil 
Liberties and Human Rights (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 255. 
6 T D C Bennett, ‘Horizontality's New Horizons - Re-Examining Horizontal Effect: Privacy, Defamation 
and the Human Rights Act Part 1’ (2010) 21(3) Ent LR 96; K Hughes, ‘Horizontal Privacy’ (2009) 125 
LQR 244; N A Moreham ‘Privacy and Horizontality: Relegating the Common Law’ (2007) 123 LQR 373. 
7 The photographs included images of Princess Caroline horse riding, shopping, in a restaurant, cycling, on 
a skiing holiday, leaving her Paris home with her husband, playing tennis, and tripping over an obstacle at a 
beach club in Monte Carlo. 
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Importantly, the Strasbourg Court found that although this was a matter concerning the 
legal relations between two private parties, it could require the State to adopt measures to 
secure respect for private life (normally called positive obligations).8 The Court went on 
to find that the photographs concerned contained ‘very personal or even intimate 
“information”’9 and so had ‘no doubt that the publication by various German magazines 
of photos of the applicant in her daily life either on her own or with other people [fell] 
within the scope of her private life’.10 The public context did not prevent the pictures 
engaging Article 8 because of the need for a zone of interaction, even in public, ‘to 
ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each 
individual in his relations with other human beings’.11  
 
The Court classified Princess Caroline as a private individual as she had not exercised any 
official functions on behalf of the State of Monaco and, as the photographs showed the 
Princess ‘engaged in activities of a purely private nature’12 and related solely to her private 
life, they could not be said to contribute to a political or public debate of general 
interest.13 For these reasons, having noted the importance of the press in a democratic 
society to inform the public, the Court found that Article 10 must be given a narrow 
interpretation while according Article 8 an expansive one. The Court therefore concluded 
that ‘the public does not have a legitimate interest in knowing where the applicant is and 
how she behaves generally in her private life even if she appears in places that cannot 
always be described as secluded and despite the fact that she is well known to the 
public’.14 The German Courts had failed to provide sufficient protection of Princess 
Caroline’s private life as the spatial isolation criterion was too vague and difficult for her 
to determine in advance, and she would have the burden of proving that she had an 
expectation of privacy by retreating to a secluded place.15 There had therefore been a 
violation of Article 8. 
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The Reasoning in Von Hannover v Germany 
 
Possibly the most striking aspect of the Court’s decision in Von Hannover is its treatment 
of the types of information falling within the scope of private life. Firstly, it held that the 
photographs of Princess Caroline (alone and with others) were ‘very personal or even 
intimate’.16 The German courts had already restricted publication of arguably the most 
private images, those showing her with her children and in a secluded location, but 
protection was extended to the quite mundane pictures of the Princess, including those 
showing her alone which therefore fell outside the ‘zone of interaction’ justification, 
without much explanation by the Strasbourg Court. The earlier ECtHR decision in Peck v 
United Kingdom17 had generally been taken to suggest that Article 8 would only apply to 
images showing some very private or sensitive information (in that case CCTV images of 
a person walking in the street immediately after an unsuccessful suicide attempt). Instead 
of articulating why protection should be extended to apparently inoffensive photographs 
of the Princess in her daily life,18 which would have provided clarity and legitimacy,19 the 
Court reasoned that as Princess Caroline did not exercise official functions (unlike, say, a 
politician) and as the photographs did not depict her performing any official role, they 
must fall within the scope of private life. The Court distinguished between the 
publication of facts ‘capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society relating 
to politicians in the exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting details of the 
private life of an individual who…does not exercise official functions’.20 Therefore, the 
stance taken in Von Hannover appears to be that Article 8 is engaged by the publication of 
any unauthorised photograph of an individual in a public location, provided they are not 
performing official duties. 
 
Kirsty Hughes, commenting on the case, has suggested that the private nature of the 
images was exaggerated by the Court to reach the conclusion they wanted, which was to 
protect the Princess from harassment by the press.21 The Court did stress that the 
photographs had been taken in a ‘climate of continual harassment’ inducing a ‘very 
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strong sense of intrusion…or even of persecution’,22 allowing for the possibility of a 
second interpretation of the case based on that factor.23 Subsequent cases, however, seem 
to confirm that ‘the publication of a photograph falls within the scope of private life’, 
even in the absence of persistent photography or harassment.24 While it might not be 
immediately attractive to suggest that pictures of an individual walking down a public 
street constitute a violation of their right to privacy, the Court in Von Hannover rejected a 
‘rigid compartmentalisation of human activity along the “public-private” border and, 
instead, [adopted] a more holistic reading of private life, treating it as a continuum which 
extends to activity in the public sphere’.25  
 
In so doing the judgement recognises the reality of daily life for the modern celebrity. As 
suggested in chapter 1, there is huge demand for anodyne, as well as personal, 
information about those in the public eye. The lucrative ‘infotainment’ industry 
encourages newspapers and magazines to employ paparazzi to pursue and capture images 
of celebrities, regardless of their location or activities, and the prevalence of camera 
phones and other technology means that they can be photographed or recorded by 
almost anyone at any time. If publication is permitted, these individuals have completely 
lost control of information about themselves. Granting such strong privacy rights, and 
extending them to activities in a public place as well as more obviously private activities, 
reduces the chance of any interference with an individual’s substantive autonomy; for 
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example their choices in daily life as to where they go and who they are seen with. The 
Court’s concept of private life therefore maximises the ability of these individuals to lead 
an autonomous life. It may also discourage the practice of harassment (or ‘doorstepping’) 
carried out by some photographers and clearly of concern in the case. Von Hannover 
therefore appears to provide a very strong commitment, and practical legal effect, to the 
foundational principles of privacy—informational and substantive autonomy—discussed 
in chapter 1, even if this was not fully explained by the Strasbourg Court in its judgment. 
 
The second important (and less convincing) finding regarding the scope of Article 8 
protection was the classification of Princess Caroline as a private individual, given that 
she did not perform any official State functions.26 Within the Von Hannover judgement 
itself there was some uneasiness with this finding. Judge Cabral Barreto, in his 
Concurring Opinion, took the view that Princess Caroline was a public figure as she had 
‘for years played a role in European public life, even if she [did] not perform any official 
functions in her own country’.27 The Judge preferred a wider definition of ‘public figure’ 
to include ‘persons holding public office and/or using public resources and, more 
broadly speaking, all those who play a role in public life’.28  
 
A number of commentators have taken a similar view. Rudolf argues that the distinction 
made between politicians exercising official functions and private individuals ‘fails to 
address the case of nonpoliticians who are nonetheless persons of social or economic 
influence’.29 Sanderson makes a similar argument, criticising the Court for failing to 
recognise what he terms ‘intermediate figures’; ‘those figures, like the Princess, who enjoy 
a sufficiently high public profile to be of interest to the general public’.30 Sanderson 
makes a strong argument by seeking to identify why individuals such as Princess Caroline 
are of legitimate interest and so have a lesser expectation of privacy than a purely private 
individual. He suggests that the position of the Royal Family in Monaco, Princess 
Caroline’s proximity to the throne, and the ‘cultural, social and economic power’ it 
                                                 
26 It was noted in the judgement that Princess Caroline represented the ruling family at cultural and 
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27 [2004] EMLR 21, 409. 
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29 B Rudolf, ‘Council of Europe: Von Hannover v Germany’ (2006) 4(3) IJCL 533, 537. 
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confers on her mean that it seems ‘wrong to permit her the same degree of Article 8 
protection that one might allow an ordinary citizen who does not enjoy a similar quality 
of influence’.31 By simply classifying the Princess as a private individual, the Strasbourg 
Court failed to engage with these persuasive arguments that call for a more nuanced 
approach rather than a clear cut distinction between politicians and private individuals. 
While the outcome may have been right in this case, there is a plausible argument that 
some private individuals such as business or religious leaders and celebrities, though 
unelected, hold sufficient power to be considered public figures. Adopting such a 
restrictive conception of ‘public figure’ not only expanded the scope of Article 8 
protection enormously but also effectively closed off discussion of the Article 10 value of 
the speech concerned; once it was accepted that the information related to a private 
figure, in their private life, it became much harder to persuade the Court that there was 
any free speech interest involved at all. 
 
The discussion of certain aspects of Von Hannover in this chapter suggests that the 
Strasbourg Court provides full privacy protection for the unauthorised publication of 
photographs of any individual not performing official functions and, therefore, 
demonstrates a strong adherence to the theoretical model of privacy protection set out in 
chapter 1. As the academic commentary indicates, the decision is undoubtedly very 
controversial and, depending on its incorporation into UK domestic law, clearly has the 
potential to reform an industry built upon the widespread demand for information about  
the private and daily lives of celebrities and other ‘public figures’. Before examining how 
far the UK has followed Von Hannover it is necessary to consider some further recent 
developments at Strasbourg.  
 
Does Von Hannover (No. 2) Modify the Strasbourg Position? 
 
In February 2012 the ECtHR sitting as a Grand Chamber (suggesting that the case was 
of particular importance) handed down its decision in Von Hannover (No. 2). The 
applicants, Princess Caroline and her husband, complained of the German courts’ 
implementation of the first Von Hannover judgement, with regards to the publication of 
further unauthorised photographs in two German magazines. The position in German 
domestic law had been modified, following Von Hannover (No. 1), to the extent that, in 
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the second set of proceedings, photographs of the applicants walking in St Moritz and on 
a chair lift during a skiing holiday were restrained. Importantly, the photographs and 
accompanying articles were found to be for entertainment purposes only. The claim 
concerned another photograph of the applicants walking in the street during the skiing 
holiday. This had not been protected by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
because it accompanied, and was linked to, an article about the failing health of Prince 
Rainier III, the then Sovereign Prince of Monaco, which was said to be a matter of 
public interest. Illustrating such an article with related photographs, showing scenes from 
daily life, was justified according to German law.  
 
The Grand Chamber unanimously determined that there had been no violation of Article 
8; the German courts had not failed to comply with their positive obligations to protect 
private and family life. Reaffirming those principles already quoted from Von Hannover 
(No. 1), 32 the Court added that: 
 
[A] person’s image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the 
person’s unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The right to 
the protection of one’s image is thus one of the essential components of personal development. It 
mainly presupposes the individual’s right to control the use of that image, including the right to 
refuse publication thereof.
33
  
 
By emphasising ‘control’ over the use of personal information the Court again indicates 
its commitment to the underlying values of privacy, improving upon the justification 
used in Von Hannover (No. 1) which could have been taken to indicate that the Strasbourg 
Court sought only to further the development of human relationships. Nevertheless, the 
Court accepted that the photograph ‘did contribute, at least to some degree, to a debate 
of general interest’,34 given that it accompanied an article found to be in the public 
interest because it concerned the health of Monaco’s reigning head of state. The case is 
primarily concerned with balancing the competing privacy and speech rights,35 and 
proceeded on the basis that publication of the photographs engaged Article 8. However, 
some aspects of the judgement can be interpreted as modifying Von Hannover (No. 1) in 
terms of the scope of private life within the meaning of Article 8(1) in this context, and 
                                                 
32 See text to footnote 11 above.  
33 App no 40660/08 (ECHR, 7 February 2012), [96]. 
34 ibid [118]. 
35 See chapter 4 at p 83. 
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could therefore have an effect on the developing reasonable expectation of privacy test in 
UK domestic law. 
 
The first significant modification concerns the distinction drawn by the ECtHR between 
public and private figures. As will be recalled, in Von Hannover (No. 1) Princess Caroline 
was categorised, for Article 8 purposes, as a private individual as she exercised no official 
functions. In the second Von Hannover case, however, the Strasbourg Court found that 
‘irrespective of the question whether and to what extent the first applicant assumes 
official functions on behalf of the Principality of Monaco, it cannot be claimed that the 
applicants, who are undeniably very well known, are ordinary private individuals. They 
must, on the contrary, be regarded as public figures’.36 In the case of Axel Springer v 
Germany,37 handed down at the same time as Von Hannover (No. 2), a television actor was 
found to be sufficiently well-known to be considered a public figure.38 The Court added 
that, in principle, it would be for domestic courts to assess how well known a person is,39 
a markedly different stance from Von Hannover (No. 1) which appeared to make a clear 
distinction between those who could and could not be termed public figures. As noted 
above, once an individual is found to be a public figure it becomes much easier for the 
Court to find a stronger public interest in allowing Article 10 to prevail over the relevant 
privacy interest, as it did in both Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer. It appears, 
therefore, that in allowing the term ‘public figure’ to be applied to individuals exercising 
no official functions, the Court has, in effect, reduced the expectation of privacy for 
certain categories of people.40  
 
Secondly, given that the applicants had not adduced evidence demonstrating that the 
photos were taken in unfavourable circumstances (covertly or in a climate of harassment, 
for example) it was found that ‘the photos of the applicants in the middle of a street in St 
Moritz in winter were not in themselves offensive to the point of justifying their 
prohibition’.41 This statement seems to be inconsistent with Von Hannover (No. 1) which 
strongly suggested that any publication of unauthorised photographs showing scenes 
from daily life strongly attracted the protection of Article 8. It appears, therefore, that 
                                                 
36 App no 40660/08 (ECHR, 7 February 2012), [120]. 
37 App no 39954/08 (ECHR, 7 February 2012). 
38
 ibid [99].  
39
 ibid [98]. 
40 E C Reid, ‘Rebalancing Privacy and Freedom of Expression’ (2012) 16(2) Edin LR 253, 252. 
41 App no 40660/08 (ECHR, 7 February 2012), [123]. 
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whilst purporting to follow the first Von Hannover decision, the Grand Chamber may 
have, in fact, retreated from some aspects of it.42 Anodyne photographs of individuals 
going about their daily lives in public places will still be protected if they are for 
entertainment purposes only. However, Von Hannover (No. 2) suggests that such images 
are not particularly intrusive and involve a weaker privacy claim than was previously held. 
The result of this decision may be that in attempting to redress the imbalance that Von 
Hannover (No. 1) arguably created between Articles 8 and 10, the Court has, in effect, 
downgraded an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.43 The result of these subtle 
shifts at Strasbourg may have a further impact as the decisions are absorbed into UK 
domestic law, potentially making it much easier now to bring UK privacy law into line 
with the Convention given that, as will be argued, pre-Von Hannover (No. 2), UK law was 
inconsistent with the first Von Hannover decision. Before this is considered in the light of 
the most recent English cases, it is necessary to examine the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test used by the UK judiciary to assess how far it covers the same information 
protected under Article 8 by the Strasbourg Court. 
 
The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
 
As will be recalled from chapter 2, prior to Von Hannover (No. 1) the House of Lords in 
Campbell v MGN Ltd44 replaced the first two elements of the breach of confidence action 
with a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test. The Court of Appeal, by applying the test 
of whether publication ‘would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities’,45 found that protection did not extend to the details of Campbell’s 
treatment for drug addiction at Narcotics Anonymous, including photographs of her 
leaving the clinic and saying goodbye to other patients. Campbell had accepted that the 
newspaper was entitled to publish the fact of her drug addiction and treatment at NA to 
correct her previous denials that she was a drug addict. The House of Lords determined 
that the ‘highly offensive’ test, not based on Convention jurisprudence, should not be the 
                                                 
42 B Jordan and I Hurst, ‘Privacy and the Princess - A Review of the Grand Chamber's Decisions in Von 
Hannover and Axel Springer’ (2012) 23(4) Ent LR 108, 113. 
43 It is possible that the ongoing debates about the future of the Strasbourg Court impacted upon Von 
Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer (among others), demonstrating, what one commentator has termed an 
‘appeasement approach’ on behalf of the ECtHR towards certain Member States. See H Fenwick, ‘An 
Appeasement Approach in the European Court of Human Rights?’ (UK Constitutional Law Group, 5 
April 2012) < http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/blog/> accessed 10 May 2012. This suggestion will be 
considered in greater detail in chapter 5. 
44 [2004] 2 AC 457. 
45 Taken from an Australian High Court decision; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats 
[2001] HCA 63. See Campbell v MGN Ltd [2003] QB 633, [55]. 
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primary test in domestic privacy cases. Lord Nicholls found that English courts should 
instead consult Article 8 case law and ask ‘whether in respect of the disclosed facts the 
person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy’.46 Lord Hope concurred; ‘[i]f 
the information is obviously private, the situation will be one where the person to whom 
it relates can reasonably expect his privacy to be respected. So there is normally no need 
to go on and ask whether it would be highly offensive for it to be published’.47 The 
information complained of in Campbell was ‘obviously private’ because it related to 
therapeutic treatment and health.48 If the ‘highly offensive’ test were to be used in a 
future case, for example if the court was uncertain about whether the information was 
‘obviously private’, the court should examine the offensiveness of publication to a 
reasonable person in the same circumstances as the claimant, rather than a reasonable 
person receiving the information.49  
 
The majority therefore found that the published details of Campbell’s treatment, 
including the photographs, gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, partly on the 
basis that the publicity given to her therapeutic treatment was likely to ‘deter her from 
continuing the treatment which was in her interest and also to inhibit other persons 
attending the course from staying with it, when they might be concerned that their 
participation might become public knowledge’.50 In particular, the photographs ‘added to 
the potential harm, by making Campbell think that she was being followed or betrayed, 
and deterring her from going back to the same place again’.51  
 
Subsequent cases demonstrate that a claimant has a better chance of successfully 
persuading the court that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy if it can be 
shown that the information was private due to its nature, form, and/or because it was 
disclosed in a breach of confidence. Often a reasonable expectation of privacy will be 
found if the information relates to health,52 personal and sexual relationships,53 or the 
                                                 
46 [2004] 2 AC 457, [21]. 
47 ibid [94]. 
48 The Law Lords were unanimous in finding that the information was private. The dissenting judges, Lord 
Nicholls and Lord Hoffmann, held that the additional details, including the photographs, could not be 
protected because they added nothing further to the information they had already found the Mirror entitled 
to publish. 
49 [2004] 2 AC 457, [99] (Lord Hope) and [136] (Baroness Hale). 
50 ibid [165] (Lord Carswell). 
51 ibid [155] (Baroness Hale). 
52 ibid. 
53 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). McKennitt v Ash made clear that such 
information need not be intimate or embarrassing to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
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home,54 because such information is by its nature obviously private. The form the 
information takes may also be significant.55 Photographs have been described as ‘worth a 
thousand words’56 because of the level of detail usually conveyed and their added impact. 
Information in the form of correspondence is expressly protected in the text of Article 
8(1) and accordingly gives rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court of 
Appeal in Ferdinand v MGN Ltd57 found that text messages sent from mobile phones 
could qualify as examples of correspondence and gain Article 8 protection.58 The 
personal opinions of Prince Charles expressed in handwritten journals, and sent to 
selected recipients marked ‘private and confidential’, were found by the Court of Appeal 
to be ‘paradigm examples of confidential documents’.59 Mr Justice Tugendhat in the 
recent Trimingham60 case suggested that if certain information had been contained in a 
diary piece the balance might have tipped in favour of finding a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.61  
 
The third factor of potential importance is whether the information was disclosed in a 
breach of confidence. In McKennitt v Ash62 the Court of Appeal took into account the fact 
that the claimant had a pre-existing relationship with the defendant—they had previously 
worked together professionally and had a close friendship—finding that certain private 
facts were ‘doubly private when…imparted in the context of a relationship of 
confidence’.63 The fact that Prince Charles’ diaries had been obtained by a staff member 
subject to an express duty of confidentiality, as well as the implied duty existing between 
‘master and servant’, contributed to the court finding a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.64 In Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd65 Mr Justice Eady found the privacy claim 
to be ‘partly founded’ on traditional breach of confidence because of the intimate 
relationship between the claimant and ‘Woman E’ who disclosed the information to the 
defendant.66 Most recently, in Gold v Cox,67 Mr Justice Tugendhat, with reference to 
                                                 
54 McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714. 
55 Douglas v Hello! [2006] QB 125, [83].  
56 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [31] (Lord Nicholls). 
57 [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB). 
58 ibid [55].  
59 HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] Ch 57, [35].  
60 Trimingham v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 1296 (QB). 
61 ibid [305]. 
62 [2006] EWCA Civ 1714. 
63 ibid [23]. 
64 [2008] Ch 57, [28]. 
65 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
66 ibid [6]; [108].  
67 [2012] EWHC 367 (QB). 
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breach of confidence values, granted an injunction preventing two former employees of 
Jacqueline Gold (Chief Executive of Ann Summers) disclosing information relating to 
her private and family life.  
 
The Court of Appeal in Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd 68 summarised the domestic inquiry 
into the reasonable expectation of privacy: 
[T]he question whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is a broad one, which takes 
account of all the circumstances of the case. They include the attributes of the claimant, the 
nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the 
nature and purpose of the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could 
be inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which and the purposes for which 
the information came into the hands of the publisher.
69
  
These factors are now consistently used to assist the courts in their determination.70 At 
the outset it is clear that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is quite different from 
the application of Article 8 at Strasbourg. The importance placed on finding a traditional 
breach of confidence, in particular, is clearly rooted in the common law rather than the 
Convention. Moreover, domestic courts rarely consider whether the claimant is a public 
figure at stage one, a matter of concern in terms of the scope of Article 8 in both Von 
Hannover judgements.71 This issue is clearly of less significance following Von Hannover 
(No. 2) and Axel Springer because in both cases the ECtHR found that ‘well-known’ 
individuals could be classed as public figures. Therefore recent cases such as Spelman,72 in 
which a 17 year-old England rugby player was found to be a public figure,73 and 
Trimingham, in which a press officer who entered into an affair with the prominent 
politician she worked for was not found to be a private figure, are probably in line with 
the later Strasbourg rulings. However, prior to Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer, 
UK courts clearly did not see themselves as under a duty to give the public figure 
criterion, as established in Von Hannover (No. 1), a strong influence in their stage one 
                                                 
68 [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
69 ibid [36].  
70 Terry (Previously ‘LNS’) v Persons Unknown [2010] EMLR 16, [55]; Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 
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71 See above at p 49 and p 52. 
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73 ibid [72].  
  57 
analysis.74 Again, this suggests that the domestic test is independent from that applied by 
the ECtHR. The current compatibility with the later Strasbourg cases seems to be more a 
result of coincidence rather than judges of the High Court feeling bound to give effect to 
the substance of Convention jurisprudence. As breach of confidence failed to protect 
information obtained in fully public locations, the true test of whether the content of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test is taken directly from Article 8 jurisprudence is the 
extent to which innocuous photographs of individuals in their daily life are now 
protected by UK courts. 
Do UK Courts Provide the Level of Protection Required by the Von Hannover 
Judgments? 
In Campbell, decided prior to Von Hannover (No. 1) the majority of the House of Lords 
found that the public location of the photographs did not prevent them being protected 
by law. This significant extension of the breach of confidence doctrine marks an 
acceptance by the House of Lords that private life can be engaged in a public place and 
indicates adherence to the privacy justifications set out in chapter 1. However, Campbell 
appears to represent only a partial acceptance of the full implications of Von Hannover 
(No. 1).  
 
The photographs in Campbell were protected because they clearly showed her leaving 
Narcotics Anonymous; this was ‘obviously private’ information because it related to 
therapeutic treatment and health. Baroness Hale made her position clear: 
 
We have not so far held that the mere fact of covert photography is sufficient to make the 
information contained in the photograph confidential. The activity photographed must be private. 
If this had been, and had been presented as, a picture of Naomi Campbell going about her 
business in a public street, there could have been no complaint…If…she pops out to the shops 
                                                 
74 Lord Hoffmann considered Naomi Campbell to be a public figure [2004] 2 AC 457, [36] and the Court 
of Appeal in Murray suggested (obiter) that J K Rowling would be classed as a public figure, though her 
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point in relation to the public interest, not the reasonable expectation of privacy. While the issue in a 
strong case like McKennitt may have been minor, for the sake of clarity it would have been better for ‘public 
figure’ to have been considered at stage one, as it is at Strasbourg. It may then have had a greater influence 
in more borderline cases such as Spelman, in which the public figure finding was questionable.  
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for a bottle of milk…there is nothing essentially private about that information nor can it be 
expected to damage her private life.
75
 
 
Lord Hoffmann came to a similar conclusion; ‘[i]n the present case, the pictures were 
taken without Ms Campbell’s consent. That in my opinion is not enough to amount to a 
wrongful invasion of privacy. The famous and even the not so famous who go out in 
public must accept that they may be photographed without their consent, just as they 
may be observed by others without their consent’.76 However, ‘[t]he widespread 
publication of a photograph of someone which reveals him to be in a situation of 
humiliation or severe embarrassment, even if taken in a public place, may be an 
infringement of the privacy of his personal information’.77 Lord Hope emphasised that 
the pictures were specifically taken of Campbell in secret, commenting that ‘Miss 
Campbell could not have complained if the photographs had been taken to show the 
scene in the street by a passer-by and later published simply as street scenes’.78 It would 
therefore be necessary for the claimant to have been the intended subject of any 
published photograph, a requirement usually satisfied in instances of media publication 
of photographs of celebrities and public figures. 
 
The House of Lords, pre-Von Hannover, therefore stopped short of granting individuals a 
general right to control the use of their image. Where the photograph captured some 
obviously private information (within the meaning of the domestic reasonable 
expectation of privacy test) it could be protected even if the activities shown had taken 
place in a public location. When Campbell was decided in 2004 this development would 
have been in line with the then leading Strasbourg decision in Peck, but, as this chapter 
has shown, Von Hannover (No. 1) extended the Strasbourg requirement to affording full 
Article 8 protection to photographs of someone in their daily life in public. As Phillipson 
points out, the House of Lords in Campbell did not dismiss the possibility that UK 
privacy law might develop to accommodate what was to become the Von Hannover 
position.79 Baroness Hale merely stated that the House of Lords had not ‘so far’ extended 
protection to photographs of daily life,80 but, as Campbell did not concern such 
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photographs, her comments were strictly obiter and do not bind lower courts. However, 
the courts in subsequent cases have taken account of Baroness Hale’s statements, 
arguably giving them far greater status than they should, and, as a consequence, have 
failed to bring UK privacy law into line with Von Hannover.  
 
In 2006 Sir Elton John was refused an injunction to prevent the Daily Mail publishing a 
photograph of him standing with his driver in the street outside his London home.81 Mr 
Justice Eady could not find that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy as 
the information was not obviously private and there was no element of harassment that 
might have enabled him to apply Von Hannover. The interpretation of Von Hannover 
suggested in this thesis (and later endorsed by the Court of Appeal in McKennitt) was not 
considered. Despite finding that the article was likely to cause offence and 
embarrassment to Sir Elton, Mr Justice Eady was ‘not persuaded that there is…any 
doctrine operative in English law whereby it is necessary to demonstrate that to publish a 
photograph one has to show that the subject of the photograph gave consent’.82 
 
Later in 2006, the Court of Appeal in McKennitt expressly accepted the full implications 
of Von Hannover but neglected to discuss the inconsistency with Campbell.83  The court 
went on to grant protection only to the obviously private information about Loreena 
McKennitt’s relationships and health, but not the anodyne facts about a shopping trip; 
for example. McKennitt might possibly be distinguished from Von Hannover because it 
concerned a book rather than photographs—English courts have often held that 
photographs are a particularly intrusive method of communicating information84—but 
this distinction was not suggested in the judgment.  
 
The Murray case concerned J K Rowling’s attempt to restrict publication of an 
unauthorised photograph of her young son, taken with a long-range lens while they were 
walking in the street.85 As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeal took into account, 
inter alia, the location and activities the claimant was engaged in to help them determine 
whether the information should be protected at stage one.86 The Court of Appeal found 
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that there was an arguable case despite the fact that there was nothing ‘obviously private’ 
about the photograph; ‘[i]f a child of parents who are not in the public eye could 
reasonably expect not to have photographs of him published in the media, so too should 
the child of a famous parent’.87 The case was strongly influenced by the special need to 
protect a young child88 and the fact that the photographing was not an isolated incident,89 
again raising the issue of harassment and the true meaning of Von Hannover (No. 1). 
However, the case settled before it went to trial so there has been no definitive resolution 
of the issue, but it is by no means clear that the same outcome would have occurred if 
the applicant had been an adult.90 
 
The most recent cases in which claimants have complained of the publication of 
photographs have not concerned those taken in public places. However, they may be of 
some assistance by indicating current judicial attitudes to the unauthorised publication of 
photographs and anodyne information. Ferdinand concerned an article published in the 
Sunday Mirror91 giving Carly Storey’s account of her affair with the captain of the England 
football team, Rio Ferdinand. The article included a photograph showing Storey and 
Ferdinand in a hotel room together. It might have been expected that, following Von 
Hannover, a photograph taken in a private location would easily be identified as private 
information, even if the activities photographed were not particularly intimate. Indeed, 
Mr Justice Nicol, in the High Court, did find that Ferdinand had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with regard to the photograph, without referring to Von Hannover. 
However, the photograph had probably not been taken covertly92 and ‘its unexceptional 
character’93 meant that the right was of relatively low importance:  
 
[It] showed the Claimant and Ms Storey clothed. They are not even engaging with each other. 
The Claimant is speaking on a mobile phone. It is an unexceptionable picture. It was taken in a 
private room, but its publication could have caused nothing comparable to the additional harm 
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90 Sir Anthony Clarke MR, on behalf of the Court of Appeal made clear that ‘[t]he position of an adult may 
be very different from that of a child. In this appeal we are concerned only with the question whether 
David, as a small child, had a reasonable expectation of privacy, not with the question whether his parents 
would have had such an expectation’. ibid [56]. 
91 A similar version of the article was also posted on the newspaper’s website. 
92
 [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB), [101]. 
93 ibid [102]. 
  61 
that was referred to in Campbell and none of the embarrassment that pictures of sexual activity 
may cause.
94  
 
Although Ferdinand was decided some months before Von Hannover (No. 2), it strikes a 
very similar chord. In both cases the photographs were protected in principle at stage 
one, but the relatively anodyne information depicted was said to be of low importance 
and easily overcome by the claim for freedom of expression when linked to a story in the 
public interest. It appears therefore that Ferdinand is unintentionally in line with the 
slightly weaker privacy protection provided by the Strasbourg Court in Von Hannover (No. 
2), rather than Von Hannover (No. 1).  
 
In April 2012 Carina Trimingham sought damages and an injunction to prevent further 
publication of two photographs. Both photographs had been published on a number of 
occasions after the story of Trimingham’s affair with MP Chris Huhne broke.95 
Trimingham had previously given a journalist a cropped image of herself taken in her 
home just before her civil partnership ceremony which was published in a different 
context, presumably with her consent. The same picture was used as her public 
Facebook profile before she de-activated her account when knowledge of the affair came 
to the attention of the media. The other image was a family photograph taken at the civil 
partnership ceremony itself and obtained from a family member. Mr Justice Tugendhat 
found that ‘the publication of the versions of these photographs, cropped as they were, 
disclosed no significant information in respect of which Ms Trimingham had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy’,96 adding that the images were ‘simple (and 
flattering)’97 and revealed no more information about her than the public already knew.98  
 
In terms of the first image, the fact that Trimingham had previously consented to it 
being in the public domain, at least to some extent, appears to have influenced the 
finding that its later publication could not give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy 
but, regardless of this, it would probably have been treated in the same way as the second 
photograph.  The second image had not been previously published and, although the 
judge found on the facts that it had been voluntarily given to the defendant by a family 
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member (not stolen, as Trimingham alleged), the nature of the information contained in 
the picture was considerably downplayed in this case. The photograph clearly did convey 
more information about Trimingham than the public already knew; it showed the 
appearance of her and her civil partner and their guests in intimate detail on a private 
occasion. As Lord Justice Keene mentioned in relation to the wedding photographs of 
Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones; ‘[t]he photographs conveyed to the public 
information not otherwise truly obtainable, that is to say, what the event and its 
participants looked like’.99 In that case elaborate security measures had been used to 
ensure the exclusivity of the claimant’s deal with OK! magazine, but arguably the same 
principle can be applied in the Trimingham case. While Trimingham was probably happy 
to have the photograph circulated amongst friends and family, the case demonstrates that 
she did not wish to relinquish control completely and allow the photograph to then be 
repeatedly published in an entirely different context. Whether or not the photograph was 
‘flattering’ in the opinion of the judge was not a relevant consideration that should have 
been used to determine the claimant’s reasonable expectation of privacy: as Lord Hope 
made clear in Campbell, ‘[t]he question is what a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities would feel if she was placed in the same position as the claimant and faced with 
the same publicity’.100 Trimingham gave the clear impression from her evidence that she felt 
violated by the use of photographs she had expected would remain within a limited circle 
of individuals to illustrate reports about her sexuality and private life. Trimingham differs 
from Ferdinand and Von Hannover (No. 2) in that the first stage of the privacy analysis was 
not satisfied; it was not accepted that the photographs contained any private information. 
The approach of Mr Justice Tugendhat in this case, therefore, does not seem to be fully 
aligned with either the strong privacy protection required by Von Hannover (No. 1) or the 
slightly weaker standard suggested in Von Hannover (No. 2); an even weaker standard is 
demonstrated.  
 
Overall, it appears that there is some inconsistency between the scope of privacy 
protection afforded by the Strasbourg Court under Article 8 and the types of information 
giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy in UK domestic courts. Murray was the 
obvious high-point for the protection of unauthorised photographs of daily life, but this 
may not necessarily establish a precedent for enhanced privacy protection for children. 
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Mr Justice Tugendhat recently held that the fact that the claimant was a child offered 
only limited support to his expectation of privacy.101 Since Murray the courts have 
avoided protecting less intrusive photographs of individuals (even if taken in private 
locations) by accepting that they constitute private information but giving them a low 
weight in the balancing exercise (Ferdinand), and by denying that they give rise to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy at all (Trimingham). While the Ferdinand position may be 
unintentionally compatible with Von Hannover (No. 2), neither position seems to be 
aligned with the full privacy protection advocated in Von Hannover (No. 1) or the 
theoretical model outlined in chapter 1. 
 
It is perhaps hard to criticise the High Court and Court of Appeal for these decisions; 
Baroness Hale’s comments in Campbell that the activity photographed must be private to 
incur liability have undoubtedly had a strong influence in subsequent cases. However, 
those comments were not binding and the lower courts could have given a stronger 
influence to the Von Hannover judgements if they had been inclined to do so. To attempt 
to understand why Von Hannover has not been applied fully in domestic cases, it is 
necessary to examine the courts’ duty under section 2 of the HRA, and then to look at its 
particular application in the privacy cases. 
 
The Duty of the Court under Section 2 HRA 
 
Section 2(1) HRA guides the courts with regards to the treatment of Convention 
jurisprudence, requiring them to ‘take into account’ any relevant Strasbourg decision 
when determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right. 
The plain wording of the provision suggests that the domestic courts should have 
flexibility or discretion when applying decisions of the ECtHR. This view is consistent 
with the Parliamentary debates during the passing of the HRA, and the government 
White Paper. Notably, the Home Secretary commented that ‘[t]hrough incorporation we 
are giving a profound margin of appreciation to British courts to interpret the 
Convention in accordance with British jurisprudence as well as European 
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jurisprudence’.102 Moreover, an amendment to section 2 that would have expressly made 
Convention jurisprudence binding was rejected in the House of Lords.103  
 
The somewhat vague wording of section 2 has given rise to a range of judicial 
approaches to its interpretation which has, in turn, led to a significant academic debate.104 
Judicial pronouncements in a number of cases have created a strong presumption in 
favour of following or ‘mirroring’105 Strasbourg jurisprudence, in the absence of some 
special circumstances.106 As Lord Slynn stated in Alconbury;107 ‘[a]lthough the [HRA] does 
not provide that a national court is bound by [the decisions of the ECtHR] it is obliged 
to take account of them so far as they are relevant. In the absence of some special 
circumstances it seems…that the court should follow any clear and constant 
jurisprudence of the [ECtHR]’.108 This position was then endorsed by Lord Bingham in 
Anderson109 when he suggested that the court ‘will not without good reason depart from 
the principles laid down in a carefully considered judgement of the [ECtHR]’,110 and 
again in Ullah;111 ‘[t]he duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less’.112 This approach 
has been justified by the judiciary on the (somewhat controversial) grounds that the 
Convention should have a uniform interpretation across the Member States,113 and that a 
claimant could take their case to the ECtHR which would be likely to follow a clear line 
of its own authority.114 There is another aspect of the ‘mirror’ principle based on Lord 
Brown’s comments in Al-Skeini115 that there is ‘even greater danger in the national courts 
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construing the Convention too generously in favour of an applicant than in construing it 
too narrowly’.116 This interpretation, taken to impose a ‘ceiling’ as well as a ‘floor’ on 
rights, has proven to be highly controversial,117 but is not of direct concern here as the 
issue is with meeting the basic Strasbourg requirement for rights protection rather than 
going beyond it.  
 
An important example of the ‘mirror’ principle is AF (No. 3)118 in which the House of 
Lords followed the decision of the Grand Chamber in A and Others v United Kingdom,119 
rather than MB,120 a relevant domestic decision, with the knowledge that doing so would 
undermine Parliament’s intention in legislating for counter-terrorism control orders.121 A 
number of the Lordships expressed their disagreement with the Strasbourg case but 
nevertheless felt bound to apply it. Lord Roger’s comments were striking; ‘[e]ven though 
we are dealing with rights under a United Kingdom statute, in reality we have no 
choice…Strasbourg has spoken, the case is closed’.122 Such statements are likely to have 
been strongly influenced by the fact that the UK was a party to A and Others v United 
Kingdom and, although that case was not concerned with control orders specifically (as 
AF (No. 3) was), it was sufficiently analogous to convince the judges that the same 
standard of rights protection would be required by the Strasbourg Court in a control 
orders case. It is possible therefore that the pronouncements on section 2 in AF (No. 3) 
were restricted to the specific context of that case and may not indicate judicial attitudes 
to Strasbourg jurisprudence generally. However, a similar stance was taken by the 
Supreme Court when applying Salduz v Turkey,123 a Grand Chamber decision to which the 
UK was not a party, in Cadder v HM Advocate (HM Advocate General for Scotland).124  
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The dominant judicial approach to section 2, therefore, ‘comes close to affording binding 
force to the [Convention] jurisprudence’,125 but crucially judicial discretion is preserved 
by the possibilities for departure from decisions of the ECtHR. These possibilities have 
been expressly (and implicitly) realised by the courts in a number of cases.126 Lord 
Hoffmann said in Alconbury that if the jurisprudence ‘compelled a conclusion 
fundamentally at odds with the distribution of powers under the British Constitution, 
[he] would have considerable doubt as to whether [it] should be followed’.127 Recently in 
Horncastle128 Lord Phillips, on behalf of the Supreme Court, stated that there will be ‘rare 
occasions where this court has concerns as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg Court 
sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process. In 
such circumstances it is open to this court to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, 
giving reasons for adopting this course’.129 In another instance, the Animal Defenders130 
case, the House of Lords declined to follow what was arguably the most relevant 
Strasbourg case (VgT131) as it would have compelled the court to find that the UK’s ban 
on political broadcasting breached Article 10. The justification for such a departure, apart 
from the lack of consensus across Europe on the matter, was not articulated by the 
court; Lord Scott merely suggested that ‘the judgements of the European 
Court…constitute material, very important material, that must be taken into account, but 
domestic courts are nonetheless not bound by the European Court’s interpretation of an 
incorporated article’.132  
 
The cases discussed demonstrate that the courts will usually follow a clear line of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence but may, with or without express justification, depart from such 
authority, in certain circumstances. It is interesting therefore that the Ullah principle has 
not been utilised to give full effect to the Von Hannover judgements and there continues 
to be some unacknowledged judicial reluctance to apply the leading Strasbourg case law. 
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At this stage it may be tentatively suggested that the resistance indicates a judicial feeling 
that creating the right to control the use of one’s image is beyond the constitutional 
powers of the judiciary, or is simply seen as an undesirable extension of the law in this 
area. Moreover, given the particular area of law concerned, the UK courts might have 
legitimately expected that States would be given a wide margin of appreciation to 
determine the scope of privacy protection, provided a minimum standard was met. This 
is because the case involved a complainant seeking to impose positive obligations on the 
State to protect them from the actions of a private party, and a balance between two 
conflicting Convention rights was required.133 The Court in Von Hannover (No. 1) and 
(No. 2) did refer to the State’s margin of appreciation in fulfilling its positive 
obligations,134 but it does not appear to have played a significant role. Nicolas Bratza, the 
current President of the ECtHR, has recently commented that ‘the Von Hannover case is a 
good example of a case where the Strasbourg [Court substituted] its own view for that of 
the German Constitutional Court’.135 The fact that such exacting standards of privacy 
protection appeared to be imposed by a court of review may account for some of the 
ambiguity surrounding the reception of Von Hannover into domestic law, particularly 
given that until Von Hannover it had not been clear that domestic authorities would even 
be required to provide a remedy for privacy invasions carried out by private individuals.  
 
For a variety of reasons, therefore, Von Hannover (No. 1), in particular,136 creates a 
considerable dilemma for the courts and, so far, rather than reluctantly following the case 
or declining to follow it with clear reasons, as they have in other contexts, the issue has 
not been fully confronted. This is particularly unsatisfactory because the case is of critical 
importance and, when combined with those judicial statements seemingly endorsing 
strong indirect horizontal effect, the scope of the misuse of private information tort 
remains uncertain. Moreover, by avoiding a clear resolution of the issue the courts are 
not giving the Strasbourg Court ‘the opportunity to reconsider the particular aspect of 
the decision that is in issue, so that there takes place what may prove to be a valuable 
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dialogue between [the domestic] court and the Strasbourg Court’,137 as occurred when the 
Grand Chamber re-heard Al-Khawaja138following the Supreme Court’s decision not to 
follow it in Horncastle. Arguably, dialogue between the Strasbourg Court and domestic 
courts would be a better method of harmonising human rights interpretation, rather than 
the kind of State pressure that appears to have had an impact on the decisions in Von 
Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer. As this chapter will move on to suggest, a further 
aspect of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, the argument of waiver, supports the 
conclusion that domestic judges in the UK have not sought to mirror the Convention 
through their use of section 2 HRA. Instead, consistency has apparently been achieved 
following the recent Axel Springer decision which, on this point, demonstrates a further 
retreat by the Strasbourg Court from its previous strong protection of privacy.  
 
The Argument of Waiver 
 
‘Implied consent’ or ‘waiver’ are terms used to describe the argument that a claimant, by 
seeking publicity in the past and voluntarily placing their private life in the public domain, 
should be taken to have consented to the publicity they now complain of.139 Waiver 
operates in this context as a defence of sorts because the press must raise and prove the 
argument.140 Waiver will be considered in this chapter, however, because if an individual 
is deemed to have waived their privacy rights it is the reasonable expectation of privacy 
that is defeated; in a sense it never existed.  
 
The concept of waiver is problematic in terms of the interests sought to be protected by 
privacy law in this context. As chapter 1 emphasised, informational autonomy or control 
over personal information is generally considered to underpin the legal regulation of 
private information. Thus, selective disclosure within a chosen sphere furthers the 
development of intimate relationships, self-fulfilment and dignity. 141 It follows therefore 
that ‘previous disclosures amount not to an abandonment of the right to privacy, but an 
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exercise of it’.142 In many cases, to justify unauthorised publication of personal 
information with the notion of implied consent would be contrary to the foundational 
principles of privacy protection. There may be a plausible argument that the private 
nature of certain information might be lost by the claimant having repeatedly and 
consensually discussed it with the media. There would be in that instance no reason for 
the court to protect it by the tort of misuse of private information. If such an argument 
is to be compatible with the theoretical model for privacy protection this thesis is putting 
forward, the waiver argument should be restricted to the very limited circumstances in 
which the publicity complained of virtually mirrored the previous disclosures; a limited 
‘zonal’ or ‘differentiated’ waiver approach. In this way, interviews given by a celebrity 
about certain aspects of her relationship would not, from then on, entitle the press to 
publish any details of her personal life (a ‘blanket waiver’ approach) or even of her future 
relationships. As Fenwick and Phillipson suggest; ‘a claim would still lie where the 
publication went further in terms of intimate detail than any disclosures voluntarily made 
by the claimant’.143 Similarly, waiver would have little or no impact regarding the 
publication of photographs. Consent to take part in specific photo-shoots, and the 
implicit consent given when celebrities attend red-carpet events, could not be said to 
permit the publication of any photographs of the individual, particularly given the special 
protection photographs are given by the courts.144  
 
Until recently, the ECtHR had provided no clear guidance as to the appropriate 
treatment of the waiver argument.145 However, cases such as Tammer v Estonia,146 which 
granted strong Article 8 protection to a politician’s private life, and later Von Hannover 
(No. 1), indicated that such an argument would be unlikely to undermine the privacy 
claim at Strasbourg. The UK courts’ inconsistent application of waiver, it will be argued, 
reflects some judicial hesitancy about the extent to which the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test should continue to be informed by the principles of common law breach of 
confidence, which accepted the waiver argument. Furthermore, the apparent recent 
acceptance of waiver by the Strasbourg Court creates further uncertainty regarding this 
crucial aspect of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, while, technically, resulting in 
greater consistency between it and UK courts. 
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Waiver was accepted by the courts in a number of pre-HRA breach of confidence cases. 
In Lennon,147 John Lennon sought to prevent his former wife publishing details about 
their married life. The Court of Appeal, in dismissing his appeal against the refusal to 
grant an injunction, held that as both parties had previously disclosed information about 
their relationship it had ‘ceased to be their own private affair’.148 Lennon had effectively 
waived his right to restrict publication.149 Early privacy cases in the post-HRA era also 
accepted the argument of waiver. In A v B Lord Justice Woolf commented (obiter) that 
‘[i]f you have courted publicity then you have less ground to object to the intrusion 
which follows’,150 suggesting a blanket waiver approach whereby the expectation of 
privacy in all aspects of private life would be diminished by previous voluntary publicity. A 
more restrictive version of waiver was applied in Theakston; ‘[h]aving courted publicity 
and not complained of it when hitherto it had been very largely favourable to him, the 
claimant could not complain if the publicity given to his sexual activities in this instance 
were less favourable’.151 Although Theakston’s previous disclosures had been in the same 
zone as the information complained of (his sex life) the publication certainly added 
additional details that, based on the model outlined above, he should not have been 
deemed to consent to. 
 
In contrast, the Court of Appeal in Douglas (No. 2) rejected the waiver argument and 
instead examined the couple’s attempts to retain the privacy of their wedding, as opposed 
to their past publicity. The fact that ultimately the photographs would be sold to OK! 
magazine, and widely disseminated, could affect the remedy granted but not the 
expectation of privacy.152 Lord Hoffmann in Campbell rejected the notion of a blanket 
waiver; ‘[a] person may attract or even seek publicity about some aspect of his or her life 
without creating any public interest in the publication of personal information about 
other matters’.153 The finding that Campbell could not conceal the fact of her treatment 
for drug addiction was said to be a matter of public interest (that the public should not 
be misled) rather than an issue of waiver and Campbell’s past publicity did not prevent 
the court protecting the details of her treatment at NA. Lord Hoffmann did, however, 
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appear to contemplate a narrow zonal approach; ‘[Campbell and the media] have for 
many years…fed upon each other. She has given them stories to sell their papers and 
they have given her publicity to promote her career. This does not deprive Ms Campbell 
of the right to privacy in respect of areas of her life which she has not chosen to make public’.154 The 
italicised text suggests that had Campbell, in the past, publicised specific details of her 
treatment there might have been some application of a restrictive version of the waiver 
doctrine and the publication of these details may have been permitted. 
 
Post-Campbell the waiver argument has been inconsistently applied. In A v B155 a 
musician, who had previously disclosed his drug-taking to the press, sought to restraint 
publication of an article written by his former wife detailing the effects drugs had on him 
and his treatment at NA. Mr Justice Eady emphasised the importance of waiver to the 
outcome of the case; ‘[t]he critical question is whether the claimant has a reasonable 
expectation that such information should be protected, [which] depends to a large extent 
upon his own circumstances and conduct’.156 Rejecting the notion of a blanket waiver, he 
went on to state that: 
 
[I]n identifying the scope of material within the public domain, once such a claimant has chosen 
to lift the veil on his personal affairs, the test will be ‘zonal’; that is to say, the court’s 
characterisation of what is truly in the public domain will not be tied specifically to the details 
revealed in the past but rather focus upon the general area or zone of the claimant’s personal life 
(e.g. drug addiction) which he has chosen to expose.
157
 
 
This fairly broad approach to waiver is, along with the blanket approach, out of accord 
with the principle of informational autonomy because it takes a specific instance of an 
exercise of control over personal information and applies it to a much wider context that, 
in many cases, probably would not have been consented to. The case may have been 
driven by a desire, on the part of the judge, to prevent that particular claimant obtaining 
redress given his prior criminal conduct, but to broaden the scope of zonal waiver from 
that discussed by the House of Lords in Campbell (itself not clearly in accord with 
Strasbourg at that time) was an unsatisfactory outcome in the case. 
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More recently, the higher courts have not applied the A v B approach to waiver. In the 
Prince of Wales case the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that by speaking publicly and 
publishing articles on political matters Prince Charles had forfeited his reasonable 
expectation of privacy with regard to his private diary.158 The waiver argument was 
convincingly dismissed at first instance in McKennitt; ‘there is… a significant difference 
between choosing to reveal aspects of private life with which one feels comfortable and 
yielding up to public scrutiny every detail of personal life’.159 The Court of Appeal 
confirmed this view, finding that ‘[t]he zone argument completely undermines [the] 
reasonable expectation of privacy’.160 In Murray the Court of Appeal contemplated some 
use of the waiver argument; ‘if the parents of a child courted publicity by procuring the 
publication of photographs of the child in order to promote their own interests, the 
position would or might be quite different from a case like this, where the parents have 
taken care to keep their children out of the public gaze’.161 Though those comments were 
strictly obiter it is possible that celebrities, who might be said to commodify aspects of 
their private life by regularly featuring their children in photo-shoots and television series, 
may now find it difficult to object to the unauthorised publication of photographs of 
them. In Ferdinand the waiver argument was once again dismissed. Although Ferdinand 
had previously discussed his sex life with the media, it was found that there was ‘no basis 
for arguing that…he had forsaken a reasonable expectation of privacy in connection with 
his relationship with Ms Storey’.162 By this statement, the court seemed to imply that for 
the zone argument to have any chance of success it would have to be shown that the 
material complained of was in the same narrow zone as the previous disclosures.  
 
While Murray may indicate some inconsistency, following Ferdinand it seemed that the 
waiver argument was becoming marginalised by the courts, demonstrating an increasing 
judicial commitment to the theoretical justifications for privacy protection and 
consistency with the Convention, though this was not expressly mentioned by the courts. 
Decisions in the domestic courts may now be influenced by the Grand Chamber’s recent 
decision in Axel Springer AG v Germany.163 Bild newspaper ran a front-page story, featuring 
three photographs, covering the arrest of a well-known television actor who had been 
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found in possession of cocaine at the Munich Beer Festival. The story was followed up 
several months later with publication of the actor’s confession and criminal prosecution. 
The German courts granted injunctions to prevent further publication of the material 
and fined the publisher. Bild’s publisher complained that Article 10 had been violated by 
the restriction. The ECtHR held that the actor was sufficiently well-known to be rightly 
classed as a public figure, there was a public interest in the material164 and consequently 
there had been a violation of Article 10. The most interesting aspect of the Court’s 
judgement, for present purposes, is the credence given to the argument of waiver.  
 
The Court, speaking of the waiver argument in general terms, suggested that: 
 
The conduct of the person concerned prior to publication of the report or the fact that the photo 
and the related information have already appeared in an earlier publication are also factors to be 
taken into consideration…However, the mere fact of having cooperated with the press on 
previous occasions cannot serve as an argument for depriving the party concerned of all 
protection against publication of the report or photo at issue.
165
 
 
These comments indicate a rejection of the blanket waiver approach with a possible 
acceptance that Article 8 protection may be reduced if a person seeks publicity in respect 
of one aspect of their private life. The Court then purported to apply this principle in the 
case, finding that as the claimant had previously sought the limelight by giving numerous 
interviews, his legitimate expectation of privacy was reduced.166 This finding was made 
without clarification of precisely how or why actor ‘X’ had, in effect, waived his rights. 
Of more concern are the findings of the German Regional Court which shed light on X’s 
publicity seeking past and are summarised in the ECtHR’s judgement: 
 
X had not sought to portray himself as an emblem of moral virtue; neither had he adopted a 
stand on matters relating to drug abuse. The interviews reported by the applicant company 
contained no comment by X on the subject. In Issue No.48/2003 of the magazine Bunte, X had 
stated, in passing, that he did not have any alcohol in the house and that he had become a big tea 
connoisseur. In the [Regional] court’s view, the fact that X had briefly remarked on his previous 
conviction in two interviews with magazines in 2000 and 2001 did not mean that he had 
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portrayed himself as an advocate or critic of the fight against drugs or as an expert in the field. 
That subject had been only marginally covered in the interview, which had mainly concerned the 
actor’s professional prospects and his difficulties in his relationships.
167  
 
Given that X did not appear to have extensively publicised his use of drugs in the past, 
the Court seems to have in fact adopted a wide zonal waiver approach, 168 contrasting the 
apparently more restrictive position taken by the English court in Ferdinand. The waiver 
issue was again raised in the post-Axel Springer decision of the High Court in Trimingham. 
Mr Justice Tugendhat found that the claimant’s Article 8 rights were limited ‘because she 
herself had been open about her sexuality and her sexual relationships’.169 This statement 
can be interpreted as an acceptance of the zonal waiver approach, or could refer to the 
fact that a number of people were aware of the information complained of in the case, 
highlighting the overlap between the two concepts. In either instance this factor should 
not have undermined the claimant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The judge 
accepted that ‘those who knew her knew of her sexuality’ and it was clear that Trimingham 
had not revealed the more explicit details of her relationship with Chris Huhne beyond a 
limited group of people she was ‘comfortable with’.170 As previously discussed, the courts 
are reluctant to find that a controlled release of information destroys the expectation of 
privacy171 so the fact that a number of people were aware of the information should not 
have been significant. Moreover, the waiver argument should not have been applied 
because the judge accepted that Trimingham had not previously publicised information 
relating to her sex life.  
It does not appear that the revival of the issue of waiver in Trimingham was a direct result 
of its mention in Axel Springer. However, the Trimingham case demonstrates that some 
English judges remain open to the waiver argument in certain cases and, in the light of 
Strasbourg’s apparent endorsement of the doctrine, it is likely that barristers for the press 
will renew their attempts to show that a claimant has waived their privacy rights through 
prior publicity. In this they will be assisted by section 2 HRA and the PCC Privacy 
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Code172 which states that ‘account will be taken of the complainant’s own public 
disclosures of information’. If the waiver argument, as conceived in these cases, does 
achieve more prominence in the future, though it may technically be in line with the 
Strasbourg ruling in Axel Springer, would have the effect of widening the distance 
between the theoretical and legal models of privacy protection. 
Conclusion 
In answering the research questions, this chapter has argued that the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of the scope of Article 8 in Von Hannover (No. 1) fully adheres to the 
theoretical model for privacy protection discussed in chapter 1. Protection of the core 
values of privacy (informational and substantive autonomy) was maximised by granting 
strong protection to anodyne information (in speech terms), acquired in a public 
location. The recent Strasbourg decisions in Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer 
appear to have downgraded the degree of Article 8 protection by extending the category 
of ‘public figures’ to include well-known, as well as political, figures, and suggesting that 
only a weak engagement with Article 8 occurs when anodyne information is published by 
the media. The developments identified in these cases have significant implications for 
the balancing stage of the courts analysis (discussed in the following chapter), but, 
depending on their interpretation by the domestic judges, arguably should not have a 
major impact in English law. In both cases it was accepted that the information prima facie 
engaged Article 8. Of greater concern is the doubtful application of waiver in Axel 
Springer. Given that, as argued, the notion of waiver of privacy rights is inconsistent with 
informational autonomy, this aspect of the case, in particular, indicates a shift in favour 
of media freedom at Strasbourg and, moreover, involves a significant departure from the 
theoretical model.  
It has further been argued that the reasonable expectation of privacy test in UK law is 
quite different from the equivalent test at Strasbourg. This is most striking in terms of 
the emphasis placed by the courts on the finding of a traditional breach of confidence 
and their continued hesitancy over the issue of innocuous photographs of individuals in 
public locations. The domestic courts seem to have reached the position that information 
will be protected if it can be shown that it was private due to its nature, form, and/or 
because it was disclosed in a breach of confidence. Following the 2008 Court of Appeal 
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decision in Murray, the courts have avoided protecting less intrusive photographs of 
individuals. Information such as anodyne photographs of an individual, in either a public 
or private location, must usually have the addition of surreptitious acquisition, an element 
of harassment, or a particularly vulnerable claimant, for the court to find a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, despite the presumption in favour of following Strasbourg 
jurisprudence that has been developed by the courts under section 2 HRA.  
As suggested, the Strasbourg decisions in Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer appear 
to have relaxed some of the more stringent requirements of the first Von Hannover 
decision, and the domestic reasonable expectation of privacy test (with the exception of 
the High Court decision in Trimingham) is now broadly in harmony with Strasbourg’s 
application of Article 8. However, it is clear that this consistency has been more 
coincidental173 than as a direct result of English courts feeling bound to import the 
content of Article 8 into the tort of misuse of private information. Therefore, the 
language of strong indirect horizontal effect, or even direct effect, used by the judges in 
some of these cases is misleading and masks the fact that in practice the cases are much 
more suggestive of a weak version of indirect horizontal effect and the preservation of 
the flexibility of common law judicial decision making. While the most recent domestic 
decisions indicate consistency with Strasbourg, the inconsistent application of waiver in 
Ferdinand and Trimingham, together with a continued reluctance to afford strong 
protection to ‘anodyne’ information, suggests that informational autonomy is not 
afforded full protection in English law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
173 And is probably linked to the dissatisfaction with Von Hannover (No. 1) among Member States. See 
chapter 5 at p 108. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE ULTIMATE BALANCING EXERCISE 
 
Introduction 
 
The theoretical model for privacy protection outlined in chapter 1 suggested that when 
balancing privacy and free speech courts should initially presume that the respective 
rights are of equal value. The degree of engagement with the philosophical justifications 
underlying the respective rights may then be used to determine which right should 
ultimately prevail. As argued, directly political speech, potentially impacting upon the 
voting decisions of the electorate, engages the powerful argument from democracy and 
may, in general, require very strong reasons to justify interference with it. In contrast, 
celebrity gossip, often involving photographs of celebrities in their daily lives and more 
intrusive information relating to their intimate relationships, usually finds no support 
from the core speech rationales. The ‘infotainment’ category of speech, containing 
elements of both celebrity gossip and political speech (broadly defined) may, depending 
on its link to issues of public importance, have some value in speech terms. While the 
courts should recognise the possible value of such speech, if a practical and effective 
privacy action is to emerge, such speech should not generally override a competing 
privacy claim.1  
 
This chapter will begin by considering the leading Strasbourg authorities on the 
speech/privacy balance, arguing that while Von Hannover (No. 1) demonstrated a strong 
adherence to the theoretical model, recent modification of that position, following the 
2012 decisions in Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer, suggests that the ECtHR now 
accepts relatively weak speech justifications as legitimate interferences with the right to 
privacy. A comparison with the domestic speech/privacy balances adds further support 
to the conclusion reached in chapter 3; post Von Hannover (No. 1) UK judges do not 
appear to have felt bound to bring UK law into line with the Convention. While a 
number of encouraging post-Von Hannover (No. 1) domestic decisions may have indicated 
                                                 
1 See chapter 1 at p 15. 
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a stronger commitment by the English judiciary to mirror Strasbourg, more recently it 
appears that weaker public interest claims have been given greater prominence. The 
current harmony between the domestic and European courts appears to be as a result of 
the Strasbourg Court weakening the level of privacy protection. Therefore, while the 
Convention jurisprudence has provided a strong measure of guidance for the UK courts, 
in terms of the structure of the balancing exercise, there is little evidence of direct 
horizontal effect or strong indirect horizontal effect in the substance of the balancing act 
carried out in domestic privacy adjudication. 
 
The Balance Struck by the Strasbourg Court 
 
Freedom of expression is protected by the Convention under Article 10, which states 
that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers’. As with the Article 8 right to respect for 
private and family life, Article 10 is qualified and may be restricted under paragraph two 
provided the interference is prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim, is necessary in a 
democratic society and is a proportionate response to the aim pursued. The Article 10 
jurisprudence reveals that, although freedom of expression ‘constitutes one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society’,2 a hierarchy of different types of 
expression has been developed by the ECtHR. Political speech, engaging the argument 
from democracy,3 generally receives a stronger level of protection than artistic and 
commercial expression.4 Privacy actions involve the conflict of two rights. The complaint 
could be initially framed in either Article 8 terms—the State had failed to sufficiently 
protect the applicant’s right to private life—or Article 10 terms—the State had infringed 
the applicant’s right to freedom of expression by imposing sanctions aimed at protecting 
private life. Therefore, when considering whether the primary right may be restricted 
under paragraph two, the Court must consider the conflicting right based on the 
                                                 
2 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737. 
3 See chapter 1 at p 8. 
4 The leading cases such as Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 
EHRR 103, Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1 demonstrate that 
when political speech is at stake the ECtHR applies a narrow margin of appreciation, subjecting the 
interference with expression to ‘intensive review’. In contrast, in cases concerning the restriction of artistic 
expression the Court tends to grant domestic authorities a wide margin of appreciation, enabling them to 
respond to the perceived religious and moral needs of the state. See Müller v Switzerland (1991) 13 EHRR 
212; Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria (1995) 19 EHRR 34; Wingrove v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 1. See 
H Fenwick and G Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP 2006) 50. 
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presumption that Articles 8 and 10 are of equal value, rather than considering the 
conflicting right as an exception to the primary right. This approach is consistent with 
the overall scheme of the Convention, which does not seek to prioritise the qualified 
rights such as Article 8 and Article 10,5 but also ensures that any restriction on either 
right is closely scrutinised and a fair balance is struck between the two. The pre-Von 
Hannover (No. 1) cases did not expressly endorse this method of balancing Articles 8 and 
10,6 following Von Hannover (No. 1), however, it is clear that, initially, neither right takes 
precedence over the other.   
 
As will be recalled from chapter 3, in Von Hannover (No. 1) the Strasbourg Court ruled 
that Princess Caroline’s rights under Article 8 had been infringed by the publication in 
German magazines of photographs of her in her daily life. Having found that Article 8 
was engaged, because the Princess was a private individual and the photographs showed 
scenes from her private life, the Court went on to balance the protection of privacy 
against freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 10.7 In determining how the balance 
should be struck, the Court considered that the ‘decisive factor… should lie in the 
contribution that the published photos and articles make to a debate of general interest’.8 
The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany had, as Fenwick and Phillipson note, 
conducted a ‘relatively subtle and sophisticated’ enquiry into the value of the type of 
speech in question:9 
 
[T]here is a growing tendency in the media to do away with the distinction between information 
and entertainment both as regards press coverage generally and individual contributions, and to 
disseminate information in the form of entertainment or mix it with entertainment 
(“infotainment”)…Nor can mere entertainment be denied any role in the formation of opinions. 
That would amount to unilaterally presuming that entertainment merely satisfies a desire for 
amusement, relaxation, escapism or diversion. Entertainment can also convey images of reality 
and propose subjects for debate that spark a process of discussion and assimilation relating to 
philosophies of life, values and behaviour models…The same is true of information about 
people. Personalisation is an important journalistic means of attracting attention. Very often it is 
                                                 
5 There is, however, a distinction between the absolute rights (Articles 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7) and the qualified 
rights (Articles 8 to 11).  
6 As Fenwick and Phillipson argue, however, such an approach may be implicit in Tammer v Estonia (2003) 
37 EHRR 43 and Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41. Both cases suggested that the scope of Article 
8 would not be narrowed when it came into conflict with Article 10. See H Fenwick and G Phillipson, 
Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP 2006) 691. 
7 [2004] EMLR 21, [58].  
8 ibid [76]. 
9 H Fenwick and G Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP 2006) 694. 
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this which first arouses interest in a problem and stimulates a desire for factual 
information…Additionally, celebrities embody certain moral values and lifestyles. Many people 
base their choice of lifestyle on their example. They become points of crystallisation for adoption 
or rejection and act as examples or counter-examples. This is what explains the public interest in 
the various ups and downs occurring in their lives.
10
 
 
The German Court had found that there could be a public interest in the dissemination 
of entertaining speech about the private lives of celebrities and other individuals, 
primarily to stimulate debate and further the personal development of the audience. The 
reasoning, to some extent, reflects Raz’s ‘personal identification’ argument, discussed in 
chapter 1.11 Moreover, it accords with the earlier Strasbourg decision in Thorgeirson v 
Iceland.12 In that case the Court had found that there was ‘no warrant in its case-law for 
distinguishing…between political discussion and discussion of other matters of public 
concern’.13 Thus the high level of protection given to political speech could extend 
beyond information relating strictly to politicians and the political process. 
 
The Strasbourg Court, in Von Hannover (No. 1) ‘implicitly rejected’14 this interpretation of 
the public interest, finding that ‘the publication of the photos and articles in question, of 
which the sole purpose was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding the 
details of the applicant’s private life, cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of 
general interest to society despite the applicant being known to the public’.15 In 
concluding that freedom of expression should be interpreted narrowly on the facts,16 the 
Court employed the same reasoning as when determining whether Article 8 was 
engaged.17 Thus the criticisms relating to the classification of Princess Caroline as a 
private individual, and the finding that the photographs contained private information, 
are also relevant at the balancing stage.18 In term of striking the balance between the 
protection of private life and freedom of expression, the case makes clear that, in general, 
if the applicant claiming a breach of Article 8 performs no official functions, and the 
                                                 
10 [2004] EMLR 21, [25].  
11 See chapter 1 at p 14. 
12 (1992) 14 EHRR 843. 
13 ibid [64].  
14 B Rudolf, ‘Council of Europe: Von Hannover v Germany’ (2006) 4(3) IJCL 533 (note), 535. 
15 [2004] EMLR 21, [65].  
16 ibid [66]. 
17 ibid [76]. 
18 See chapter 3 at p 47. This is highlighted in the Concurring Opinion of Judge Cabral Barreto. Having 
found that Princess Caroline was a public figure, the Judge went on to decide that ‘information about her 
life [contributed] to a debate of general interest’; [2004] EMLR 21, 409. 
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information relates solely to their private life, no contribution to a debate of general 
interest will be made by its publication.19  
 
In contrast, the Strasbourg Court considered that the public’s right to be informed could 
‘in certain special circumstances… extend to aspects of the private life of public figures, 
particularly where politicians are concerned’.20 The Von Hannover (No. 1) judgement is 
therefore consistent with the decision in Plon (Société) v France.21 The Court had found that 
a permanent injunction prohibiting the publication of a book written by a doctor of the 
late President Mitterrand, revealing that the President had concealed his serious health 
problems for over a decade, breached Article 10. Despite the sensitive nature of the 
information disclosed, the speech in question was clearly of high value and, accordingly, 
the Court found that the French public had an interest in being informed about the 
secrecy surrounding the President’s illness, and the opportunity to discuss his suitability 
for office. While Plon (Société) confirms that political speech (relating to politicians and the 
political process) is afforded strong protection by the Strasbourg Court, to the extent that 
it may be found to override even strong competing privacy rights, it should be 
emphasised that the Court upheld an interim injunction lasting nine months out of 
respect for the President’s grieving family immediately after his death. Moreover, in an 
earlier political speech case, Tammer v Estonia,22 concerning the reporting of an affair 
between a senior politician and a former government official, the Court found that 
criminal sanctions imposed on the journalist by the domestic courts were necessary and 
proportionate to protect the Article 8 rights of those concerned.23 Thus, while political 
speech may be an exception to the general rule favouring the protection of Article 8, 
following Von Hannover (No. 1), the cases mentioned demonstrate that even speech going 
to the heart of the political process may, in certain circumstances, be restricted in the 
interests of protecting privacy. 
 
The balance struck in Von Hannover (No. 1) appears, therefore, to closely adhere to the 
theoretical model discussed in chapter 1. On the facts, no plausible argument could have 
                                                 
19 See, however, the Concurring Opinion of Judge Cabral Barreto who broadly agreed with the reasoning 
of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, adding that ‘the public has a legitimate interest in being 
allowed to judge whether the personal behaviour of the individuals in question, who are often regarded as 
idols or role models, convincingly tallies with their behaviour on their official engagements’ [2004] EMLR 
21, 409. 
20 [2004] EMLR 21, [64]. 
21 (2006) 42 EHRR 36. 
22 (2001) 37 EHRR 857. 
23 ibid [59].  
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been, or was, raised to demonstrate that the published photographs of Princess Caroline 
in her daily life genuinely contributed to a debate of general interest. The information 
could not have been said to engage the argument from democracy, in a strict sense, as 
Princess Caroline was not involved in political life in Monaco. As argued in chapter 1, the 
truth value of the speech was of limited importance and must have given way to the 
much stronger privacy claim.24  
 
In accordance with the view of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the speech 
may have had some value in terms of proposing subjects for debate, and the possible 
positive impact of this on the self-fulfilment and personal development of the audience.25 
However, the Strasbourg Court was right to afford the speech a low weighting given that, 
for the majority of readers, the information would have merely been for entertainment 
purposes and any debate sparked would have related to the anodyne facts of Princess 
Caroline’s daily lifestyle choices; the information did not genuinely relate to a matter of 
public concern. Even if such a link had been established, on the other side of the 
balance, the threat to Princess Caroline’s informational and substantive autonomy was 
relatively serious, notwithstanding the fact that the photographs did not immediately 
appear to be particularly intrusive or embarrassing.26 The Article 8 claim would have been 
even stronger if the speech related to medical data or sexual life, for example.27 As 
discussed in chapter 1,28 it would arguably be an unjustifiable intrusion to publish such 
facts for entertainment or in order to foster public debate, particularly given that this 
need could be satisfied by those willing to share their stories and images.29 For the 
Strasbourg Court, in Von Hannover (No. 1), to have found in favour of Article 10, the 
right to respect for private life would have been outweighed by the interest in 
entertaining the masses, or, effectively, ‘[t]he debasement of individual rights to the 
collective whim’.30 If this position had been adopted, it would have been contrary to the 
notion that human rights aim to protect the rights of all against such an exercise of 
power by the majority.31  
                                                 
24 See chapter 1 at p 10. 
25 See above at p 79 and chapter 1 at p 12. 
26 See chapter 3 at p 47. 
27 See chapter 1 at p 17. 
28 ibid. 
29 H Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 950.  
30 G Phillipson, ‘Memorandum to the Leveson Inquiry’ (28 March 2012) 
<http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Submission-by-Professor-Gavin-
Phillipson-Durham-Law-School.pdf> accessed 10 August 2012, [10]. 
31 ibid [9].  
  83 
 
Moreover, by emphasising that public figures (referring essentially to politicians within 
Strasbourg’s sense of the term) are the exception to the general rule, the Court set out to 
ensure that speech engaging the argument from democracy, one of the central 
justifications for freedom of speech, would receive stronger protection. The 
controversial interpretation of the term ‘public figure’,32 however, and the reasoning used 
by the Court—that there can generally be no public interest in the private life of non-
public figures—risks the automatic restriction of expression, without close scrutiny of 
the speech itself, or recognition that such speech can contribute to debate. The Court’s 
approach runs the risk of prematurely tipping the balance in favour of Article 8, 
potentially leading to the restriction of valuable speech. Although, as has been argued, it 
will often be the privacy interest that prevails, the value of the speech in question should 
always be seriously considered and articulated by the court.  
 
The guidance of the Strasbourg Court in Von Hannover (No. 1), with regards to balancing 
the competing rights under Articles 8 and 10, suggests that private information about 
non-politicians should not be deemed to contribute to a debate of general interest. 
Consequently, it is of little value in Article 10 terms and, generally, in such cases, Article 
8 should prevail. While the outcome of the case was, it is argued, correct, the reasoning 
of the Court could have demonstrated a more nuanced approach to the speech in 
question. This would have recognised that although such speech may have some value, 
the competing right to private life will often be sufficient to outweigh any benefit the 
audience would have by receiving it. Before considering how far the UK judiciary has 
followed Von Hannover (No. 1) it is necessary to consider some further recent 
developments at Strasbourg. 
 
Re-Balancing at Strasbourg following Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer? 
 
In Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer the ECtHR set out a list of criteria relevant for 
the balancing exercise. These were to include; (1) the contribution of the information to a 
debate of general interest, (2) how well know the person concerned is (their role or 
function) and the subject of the report, (3) the prior conduct of the person concerned, 
(4) the content, form and consequences of the publication, (5) the circumstances in 
                                                 
32 See chapter 3 at p 49. 
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which the photographs were taken (were they taken covertly or with consent and what 
was the nature or seriousness of publication?).33 The case concerned publication of a 
photograph of Princess Caroline and her husband walking in the street during a skiing 
holiday in St. Moritz, to illustrate an article about the failing health of Monaco’s reigning 
Head of State. Although the Strasbourg Court maintained that ‘whilst a private individual 
unknown to the public may claim particular protection of his or her right to private life, 
the same is not true of public figures’34 (the Von Hannover (No. 1) position), the Court 
modified its definition of public figures to include those simply well-known to the 
public.35 The Court did not find unreasonable the German Courts’ characterisation of 
Prince Rainier’s illness as an event of contemporary society.36 Therefore, in line with the 
findings of the Federal Constitutional Court, the press could legitimately report on how 
the Prince’s children reconciled family duties with their private life, which, in this 
instance, included going on holiday during the time of the Prince’s illness.37 There was, in 
the view of the Strasbourg Court, a sufficiently close link between the event and the 
photograph; ‘the photos in question, considered in the light of the accompanying articles, 
did contribute, at least to some degree, to a debate of general interest’.38 Moreover, the 
photographs themselves were not offensive to the extent that their prohibition was 
justified.39 
 
As argued in relation to stage one of the Court’s analysis (whether Article 8 is engaged by 
the publication), the expansion of the Court’s definition of ‘public figure’ in Von 
Hannover (No. 2) is somewhat more satisfactory, although it does appear to downgrade 
the privacy rights of certain categories of people.40 It invited the Court to recognise that 
speech relating to non-politicians may be of value in Article 10 terms, as reflected in 
Thorgeirson and the academic literature.41 Beyond this, however, the reasoning of the 
Court was not wholly convincing. As Jordan and Hurst persuasively argue, although ‘the 
differentiation between the subject matter of the articles in Von Hannover (No. 1) and (No. 
2) is understandable, the link between the article in Von Hannover (No. 2) and the 
                                                 
33 App no 40660/08 (ECHR, 7 February 2012), [108]. 
34 ibid [110]. 
35 As discussed in chapter 3, see p 52. 
36 App no 40660/08 (ECHR, 7 February 2012), [118]. 
37 The German Courts had already restrained publication of similar photographs taken of the applicants on 
holiday which made no reference to an event of contemporary society.  
38 App no 40660/08 (ECHR, 7 February 2012), [118]. 
39 ibid [123]. 
40 See chapter 3 at p 52. 
41 See above at p 80 and chapter 1 at p 14. 
  85 
photograph of Princess Caroline taking a walk with her husband on a public street in St. 
Moritz during a skiing holiday is strained’.42 There is little to distinguish between the 
photographs found to be relatively inoffensive in this case, and those described as ‘very 
personal or even intimate’ in Von Hannover (No. 1). The tenuous link found between the 
article and the photographs appears to demonstrate the Strasbourg Court retreating from 
the strong commitment to informational privacy shown in the first Von Hannover 
decision.43 Moreover, the Court failed to confront the issue of whether, in future, the 
media would use an ‘event of contemporary society’ as a pretext to justify the publication 
of images of celebrities in daily life (or possibly more intrusive images), thereby 
circumventing the protection of privacy. Given the looseness of the connection between 
the article and photographs in Von Hannover (No. 2), it would appear that this may be a 
real possibility, depending on how the decision is interpreted by UK courts and absorbed 
into the action for misuse of private information. 
 
Similarly, Axel Springer, handed down at the same time as Von Hannover (No. 2), indicates 
a ‘perceptible shift towards freedom of expression’.44 The case concerned publicity given 
to the arrest of a well-known television actor, found in possession of cocaine at the 
Munich Beer Festival. The Strasbourg Court found that, in principle, the public had an 
interest in being informed about criminal proceedings, whilst strictly observing the 
presumption of innocence, particularly as the arrest had taken place in public.45 This was 
despite the fact that the offence was common, of medium or minor seriousness, and ‘the 
applicant company’s interest in publishing the articles in question was solely due to the 
fact that X had committed an offence which, if it had been committed by a person 
unknown to the public, would probably never have been reported on’.46  
 
While the arrest of a well-known actor at a public festival for a drugs related offence, may 
have contributed, to some extent, to a debate of general interest, the Court went on to 
take into account the actor’s television role as supporting that contribution: 
 
                                                 
42 B Jordan and I Hurst, ‘Privacy and the Princess - A Review of the Grand Chamber's Decisions in Von 
Hannover and Axel Springer’ (2012) 23(4) Ent LR 108,113. For a concurring view, see E C Reid, ‘Rebalancing 
Privacy and Freedom of Expression’ (2012) 16(2) Edin LR 253, 257. 
43 See chapter 5 for suggested reasons for this retreat. 
44 E C Reid, ‘Rebalancing Privacy and Freedom of Expression’ (2012) 16(2) Edin LR 253, 256. 
45 [2012] EMLR 15, [96].  
46 ibid [100].  
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[W]hilst it can be said that the public does generally make a distinction between an actor and the 
character he or she plays, there may nonetheless be a close link between the popularity of the 
actor in question and his or her character where, as in the instant case, the actor is mainly known 
for that particular role. In the case of X, that role was, moreover, that of a police superintendent, 
whose mission was law enforcement and crime prevention. That fact was such as to increase the 
public’s interest in being informed of X’s arrest for a criminal offence.
47
 
 
Although not articulated in the judgement, the Court seems to have accepted that actor 
X, given his popularity, was a role model.48 The applicant magazine was, therefore, 
justified in revealing that an aspect of his personal life did not match that of the character 
he portrayed on television. Reid makes the point that ‘[t]his seems to be a straightforward 
example of a feature which increased the public’s interest in the story but which had little 
bearing on its public interest value as such’.49 As discussed in chapter 1, the theoretical 
model of privacy protection suggested in this thesis does not, generally, support 
intrusions into private life for the purposes of correcting false impressions created by 
involuntary role models.50 The Court’s expansion of the role model argument, to include 
the correcting of false impressions created during the course of an individual’s acting 
career, seems wholly illogical. Moreover, no convincing reason for this aspect of the 
decision was supplied by the Court. By allowing such a flimsy justification to bolster the 
public interest in the article, the Court, again, appears to have weakened the privacy 
protection for certain individuals. 
 
Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer, taken together, affirm some of the principles set 
out in the first Von Hannover decision. Private information (including photographs) will 
still be protected if publication is for entertainment purposes only. The information must 
be linked to an event of contemporary society or be said to contribute to a debate of 
general interest, and, provided evidence can be adduced by the party claiming a breach of 
Article 8, other factors (such as harassment) may be taken into account. However, as has 
been argued, the inclusion of well-known individuals in the ‘public figure’ category has 
weakened the privacy rights of certain celebrities. Moreover, both cases suggest that very 
weak public interest justifications may be used to support publication of the information 
itself (as in Axel Springer) as well as photographs having little to do with the content of 
                                                 
47 ibid [99]. 
48 The reasoning is therefore more in line with the Concurring Opinion of Judge Cabral Barreto in Von 
Hannover (No. 1), as opposed to the judgement of the Court in that case. 
49 Reid, ‘Rebalancing Privacy and Freedom of Expression’ (n 44) 257. 
50 See chapter 1 at p 3 and below at p 91. 
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the article (as in Von Hannover (No. 2)). Furthermore, and seemingly in contrast to Von 
Hannover (No. 1), the focus of the Court was on reviewing the criteria applied by the 
domestic courts in conducting the balance, as opposed to scrutinising the substance of 
the competing claims. Overall, the later cases represent a retreat from the strong privacy 
protection demonstrated in Von Hannover (No. 1), both in terms of the scope of Article 8, 
in this context,51 and the way the balance is struck between privacy and freedom of 
expression. This chapter will move on to consider whether this shift has made it easier 
for UK courts to bring the balance struck in domestic law into line with the Convention 
given that, as will be argued, pre-Von Hannover (No. 2), some inconsistency with Von 
Hannover (No. 1) was apparent. 
 
The Ultimate Balancing Exercise in UK Domestic Courts 
 
It will be argued in this section that UK domestic courts have now settled upon an 
approach to the speech/privacy balance that grants equal status to the two rights, 
consistent with the leading Strasbourg authorities. The remainder of this chapter will 
critique the English courts’ interpretation of the public interest. 
 
The Structure of the Enquiry 
 
 Section 12(4) HRA enjoins domestic courts to ‘have particular regard to the importance 
of the Convention right to freedom of expression’ when considering whether to grant 
relief. Although this provision may indicate some Parliamentary intention to afford 
priority to Article 10 when balancing it against privacy and other interests,52 such an 
interpretation would have resulted in a structural imbalance between Articles 8 and 10, 
lacking consistency with the scheme of the Convention and even pre-Von Hannover (No. 
1) jurisprudence.53 Moreover, an approach treating the privacy claim as a restriction on 
expression under Article 10(2), using the reasoning of Lord Steyn in Reynolds v Times 
Newspapers,54 would have a similar effect in practice: 
                                                 
51 See chapter 3 at p 50. 
52 However, debates in the commons during the passing of the Human Rights Bill do not suggest that the 
government intended to create a hierarchy of rights domestically. See HC Deb 2 July 1998, vol 315 col 
535-39. 
53 See footnote 6 above. 
54 In considering the speech defence in libel law, Lord Steyn commented that ‘[t]he starting point is now 
the right of freedom of expression, a right based on a…higher legal order foundation. Exceptions…must 
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[P]rivacy would lose its Convention status as a fully-fledged right, becoming instead merely a 
narrowly interpreted exception to the right to freedom of expression. Such an approach…could 
not be right…The protection of the right to privacy would have to be justified as necessary in a 
democratic society, while the claims of free speech would be simply assumed.
55
 
Lord Justice Sedley, in Douglas v Hello! Ltd, recognised that to achieve compatibility with 
the Convention, when balancing the competing rights under Articles 8 and 10, domestic 
courts would have to treat the two rights, at least initially, as having equal value: 
The European Court of Human Rights has always recognised the high importance of free media 
of communication in a democracy, but its jurisprudence does not - and could not consistently 
with the Convention itself - give Article 10(1) the presumptive priority which is given, for 
example, to the First Amendment in the jurisprudence of the United States’ courts. Everything 
will ultimately depend on the proper balance between privacy and publicity in the situation facing 
the court.
56 
However, in subsequent pre-Campbell cases, the structural approach of UK domestic 
courts appeared to grant the right to free speech automatic priority in this context. In 
Venables, when considering whether publication of information relating to the 
whereabouts of the killers of James Bulger could be restricted, Dame Elizabeth Butler-
Sloss expressly treated the conflicting Article 2, 3 and 8 rights of the boys as narrowly 
interpreted exceptions to the Article 10 guarantee.57 A similar approach was applied in 
Theakston58 and implied in A v B plc,59 two cases in which Article 10 prevailed on arguably 
spurious public interest grounds.60  
The House of Lords in Campbell expressly and actually applied Lord Justice Sedley’s 
method of balancing the competing rights, confirming beyond doubt the presumptive 
equality of the two rights. As Lord Nicholls put it; ‘[t]he case involves the familiar 
competition between freedom of expression and respect for an individual’s privacy. Both 
                                                                                                                                            
be justified as being necessary in a democracy. In other words, freedom of expression is the rule, and 
regulation of speech in the exception requiring justification’. [1999] 4 All ER 609, 629. 
55 H Fenwick and G Phillipson, ‘Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era’ 
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are vitally important rights. Neither has precedence over the other’.61 From this starting 
point, their Lordships conducted a ‘parallel analysis’62 by scrutinising the strength of the 
claims under both Articles and assessing whether interference with either right would go 
further than necessary. Lord Steyn reaffirmed and clarified this approach in the House of 
Lords decision in Re S: 
First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the 
two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights 
being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or 
restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied 
to each.
63
 
 
These guidelines are now consistently referred to and applied by the lower courts in 
privacy cases.64 It is therefore clear that UK domestic courts are, at least in terms of 
structure, approaching speech/privacy balances compatibly with the overall Convention 
system and the leading jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court. However, this correct 
structural approach could be seriously undermined if the principles applied by the courts 
fail to accord with Strasbourg, an eventuality which, as will be argued, has intermittently 
occurred in domestic privacy cases. 
 
Information Contributing to a Debate of General Interest in Domestic Decisions 
The House of Lords in Campbell made clear that in carrying out the parallel analysis 
courts should scrutinise the strength of the competing claims by considering the values 
underlying both Article 8 and 10. Thus Lord Hope, recognising the hierarchy of 
expression developed by the Strasbourg Court, commented that ‘there were no political 
or democratic values at stake’ in the case, and that it was ‘not enough to deprive Miss 
Campbell of her right to privacy that she is a celebrity and that her private life is 
newsworthy’.65 Baroness Hale came to a similar conclusion; ‘[t]he political and social life 
of the community, and the intellectual, artistic or personal development of individuals, 
are not obviously assisted by pouring over the intimate details of a fashion model’s 
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private life’.66 In a subsequent, post-Von Hannover (No. 1) case, Baroness Hale reiterated 
these strong pro-privacy statements: 
The public only have a right to be told if two conditions are fulfilled. First, there must be a real 
public interest in communicating and receiving the information. This is, as we all know, very 
different from saying that it is information that interests the public - the most vapid tittle-tattle 
about the activities of footballers’ wives and girlfriends interests large sections of the public but 
no-one could claim any real public interest in our being told all about it.
67
 
Foreshadowing the decision of the Strasbourg Court in Von Hannover (No. 1), the House 
of Lords therefore recognised that in many instances press publication of facts about 
celebrities’ private lives would not necessarily be in the public interest and must often 
give way to a competing claim under Article 8. In contrast, interference with political 
speech, engaging the core free speech rationales, would require stronger justification. 
 
Mr Justice Eady in the High Court in Mosley built upon some of the principles considered 
in Campbell. As previously mentioned, the case concerned an article published by the 
News of the World detailing (with written descriptions, photographs and video footage) 
Max Mosley’s sexual activity in his private residence with a number of sex-workers. 
Having found that there was no Nazi theme to the ‘S and M’ activity, which may have 
justified publication of the information,68 Mr Justice Eady concluded that there was no 
public interest justifying publication of the material. Given Strasbourg’s strong protection 
of information relating to sexuality,69 Mr Justice Eady elaborated on the evolving judicial 
role in the context of intimate personal information: 
 
[I]t is not for the state or for the media to expose sexual conduct which does not involve any 
significant breach of the criminal law. That is so whether the motive for such intrusion is merely 
prurience or a moral crusade. It is not for journalists to undermine human rights, or for judges to 
refuse to enforce them, merely on grounds of taste or moral disapproval. Everyone is naturally 
entitled to espouse moral or religious beliefs to the effect that certain types of sexual behaviour 
are wrong or demeaning to those participating. That does not mean that they are entitled to 
hound those who practise them or to detract from their right to live life as they choose.
70
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Similar ideas were reiterated by the High Court in Terry.71 While these strong pro-privacy 
statements created a significant backlash from some areas of the press,72 they 
demonstrate a strong judicial commitment to the privacy values contained in the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and clear commitment to the value of informational and 
substantive autonomy, furthered by privacy protection. Mosley aside, the overall picture of 
speech/privacy balancing in domestic decisions has been, it is argued, undermined by the 
intermittent acceptance of an argument commonly raised by the media; namely that there 
is a strong public interest in revealing private information about celebrities, sometimes 
termed ‘role models’, in order the put the record straight if it is discovered that they fail 
to live up to their public persona in some aspect of their private life. 
 
Role Models and Putting the Record Straight 
 
The PCC Code, which the courts must take into account under section 12(4) HRA, 
refers to the notion that there may be a public interest in ‘preventing the public from 
being misled by an action or statement of an individual or organisation’. Lord Woolf, 
setting out guidance for the lower courts in A v B plc, commented that: 
A public figure is entitled to a private life. The individual, however, should recognise that because 
of his public position he must expect and accept that his actions will be more closely scrutinised 
by the media. Even trivial facts relating to a public figure can be of great interest to readers and 
other observers of the media…The public figure may hold a position where higher standards of 
conduct can be rightly expected by the public. The public figure may be a role model whose 
conduct could well be emulated by others. He may set the fashion. The higher the profile of the 
individual concerned the more likely that this will be the position…In many of these situations it 
would be overstating the position to say that there is a public interest in the information being 
published. It would be more accurate to say that the public have an understandable and so a 
legitimate interest in being told the information. If this is the situation then it can be appropriately 
taken into account by a court when deciding on which side of the line a case falls.
73
 
Following this reasoning, the Court of Appeal declined to grant an injunction preventing 
publication of the details of a footballer’s extra-marital affairs with two women; ‘it is not 
self-evident that how a well known premiership football player, who has a position of 
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responsibility within his club, chooses to spend his time off the football field does not 
have a modicum of public interest. Footballers are role models for young people and 
undesirable behaviour on their part can set an unfortunate example’.74 A similar stance 
was taken in Theakston. Although Mr Justice Ouseley accepted that BBC television 
presenter Jamie Theakson probably could not be classed as a role model, he went on to 
find that ‘the very nature of his job as a TV presenter of programmes for the younger 
viewer means that he will be seen as somebody whose lifestyle, publicised as it is, is one 
which does not attract moral opprobrium and would at least be generally harmless if 
followed’.75  
A related argument, often raised by media organisations to justify intrusive publications, 
was considered by the House of Lords in Campbell. The Court unanimously agreed that it 
was in the public interest to correct the false impression Campbell had created by 
publicly and repeatedly denying drug addiction.76 Had Campbell not made such public 
statements, all of the information would have, in principle, been protected by the tort of 
misuse of private information: 
Miss Campbell cannot complain about the fact that publicity was given in this article to the fact 
that she was a drug addict. This was a matter of legitimate public comment, as she had not only 
lied about her addiction but had sought to benefit from this by comparing herself with others in 
the fashion business who were addicted. As the Court of Appeal observed…where a public figure 
chooses to make untrue pronouncements abut his or her private life, the press will normally be 
entitled to put the record straight.
77  
Taken together, these three cases establish that domestic courts have been persuaded by 
the arguments that there may be a public interest in publishing private information if the 
subject of the article was a role model whose behaviour may influence others, particularly 
the young (A v B plc), if they presented a false image which belied the reality of their 
private life (Theakston), or if the public had been deceived by express lies about some 
aspect of the individual’s private life (Campbell). The underlying rationale of the courts in 
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these cases does not appear, therefore, to be furtherance of the argument from truth,78 
but instead an interest in exposing ‘misconduct by hypocrisy’.79 
As suggested in chapter 1, a privacy law strongly committed to the right to informational 
autonomy would not generally support such arguments tipping the balance in favour of 
free speech.80 This right grants individuals the freedom to set their own parameters for 
disclosure of private information, thereby enabling them to establish varying levels of 
intimacy in relationships and furthering personal development in a variety of ways.81 
Inevitably, this may lead to the public developing incorrect impressions about how 
certain high-profile individuals behave in their private lives. It is not clear, however, why 
such impressions are damaging to the public interest and thus entitle the press to put the 
record straight.82 What does seem clear is that this general approach would seriously 
threaten the right to selective disclosure, undermining, inter alia, individual choice over 
self-presentation, something practiced routinely by most of the population in the course 
of everyday social interaction.83 A problem with the role model idea in particular is that 
while some celebrities may willingly accept such a title, many do not. Sometimes a 
celebrity may be seen as a role model because of their career in the media, as in Theakston. 
Moreover, as Hatzis points out, the more media attention someone is given the more 
likely it is that they will be seen as a role model -the media may project an individual as a 
role model and then rely on this to serve their own commercial ends in justifying privacy 
invasions.84 
Campbell, it is argued, is a less clear-cut example because the model had taken a more 
active role in misleading the public by repeatedly stating that she was not a drug addict, 
gaining favourable publicity by so doing. However, there are other strong arguments 
against allowing the press to invade privacy in order to expose hypocrisy. As Baroness 
Hale recognised in Campbell; ‘[i]t might be questioned why, if a role model has adopted a 
stance which all would agree is beneficial rather than detrimental to society, it is so 
important to reveal that she has feet of clay’.85 As Fenwick and Phillipson point out, any 
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potential damage to those influenced by Campbell’s behaviour would be as a result of the 
Mirror bringing her wrongdoing to the public’s attention, rather than the fact of the 
behaviour itself.86 Logically, therefore, the public interest would be better served by 
preventing disclosure of the information to eliminate the possibility that her young fans 
could be encouraged to emulate her illegal activities.  
Given the clear inconsistency between Von Hannover (No. 1) and A v B plc, the Court of 
Appeal in McKennitt v Ash downplayed the effect of Lord Woolf’s guidance; ‘[i]f the court 
in A v B had indeed ruled definitively on the content and application of Article 10 then 
the position would be different; but that is what the court did not do’.87 Having found 
that A v B plc was not binding on the content of Articles 8 and 10,88 Lord Justice Buxton 
found that McKennitt, a well-known folk singer, did not ‘hold a position where higher 
standards of conduct [could] be rightly expected by the public’.89 Moreover, he doubted 
the validity of the concept of involuntary role models, particularly given that McKennitt 
had sought to maintain a degree of privacy over her personal life.90 The court was equally 
dismissive of Ash’s claim that the press were entitled to reveal that McKennitt had acted 
hypocritically by presenting a public image of proper behaviour, whilst mistreating Ash in 
her private capacity.91 The Court of Appeal did not, however, fully support the view of 
Mr Justice Eady in the High Court who had commented that ‘a very high degree of 
misbehaviour must be demonstrated’ to trigger a public interest defence: 
All of us try to behave well, no doubt, for most of the time, but hardly anyone succeeds in 
achieving that ideal. The mere fact that a ‘celebrity’ falls short from time to time, like everyone 
else, could not possibly justify exposure, in the supposed public interest, of every peccadillo or 
foible cropping up in day-to-day life.
92  
Although the Court of Appeal in McKennitt took the positive step of minimising the 
effect of Lord Woolf’s comments in A v B plc, importantly, they left open the possibility 
that a public interest defence could be established to expose the hypocrisy of a public 
figure, falling short of the Campbell situation in which she wilfully mislead the public by 
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lying about her drug addiction. Moreover, despite the strong pro-privacy ruling in Mosley, 
Mr Justice Eady also recognised some potential, albeit marginal, impact of the ‘role 
model’ argument in speech/privacy balancing: 
This modern approach of applying an ‘intense focus’ is thus obviously incompatible with making 
broad generalisations of the kind to which the media often resorted in the past such as, for 
example, ‘public figures must expect to have less privacy’ or ‘people in positions of responsibility 
must be seen as “role models” and set us all an example of how to live upstanding lives’. 
Sometimes factors of this kind may have a legitimate role to play when the ‘ultimate balancing 
exercise’ comes to be carried out, but generalisations can never be determinative. In every case ‘it 
all depends’ (i.e. upon what is revealed by the intense focus on the individual circumstances).
93
 
The possibility opened up in McKennitt and Mosley was realised by the High Court in the 
subsequent Ferdinand case. As discussed in chapter 3, Ferdinand concerned articles 
published by the Sunday Mirror revealing Rio Ferdinand’s extra-marital affair with Carly 
Storey. When balancing the competing rights, Mr Justice Nicol found that Article 10 
should prevail. The judge’s reasoning was partly based on the argument that Ferdinand 
had projected a false public image which the defendant newspaper was entitled to 
correct. Statements made in Ferdinand’s autobiography and in previous media interviews, 
suggesting that he had left behind his wild past in favour of a committed relationship, 
were given detailed consideration by the judge,94 leading to the conclusion that Ferdinand 
had ‘projected an image of himself and, while that image persisted, there was a public 
interest in demonstrating…that the image was false’.95 Ferdinand and Storey had not 
been in contact at the time of the misleading interviews and comments, therefore, unlike 
Campbell, Ferdinand had not lied to the public, nor could his comments be taken as a 
promise to remain faithful to his partner indefinitely, as the judge recognised.96 In giving 
this factor significant weight in the balance, the High Court appears to have arguably 
taken a broader approach to the public interest than the House of Lords in Campbell. 
Another important consideration in the case was Ferdinand’s role as captain of the 
England football team. Mr Justice Nicol accepted that a substantial body of the public 
would expect higher standards of behaviour, both on and off the pitch, from someone 
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holding the captaincy.97 The judge made clear that he was not making a judgement about 
Ferdinand’s fitness for the role, he was instead deciding that the article could contribute 
to a public debate on the matter.98 The case, therefore, arguably indicates a regressive 
step towards the criticised A v B plc position. The court found that by virtue of his role 
there was a public interest in exposing intimate aspects of Ferdinand’s private life, 
without precise explanation as to why they were relevant to the performance of that 
role.99 One aspect of Ferdinand’s conduct which arguably did impact upon his suitability 
to captain the England football team was that he had, against rules set by the team’s 
management, admitted Storey into hotel rooms where the team were staying. This, in the 
view of the judge, reinforced the public interest in exposing Ferdinand’s wrongdoing, 
regardless of whether it had happened during his captaincy (something denied by 
Ferdinand).100 While such an argument may have some persuasive force, given that, on 
the evidence, no such behaviour had occurred during the time of his captaincy and the 
very strong privacy interests at stake on the other side of the scales, it may not without 
more have been said to tip the balance in favour of Article 10.  
Rather than taking a restrictive interpretation of Campbell, as suggested by the Court of 
Appeal in McKennitt and Mr Justice Eady in the High Court in Mosley, Ferdinand marks a 
return to the heavily criticised A v B plc position and a widening of the gap between 
domestic law and the theoretical model. Ferdinand may now technically be aligned with 
the Convention, following the apparent acceptance of a form of ‘role model’ argument in 
Axel Springer. However, the public interest element in Springer related to a criminal 
offence in a public location, arguably of greater seriousness in public interest terms than 
a footballer’s extra-marital affair. Moreover, given that Ferdinand was decided prior to the 
decision of the ECtHR, it is evident that Mr Justice Tugendhat felt no obligation to 
discount the ‘role model’ argument in light of Von Hannover (No. 1). While this case may 
be a slight anomaly, in view of the relatively clear line of preceding authority which has 
seemed to marginalise the argument, it provides some further evidence that the UK 
judiciary do not, in practice find the content of the speech/privacy balance in 
Convention jurisprudence. A more Convention-compatible approach has been reached 
with regards to the argument that the public interest is supported by the commercial 
interests of the media. 
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The Commercial Interests of the Media 
 
Lord Woolf, in A v B plc, suggested that ‘[t]he courts must not ignore the fact that if 
newspapers do not publish information which the public are interested in, there will be 
fewer newspapers published, which will not be in the public interest. The same is true in 
relation to other parts of the media’.101 The same argument was raised in Campbell by 
Lord Hoffmann, in the minority,102 and Baroness Hale, in the majority: 
One reason why press freedom is so important is that we need newspapers to sell in order to ensure 
that we still have newspapers at all. It may be said that newspapers should be allowed considerable 
latitude in their intrusions into private grief so that they can maintain circulation and the rest of us can 
then continue to enjoy the variety of newspapers and other mass media which are available in this 
country.
103
 
Such a broad justification for press freedom does not appear to be supported by the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence, or the theoretical model. This is because it automatically adds 
extra weight to the Article 10 side of the balance, without requiring the court to 
scrutinise the value of the speech in question, elevating entertaining speech to a higher 
position than it would normally occupy, which is out of accord with both Von Hannover 
decisions and Axel Springer.  
In subsequent cases, a more satisfactory position has now been reached with regards to 
this argument. Although McKennitt concerned the publication of a book, rather than a 
newspaper article, the Court of Appeal implicitly rejected the notion that the commercial 
interests of the media in reporting entertaining stories could have any significant weight 
in the balance between privacy and freedom of speech; ‘[t]he width of the rights given to 
the media by A v B cannot be reconciled with Von Hannover’.104 Moreover, such a factor 
‘is difficult to reconcile with the long-standing view that what interest the public is not 
necessarily in the public interest’.105 Following McKennitt, the ‘commercial interest’ factor 
does not appear to have been influential to the outcome of domestic privacy cases,106 
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reflecting greater harmony with the key Strasbourg rulings, and the theoretical model 
suggested in this thesis. 
Factors Strengthening the Article 8 Claim 
 
As suggested in chapter 1, when determining the weight of the Article 8 claim the courts 
should draw on the fundamental privacy values of informational autonomy, self-
fulfilment, dignity and substantive autonomy. Although the ECtHR has not fully 
articulated these underlying principles,107nor does there appear to be a hierarchy of 
interests (as is the case with Article 10), such values could be drawn out from the leading 
Strasbourg cases and academic literature. While the minority judges in Campbell 
recognised that the ‘protection of human autonomy and dignity’ had become the focus 
of the new tort of misuse of private information,108 the majority judges appeared to be 
more concerned with the physical harm that may have resulted from failure to restrict 
publication of the details of Campbell’s treatment. Thus Lord Hope found that ‘the 
potential for disclosure of the information to cause harm is an important factor to be 
taken into account in the assessment of the extent of the restriction that was needed to 
protect Miss Campbell’s right to privacy’.109 Baroness Hale came to a similar conclusion: 
 
Not every statement about a person’s health will carry the badge of confidentiality or risk doing harm 
to that person’s physical or moral integrity. The privacy interest in the fact that a public figure has a 
cold or a broken leg is unlikely to be strong enough to justify restricting the press’s freedom to report 
it. What harm could it possibly do? …The risk of harm is what matters at this stage, rather than the 
proof that actual harm has occurred. People trying to recover from drug addiction need considerable 
dedication and commitment, along with constant reinforcement from those around them. That is why 
organisations like Narcotics Anonymous were set up and why they can do so much good. Blundering 
in when matters are acknowledged to be at a ‘fragile’ stage may do great harm.
110 
 
In Murray the real risk of future intrusion, if publication of a photograph of J K 
Rowling’s young son was permitted, seemed to carry significant weight in the Court of 
Appeal’s conclusion that the balance was more likely than not to come down in favour of 
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Article 8.111 The Court considered that, given the evidence of press interest in the family, 
it was likely that there would be considerable disruption to the child’s life, possibly 
amounting to harassment.  
 
While publicity likely to cause some form of tangible harm is obviously an important 
practical consideration that should be given due weight by the court in privacy cases, a 
potential pitfall is that in the absence of such harm an Article 8 claim appears relatively 
weak, unless the court also gives sufficient weight to the core theoretical values 
underpinning the right to privacy. Arguably, a number of recent cases indicate that 
domestic courts are less prepared to find in favour of Article 8 if it is only the values of 
privacy at stake, as opposed to the risk of some identifiable harm to the individual. In 
Spelman, also concerning the private life of a minor, it was found that there was unlikely 
to be further intrusion following the initial publication. Partly on this basis, Mr Justice 
Tugendhat was unable to find that Spelman was more likely than not to have his Article 
8 rights vindicated at final trial.112 The point was emphasised in the earlier Terry case; 
‘[t]his is not a case where, on the evidence before me, the potential adverse consequences 
are particularly grave. On the evidence…I do not think it likely that [Terry] regards as 
particularly sensitive information of the kind that is sought to be protected’.113 Therefore, 
while the courts often acknowledge the distress caused by publicity given to private 
information there is often little or no express discussion of the underlying values of 
Article 8, in the absence of specific harm.114 While it is very difficult to assess the impact 
of this issue on the overall outcome of the cases discussed, it is tentatively suggested that 
a full judicial discussion of the privacy values at stake in these cases might reveal the true 
strength of certain privacy claims, potentially resulting in a stronger level of privacy 
protection being granted.  
 
The domestic courts have also determined that the Article 8 claim is strengthened if the 
information was originally disclosed in breach of confidence. In HRH Prince of Wales v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd, concerning the disclosure of Prince Charles’ private diaries by 
an employee, the Court of Appeal considered that there is an important public interest in 
upholding duties of confidentiality, particularly those expressly assumed under 
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contract.115 The court concluded that ‘[b]oth the nature of the information and of the 
relationship of confidence under which is was received weigh heavily in the balance in 
favour of Prince Charles’.116 
 
As mentioned in chapter 3 the confidentiality aspect of the case had already been 
considered when determining whether the Prince had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and, although prevention of breach of confidence is expressly mentioned in Article 10(2) 
as possibly a legitimate restriction on freedom of expression, the emphasis on breach of 
confidence in this instance may have distracted the court from conducting a more 
searching assessment of the speech at stake. The diary extract, printed in the Mail on 
Sunday soon after a State visit to London by the Chinese President, described Prince 
Charles’ impressions of events marking the handing over of Hong Kong to China. The 
newspaper placed particular emphasis on his description of the Chinese visitors as 
‘appalling waxworks’. Arguably, as an expression of the political views and lobbying 
activities of the future head of state, this information had significant value in Article 10 
terms.117 The Court of Appeal, however, was not persuaded that there was more than 
minimal public interest in the information.118 It is perhaps surprising that the Court was 
so ready to dismiss the public interest claim in this case when it is contrasted with the 
relative ease with which the courts often find a public interest in the publication of 
details of the sexual relationships of celebrities and sports figures.119 The outcome of the 
Prince Charles case may therefore be partly attributed to the significance placed on the 
breach of confidence dimension, with the result that future debate on a matter of 
political importance was stifled. While the Court of Appeal was right to take into account 
the circumstances in which the information was disclosed to bolster the Article 8 claim, 
the outcome in Prince Charles indicates that such an approach may lead to an imbalance 
between Articles 8 and 10. A final point of comparison between the domestic 
speech/privacy balancing exercise and Convention principles relates to the application of 
proportionality. In this respect it will also be argued that domestic courts could, in the 
most recent cases, demonstrate greater adherence to the principle of proportionality. 
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Is the Degree of Intrusion Proportionate to the Public Interest? 
 
The House of Lords decision in Campbell demonstrates strong judicial commitment to 
the proportionality approach of balancing the competing rights. While the judges were 
unanimous in finding that the basic facts of Naomi Campbell’s drug addiction and 
treatment could be published, their Lordships went on to scrutinise whether the 
additional details (including the photographs) went further than was necessary to inform 
the public. Attention was given, by a number of the judges, to the degree of discretion 
that should be granted to editors and journalists when presenting particular news stories. 
Lord Nicholls found that ‘[t]he balance ought not to be held at a point which would 
preclude…a degree of journalistic latitude in respect of [the] information published’.120 
Lord Hoffmann considered that the photographs, in particular, had some value in terms 
of corroborating the story that the Mirror was legitimately entitled to publish; ‘[f]rom a 
journalistic point of view, photographs are an essential part of the story. The picture 
carried the message, more strongly than anything in the text alone, that the Mirror’s story 
was true. So the decision to publish the pictures was…within the margin of editorial 
judgment and something for which appropriate latitude should be allowed’.121 Having 
determined that the additional details involved no significant further intrusion, the 
minority judges found that Article 10 should prevail in relation to all of the information, 
when the margin of discretion had been taken into account.  
 
The majority judges also recognised the editorial interests of the press,122 but the balance 
they struck was in favour of Article 8. Given that publication of the additional details was 
likely to have caused Campbell significant distress, and may have interfered with her 
treatment by revealing the location and frequency of her visits to NA,123 the majority 
found that it constituted an unjustifiable invasion of privacy. As Lord Hope pointed out; 
‘it is hard to see that there was any compelling need for the public to know the name of 
the organisation that she was attending for therapy, or for the other details of it to be set 
out…The decision to publish the photographs suggests that greater weight was being 
given to the wish to publish a story that would attract interest rather than to the wish to 
maintain its credibility’.124 Thus the judges closely scrutinised the public interest in 
                                                 
120 [2004] UKHL 22, [28].  
121 ibid [77].  
122 ibid [112] (Lord Hope); [156] (Baroness Hale); [166] (Lord Carswell). 
123 ibid [155] (Baroness Hale). 
124 ibid [120]. 
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knowing the details of Campbell’s treatment, and applied the Convention-derived 
principle of proportionality, to conclude, convincingly, that their publication went further 
than was necessary to convey the information that the public was entitled to know.  
 
In a number of subsequent cases, the guidance set out by the majority in Campbell 
appears to have been accepted. In Mosley, Mr Justice Eady found: 
 
[The] ‘ultimate balancing test’ has been recognised as turning to a large extent upon 
proportionality…The judge will often have to ask whether the intrusion, or perhaps the degree of 
the intrusion, into the claimant’s privacy was proportionate to the public interest supposedly 
being served by it…Sometimes there may be a good case for revealing the fact of wrongdoing to 
the general public; it will not necessarily follow that photographs of ‘every gory detail’ also need 
to be published to achieve the public interest objective.
125
 
 
Having recognised that there could be some ‘scope for editorial judgment as to what 
details should be included within the story’,126 the judge went on to find that none of the 
information relating to Max Mosley’s sexual activity was in the public interest. Mr Justice 
Tugendhat in Terry suggested that further intrusive details would receive different 
treatment to information relating to the existence of a relationship, although, on the 
facts, the judge did not find that there was a real threat to publish such details.127  
 
It may be possible to detect, in more recent cases, a less intense proportionality exercise 
in terms of the additional detail to certain stories and, consequently, a shift towards 
greater press freedom. In Ferdinand, the additional details published by the Sunday Mirror 
included a relatively innocuous photograph of the footballer and Carly Storey in a hotel 
room together. As discussed in chapter 3, Mr Justice Nicol in the High Court found that 
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy with regards to the photograph but, when 
balancing the competing rights, held that Article 10 should prevail. Given its 
‘unexceptionable character’, the photograph, he found: 
[C]ould have caused nothing comparable to the additional harm that was referred to in Campbell 
and none of the embarrassment that pictures of sexual activity may cause. In this case, the picture 
did provide an element of support to the story because it showed the Claimant and Ms Storey 
together. It was of limited value because of the age of the photograph but to that limited extent it 
                                                 
125 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [14]. 
126 ibid [21].  
127 [2010] EWHC 119 (QB), [69].  
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did do more than the picture in Campbell…Unlike in Campbell, I find that publication of the 
picture did not cause the Claimant justifiable additional distress.
128
 
By contrasting the different factual circumstances of Campbell and Ferdinand, the judge, in 
the latter case, appears to have concluded that publication of the photograph had not 
(and would not in future) cause Ferdinand any tangible harm. Employing such reasoning, 
however, meant that the violation of Ferdinand’s right to informational autonomy was 
considerably downplayed in the case. The potential for photographs to invade privacy 
has been repeatedly emphasised by the higher domestic courts129 and the ECtHR.130 This 
was a photograph taken in a private hotel room, probably without Ferdinand’s consent, 
providing readers with detailed information about his appearance and activities. In terms 
of corroborating the story, the photograph did no more than show that Ferdinand and 
Storey had been present, amongst others, in a hotel room on that particular occasion; it 
did not prove they were in a relationship at that time. As with Campbell, the significance 
of the photograph only became apparent in the context of the article as a whole. Had the 
nature of Ferdinand and Storey’s relationship been obvious from the photograph, Article 
8 would have undoubtedly prevailed.131 It is argued, therefore, that the photograph did 
little to contribute to the story and, had the judge had greater regard to the likely sense of 
violation and intrusion caused by its publication, a reverse finding may have been more 
consistent with the Convention. Following Von Hannover (No. 2), however, the outcome 
in Ferdinand (in terms of the photograph) is probably Convention-compatible. As 
discussed above, the Court in that case approved the publication of loosely connected 
photographs to illustrate a story found to be in the public interest,132 although those 
photographs had been taken in a public, rather than private, location. Had the Strasbourg 
Court heard Ferdinand, and found the fact of the affair to be in the public interest, they 
may well have permitted publication of the photograph.  
 
The recent Trimingham case demonstrates some similarities to Ferdinand. Carina 
Trimingham had accepted that the press could legitimately publish the fact of her affair 
with MP Chris Huhne; her complaint concerned the additional details included in a 
number of articles. In what was arguably a misapplication of the law, Mr Justice 
                                                 
128 [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB), [103]. 
129 For example, Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22, [31] (Lord Nicholls). 
130 Von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 21. 
131 [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB), [103]. 
132 See above at p 83.  
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Tugendhat found that Trimingham did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
terms of the photographs of her at her civil partnership ceremony,133 the necessity of 
their publication was not therefore considered in the judgement. The additional written 
details consisted of information about a previous relationship134 and descriptions of her 
sexual activity with Chris Huhne, attributed by the newspapers to Trimingham.135 
Although it is not entirely clear, the judge appears to have conducted a balancing exercise 
with regards to these details, finding simply that the information relating to a previous 
relationship was not ‘sufficiently serious’ to justify a successful misuse of private 
information claim,136 and the details of sexual activity came within the ‘range of editorial 
judgment, given the overall nature and content of the articles in question’.137 The judge’s 
inadequate reasoning on this point reflects the fact that publication of the additional 
details was wholly unjustified. As Lord Hoffmann made clear in Campbell: 
 
The relatively anodyne nature of the additional details is in my opinion important and 
distinguishes this case from cases in which (for example) there is a public interest in the disclosure 
of the existence of a sexual relationship (say, between a politician and someone whom she has 
appointed to public office) but the addition of salacious details or intimate photographs is 
disproportionate and unacceptable. The latter, even if accompanying a legitimate disclosure of the 
sexual relationship, would be too intrusive and demeaning.
138
 
 
The details in Trimingham, while clearly relating to a core aspect of the right to privacy—
sexual activity—added nothing to the public interest of the story beyond entertainment 
value and interest. Had the judge strictly applied the proportionality test, the obvious 
conclusion would have been that the additional details should have been protected in this 
case. 
 
In conclusion, a majority in the House of Lords in Campbell opened up the opportunity 
for domestic courts to apply a highly sensitive, proportionality based approach to the 
publication of additional details. Whilst recognising that the press have a margin of 
discretion in terms of presenting particular stories of public interest, the Court concluded 
that this could not necessarily trump an individual’s rights under Article 8. As Ferdinand 
                                                 
133 See chapter 3 at p 61. 
134 [2012] EWHC 1296 (QB), [304]. 
135 ibid [306].  
136 ibid [305]. 
137 ibid [308]. 
138 [2004] UKHL 22, [60].  
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and Trimingham demonstrate, a less sensitive approach may be emerging in the recent case 
law. Once publication of the basic information was found to be in the public interest, the 
judges appeared to conduct a far less intense scrutiny of the necessity of the further 
details. This relatively subtle shift in judicial reasoning suggests a weaker adherence to the 
theoretical model suggested in this thesis, and, while Ferdinand might possibly be 
consistent with the Convention, Trimingham seems to be out of accord with the core 
values of Article 8. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In answering the research questions, this chapter has argued that the speech/privacy 
balance achieved by the Strasbourg Court in Von Hannover (No. 1) fully accords with the 
theoretical model in that celebrity gossip, and probably ‘infotainment’, types of speech, 
unsupported by the free speech values discussed in chapter 1, and with little or no public 
interest dimension, are afforded a low weighting. Thus informational autonomy received 
a strong measure of protection by the Court at the balancing stage. The Strasbourg 
position has been modified to some extent by the recent decisions in Von Hannover (No. 
2) and Axel Springer. Private information will still be protected if it is published for 
entertainment purposes only, but both cases suggest that very weak public interest 
justifications may be used to support publication of the information itself (as in Axel 
Springer) as well as photographs having little to do with the public interest dimension of 
an article (as in Von Hannover (No. 2)). Therefore, in the most recent Strasbourg decisions 
on speech/privacy balancing, speech unsupported at the theoretical level appears to be 
given a stronger level of protection. 
 
It has further been argued that, in UK domestic law, the Convention has clearly had a 
significant impact on the structure of domestic speech/privacy balancing; the courts 
consistently emphasise the initial presumption of equality between the two rights. The 
principles applied to determine the weight of the competing rights, however, indicates 
some inconsistency between the Strasbourg Court and UK domestic courts. Prior to Von 
Hannover (No. 2), English courts intermittently accepted the argument that Article 10 
should prevail in order to put the record straight about the inconsistent behaviour of role 
models and other public figures. This justification is supported by neither the theoretical 
model nor, until recently, the Strasbourg jurisprudence; yet, in the recent Ferdinand case, 
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Mr Justice Tugendhat revived the argument, denying Rio Ferdinand protection for the 
private information relating to his extra-marital affair, and displaying no awareness of the 
incompatibility of his reasoning with Von Hannover (No. 1), the then leading Strasbourg 
authority. Moreover, on the Article 8 side of the balance, the domestic cases suggest a 
tendency among the judiciary to focus on the potential for specific harm to stem from 
permitting publication, whilst neglecting to fully consider the threat to informational and 
substantive autonomy. Thus, while it is difficult to gauge the impact of this trend, it is 
tentatively suggested that the courts could have given greater force to the privacy rights 
at stake and, accordingly, achieved greater consistency with the Convention. In addition, 
a more rigorous application of the proportionality test in a number of recent cases could 
have achieved a similar result.  
 
Therefore, it appears that, in terms of speech/privacy balancing the most recent cases at 
both the Convention and domestic levels indicate a widening of the gap between privacy 
law and the theoretical model. The consistency currently achieved between the ECHR 
and UK domestic law appears to be as a result of the re-balancing occurring in the 
Strasbourg Court, rather than as a direct result of English courts feeling bound to import 
the content of Article 8 into the tort of misuse of private information. Speech now 
appears to be protected at Strasbourg on spurious public interest grounds. In domestic 
law, the failure to fully recognise the impact of intrusive articles on informational 
autonomy and other privacy-related values, together with the application of a weak 
proportionality test and the recent revival of the role model argument, suggest that the 
balance currently struck fails to accord fully with the free speech values considered in 
chapter 1. Intrusive articles, unsupported at the theoretical level, are accorded an 
unwarranted level of protection, leaving informational autonomy inadequately protected.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Privacy Law at the Convention and Domestic Levels Critiqued Against the 
Theoretical Model 
 
The theoretical model for privacy protection set out in chapter 1 aimed to provide some 
of the basic principles to be applied when determining the types of information attracting 
legal protection, and balancing the competing rights of privacy and free speech. It was 
suggested that, for the law to provide effective protection for informational autonomy 
and other privacy-related interests, the concept of private life should be widely drawn, 
encompassing relatively anodyne information (from the perspective of ‘expression’) and 
information acquired in a public place. Such an interpretation of ‘private life’ would not 
pose an unacceptable threat to press freedom because, as argued, the privacy and speech 
value of the information in question should always be scrutinised on the basis that the 
two rights are presumptively equal. The model suggested that, in general, information 
relating to politicians’ private lives, potentially impacting upon voting practices and thus 
engaging the powerful argument from democracy, might tend to prevail in the balance. 
In contrast, privacy-invading speech with no element of public interest, such as celebrity 
gossip, often would not engage any of the core free speech rationales and its restriction 
would generally be justified. ‘Infotainment’, using examples from the private lives of 
celebrities to both entertain and stimulate debate on important contemporary issues, 
admittedly may have some speech value. However, the theoretical balance would 
normally come down in favour of privacy; to do otherwise would, in line with 
Phillipson’s argument, be contrary to the notion that human rights aim to protect the 
individual against the will of the majority.1 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 concluded that, in terms of both the concept of private life and the 
speech/privacy balance, the decision of the Strasbourg Court in Von Hannover (No. 1) 
clearly mapped on to the theoretical model. Princess Caroline was afforded a full 
                                                 
1 G Phillipson, ‘Memorandum to the Leveson Inquiry’ (28 March 2012) 
<http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Submission-by-Professor-Gavin-
Phillipson-Durham-Law-School.pdf> accessed 10 August 2012. 
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measure of privacy protection for apparently anodyne information, acquired in a public 
place. Moreover, such speech was given a very low weighting and was therefore 
restricted in favour of the protection of privacy. The 2012 decisions of the Strasbourg 
Court in Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer, however, appear to have downgraded 
the level of protection at both stages of the analysis. The Court now accepts that certain 
well-known individuals (such as actors and royals) are public figures, that Article 8 rights 
may be waived by prior consensual disclosure and that photographs taken in daily life, 
previously considered to be ‘intimate’, may be published when loosely connected to a 
story of general interest. Thus, the 2012 cases mark a departure from the theoretical 
model relied on in this thesis. The decisions give the general impression that provided 
domestic authorities have, as a matter of procedure, considered the relevant criteria set 
out by the Strasbourg Court, it may be reluctant to interfere with their decision.  
 
As chapter 3 suggested, these shifts in emphasis may be a result of the ongoing debates 
about the future of the Strasbourg Court. The first Von Hannover case was heavily 
criticised in a number of Member States for giving privacy too strong a protection and 
potentially destroying the ‘infotainment’ industry. In Von Hannover (No. 2), for example, 
there were submissions from six third parties arguing that Article 10 should prevail, 
suggesting that the ECtHR was under some pressure to reconsider its earlier decision.2 
Moreover, Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer may be influenced by the wider debates 
about the future of the ECtHR.3 By the time Von Hannover (No. 2) was heard, members 
of the Council of Europe had issued two declarations on reform of the ECtHR 
(Interlaken in 2010 and Izmir in 2011) stressing a desire for greater subsidiarity and a less 
interventionist Strasbourg Court, as well as concerns about the competence of some 
ECtHR judges and the massive backlog of cases waiting to be heard. The Brighton 
Conference, expected to call for more radical reforms, was also on the horizon, taking 
place in April 2012. It is possible therefore that these ongoing debates impacted upon 
Von Hannover (No. 2) and Axel Springer (among others), demonstrating, what one 
commentator has termed, an ‘appeasement approach’ on behalf of the ECtHR towards 
certain Member States, possibly in an attempt to prevent significant weakening of the 
Convention through dissatisfaction of the Council of Europe members.4  
                                                 
2 Von Hannover v Germany (No. 2) App no 40660/08 (ECHR, 7 February 2012) [90]. 
3 H Fenwick, ‘An Appeasement Approach in the European Court of Human Rights?’ (UK Constitutional 
Law Group, 5 April 2012) < http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/blog/> accessed 10 May 2012. 
4 ibid. 
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The conclusions drawn in chapters 3 and 4, on the level of protection provided in UK 
domestic law, reflect a similar pattern, although, it will be argued, as a result of different 
concerns. Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that in determining what constitutes ‘private 
information’, and conducting the balancing exercise, Convention jurisprudence has had a 
significant impact. The framework of the action for misuse of private information is now 
consistently defined in Convention terms. As to the content of the action, however, 
chapters 3 and 4 emphasised that, post Von Hannover (No. 1), domestic courts have 
retained a substantial degree of autonomy, creating a rift between the level of protection 
(until recently) provided by the Strasbourg Court and the domestic courts. This was 
particularly highlighted in reference to the treatment of anodyne photographs of 
individuals taken in public locations. Although the Murray case gave encouraging signs 
that protection may be extended to such photographs, the courts have consistently 
avoided confronting the issue. Additionally, concerning the speech/privacy balance, the 
judicial commitment to robust protection of privacy shown in Mosley and McKennitt has, 
to an extent, been undermined by intermittent acceptance of the argument that false 
impressions of celebrities should be corrected, an argument which was then out of 
accord with Strasbourg and, moreover, fails to uphold the core principle of informational 
autonomy. Another point of significance is the continuing role of common law breach of 
confidence which, as the Prince Charles case clearly demonstrates, may be drawn on at 
both stages of the courts’ analysis.5  
 
While it has been suggested that the state of the current law, inferred from the most 
recent High Court cases (Ferdinand, Spelman and Trimingham), demonstrates a fairly high 
level of consistency with Strasbourg, this is, it has been argued, a matter of coincidence 
following Strasbourg’s modification of its stance in 2012. The post-Von Hannover (No. 
2)/Axel Springer cases show no judicial awareness of the step change at Strasbourg, 
though, in future, those Strasbourg decisions may be given greater consideration by the 
domestic courts. Taken together, these factors appear to provide no evidence to suggest 
a binding obligation on the judiciary to bring the misuse of private information tort into 
line with Convention via sections 2 and 6 HRA. The content of the action is not to be 
found exclusively in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Moreover, while greater harmony 
between the Convention and domestic systems is evident, domestically, the reluctance to 
                                                 
5 See G Phillipson, ‘Privacy: The Development of Breach of Confidence – The Clearest Case of Horizontal 
Effect?’ in D Hoffman (ed), The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (CUP 2011). 
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afford strong protection to ‘anodyne’ information, continued (albeit intermittent) 
application of waiver and re-emergence of the ‘role model’ argument, suggest that 
informational autonomy is not afforded full protection in English law. 
 
Utilisation of the HRA in the Development of Domestic Privacy Law 
 
Chapter 2 discussed the competing academic views on horizontal effect. The interim 
conclusion drawn was that judicial statements in both the pre- and post-Campbell privacy 
cases fail to demonstrate commitment to any one version of horizontal effect. Moreover, 
contrary to the view of a number of commentators,6 comments in the post-Campbell 
privacy cases do not indicate acceptance of direct effect or strong indirect horizontal 
effect. While such a view has been refuted by Phillipson, on the basis of the origins of 
the judicial statements in the cases,7 neither is the view borne out by the analysis of the 
content of the action for misuse of private information, carried out in chapters 3 and 4. 
The substantial degree of autonomy from Strasbourg shown, including frequent 
reference to common law breach of confidence, shows that a weaker model is employed 
in this context. A more difficult conclusion to draw, however, is whether the apparent 
judicial autonomy indicates weak indirect horizontal effect (judicial flexibility to exercise 
choice between the Convention and the common law when applying legal principles to a 
case) or the slightly stronger, and more persuasive, ‘constitutional constraint’ model (an 
obligation on the judiciary to develop the common law compatibly with the Convention 
provided this can be done incrementally, with observance of fundamental constitutional 
principles).8  
 
Arguably, the constitutional constraint model is supported by evidence as to judicial 
attitudes towards the development of privacy law in this context. In Mosley, for example, 
Mr Justice Eady stated that: 
 
The law now affords protection to information in respect of which there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, even in circumstances where there is no pre-existing relationship giving 
rise of itself to an enforceable duty of confidence. That is because the law is concerned to prevent 
                                                 
6 T D C Bennett, ‘Horizontality’s New Horizons - Re-Examining Horizontal Effect: Privacy, Defamation 
and the Human Rights Act Part 1’ (2010) 21(3) Ent LR 96; K Hughes, ‘Horizontal Privacy’ (2009) 125 
LQR 244; N A Moreham ‘Privacy and Horizontality: Relegating the Common Law’ (2007) 123 LQR 373. 
7
 Phillipson, ‘Privacy: The Development of Breach of Confidence’ (n 5) 152. 
8 G Phillipson and A Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 74(6) MLR 
878. 
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the violation of a citizen’s autonomy, dignity and self-esteem. It is not simply a matter of 
‘unaccountable’ judges running amok. Parliament enacted the 1998 statute which requires these 
values to be acknowledged and enforced by the courts.
9
 
 
These comments suggest that section 6 HRA creates a general presumption in favour of 
Convention-compatible development (as the constitutional constraint model requires), as 
opposed to the wide discretion permitted by Phillipson’s weak indirect horizontal effect 
model. Thus, given that the HRA does not displace the constraint of ‘incremental 
development’,10 Mr Justice Eady’s comments would appear to support the suggestion 
that section 6 requires domestic courts to give effect to ECHR principles, subject to the 
constraints discussed above.  
 
At first glance, it could appear that the constitutional constraint model does not fully 
explain why the courts have, to some extent, failed to utilise indirect horizontal effect to 
maximise domestic privacy protection, particularly in the post-Von Hannover (No. 1), pre-
Von Hannover (No. 2)/Axel Springer, era. As argued in chapter 2, pre-HRA, the 
incremental development of common law breach of confidence had enhanced its 
capacity to protect informational privacy, the House of Lords’ decision in Campbell 
‘transformed’ breach of confidence into a tort providing remedies for the misuse of 
private information, and the 2008 Court of Appeal decision in Murray came very close to 
creating a general image right. Further development along these lines, to achieve the level 
of privacy protection (until very recently) afforded by the Strasbourg Court, arguably 
would not raise constitutional concerns in the minds of the judiciary. For example, the 
waiver doctrine, already an uncertain aspect of the law due to its intermittent application 
in a number of cases, could have been abandoned by incremental development. 
Moreover, following Murray, the protection of innocuous photographs of daily life could 
also have been achieved without offence to fundamental constitutional principles. Thus, 
stronger privacy protection could possibly have been granted, without recourse to the 
legislative-style common law development that had been expressly ruled out by the 
House of Lords in Wainwright v Home Office.11  
 
Moreover, if constitutional concerns have prevented the judiciary from granting stronger 
protection for informational privacy, it is unclear why this has never been articulated in 
                                                 
9 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [7].  
10 Phillipson and Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint’ (n 8) 888. 
11 [2003] 3 All ER 943. 
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the privacy judgments. In the context of statutory interpretation under section 3 HRA, 
the courts have expressly stated that their duty to interpret statutes compatibly with the 
Convention rights, so far as it is possible to do so, is limited by constitutional principles.12 
It could reasonably be expected, therefore, that they would do the same in the context of 
interpretation of section 6. Similarly, the judges have failed to explain why the general 
presumption in favour of following Strasbourg jurisprudence, under section 2 HRA, has 
been displaced in this context, as they did in Horncastle.13 Even if Phillipson’s ‘weak 
indirect horizontal effect’ model is preferred,14 conferring a wider discretion on the 
judiciary in their application of the Convention rights, the decisions themselves do not 
disclose why such a discretion has been used to weaken the protection afforded in Von 
Hannover (No. 1). In other words, it is unclear what other factors prevented the courts 
from affording maximum protection for informational autonomy via sections 2 and 6 
HRA. 
 
However, the controversial nature of privacy is an important background to the 
developments that have taken place in this area. While this thesis has argued in favour of 
a concept of privacy that provides strong protection for informational autonomy, chapter 
1 emphasised that there is no general consensus about how privacy should be defined. 
Moreover, views as to the value of different types of speech, and how balances should be 
struck between the competing rights, are equally diverse. These concerns were articulated 
by Lord Justice Buxton in Wainwright, when he recognised that: 
 
[I]n areas involving extremely contested and strongly conflicting social interests, the judges are 
extremely ill-equipped to undertake the detailed investigations necessary before the proper shape 
of the law can be decided. It is only by enquiry outside the narrow boundaries of a particular case 
that the proper ambit of such a tort can be determined. The interests of democracy demand that 
such enquiry should be conducted in order to inform, and the appropriate conclusions should be 
drawn from the enquiry by, Parliament and not the courts.
15
 
 
                                                 
12 For example, Lord Nicholls has suggested that; ‘[Section 3(1) HRA] is a powerful tool whose use is 
obligatory…But the reach of the tool is not unlimited. Section 3 is concerned with interpretation…In 
applying section 3 courts must be ever mindful of this outer limit. The Human Rights Act reserves the 
amendment of primary legislation to Parliament. By this means the Act seeks to preserve parliamentary 
sovereignty. The Act maintains that constitutional boundary’; Re S and Re W (Care Orders) [2002] 2 AC 291, 
[37]. 
13 R v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14. 
14 G Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, “Horizontal Effect” and the Common Law: A Bang or a 
Whimper?’ (1999) 62(6) MLR 824. 
15 [2003] 3 All ER 943, [112].  
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Lord Bingham, writing extra-judicially, before the enactment of the HRA expressed a 
similar view; ‘[m]y preference would be for legislation, which would mean that the rules 
which the courts applied would carry the imprimatur of democratic approval’.16 As this 
thesis demonstrates, however, the impetus of the HRA and lack of government 
commitment to bring forward legislation,17 has lead to a strong degree of judicial activism 
in the development of privacy law. But it may be inferred that these judicial concerns 
continue to have some impact when the courts decide privacy cases. As Baroness Hale 
suggested in a public lecture in 2005; ‘[t]he courts do not act in a vacuum. They are 
sensitive to the public opinion they detect from the media and from politicians’.18 
Commentators such as Aileen Kavanagh have made similar observations: 
 
[J]udges have not one but two general tasks when making their decisions: the first is to decide on 
the substantive merits of the individual case; the second (related) task is to make a decision on the 
extent and limits of their own institutional role. It would be irresponsible for judges to decide 
cases whilst remaining oblivious to the possible consequences of their decisions and these include 
prudential concerns, such as whether a particular judicial decision would produce a backlash in 
society, whether society is ready for the legal change, whether it might be counterproductive to 
introduce it at this particular time or whether the legislature or government would then move to 
curtail the powers of the courts as a result.
19
 
 
Thus Kavanagh’s suggestion reflects some of those principles underlying the 
constitutional constraint model of horizontal effect. The argument, however, has 
particular force in the privacy context. The press have been hostile to judicial 
developments in privacy law that are seen to curb their freedom and threaten their 
commercial success.20 Their power to disseminate information and ideas to the masses 
clearly has the potential to sway public opinion against the ECHR, HRA and the 
judiciary, if they are motivated to do so. It is argued, therefore, that such considerations 
may well have restricted the courts from interpreting sections 2 and 6 HRA in a way that 
                                                 
16 T Bingham, ‘Should there be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal Privacy?’ [1996] EHRLR 450, 462. 
17 Phillipson, ‘Privacy: The Development of Breach of Confidence’ (n 5).  
18 B Hale, ‘The Sinners and the Sinned Against, Women in the Criminal Justice System’ (2005) Longford 
Lectures <http://www.longfordtrust.org/lecture_details.php?id=10> accessed 12 June 2012. 
19 A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2009) 199. Bellamy has similarly 
argued that ‘[d]omestic courts come under greater scrutiny by the media and a broad range of interest 
groups and, thus, are more aware of public opinion than international courts. As a result, they tend to feel 
more obliged than their international counterparts to legitimize themselves and gain acceptance of their 
decisions among the wider public’; R Bellamy, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ 
(2011) 9(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 86, 96. 
20 See P Dacre, ‘Speech by Paul Dacre – Editor in Chief of the Dail Mail at the Society of Editors 
Conference in Bristol’ (November 2009) <http://www.societyofeditors.co.uk/page-
view.php?pagename=thesoelecture2008> accessed 30 January 2012. 
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would give stronger effect to Convention principles in domestic law. The effect of this 
constraint may be most clearly highlighted by the judicial reluctance to protect 
photographs of celebrities in daily life (arguably required by Von Hannover (No. 1)). The 
likely backlash by the media, and possibly the public, in response to such an extension of 
the law could be taken to indicate the effect of underlying constraints.  
 
The conclusion of this thesis is, therefore, that while the balance struck in English law, 
for the misuse of private information, accords with the values underlying privacy to a 
greater extent than in the pre-HRA era, it currently fails to accord with them fully. It also 
fails to accord fully with the free speech values considered in chapter 1, in the sense that 
protection is afforded to media freedom rather than to speech underpinned by the values 
discussed. Given the controversial nature of privacy law, and the backdrop of 
constitutional arrangements in the UK, it may be inferred that the courts have been, to 
some extent, constrained in their development of the tort of misuse of private 
information, leading to some inconsistency with Strasbourg jurisprudence, particularly in 
the pre-Von Hannover (No. 2)/Axel Springer era, but such disparity has become less 
significant following the rebalancing of privacy and free speech at Strasbourg. 
 
The Future of Privacy Law  
 
A Bill of Rights Commission, established in March 2011, published its report in 
December 2012.21 The Commission’s terms of reference were to investigate the ‘creation 
of a UK Bill of Rights that incorporates and builds on all our obligations under the 
ECHR’, and, in addition, to advise on reform of the ECtHR. The political motivation for 
human rights reform in the UK is, at least in part, a result of the development of privacy 
law;22 one aspect of a wider concern to increase Parliamentary autonomy and weaken ties 
with Strasbourg.23 In the privacy context, David Cameron has expressed his unease about 
                                                 
21 Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? – The Choice Before Us (2012) 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/cbr/uk-bill-rights-vol-1.pdf> accessed 20 December 2012. 
22 It is apparent that some Conservative politicians would also like greater executive autonomy on matters 
such as counter-terrorism policy and prisoner voting rights. See H Fenwick, ‘The Human Rights Act or a 
British Bill of Rights: Creating a Down-Grading Recalibration of Rights Against the Counter-Terror 
Backdrop?’ [2012] PL 468. 
23 H Fenwick, ‘The Conservative Anti-ECHR Stance and a British Bill of Rights – Rhetoric and Reality’ 
(UK Constitutional Law Group, 1 November 2011) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/blog/> accessed 10 
December 2011. 
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‘judges…making the law rather than Parliament’, and their use of super-injunctions.24 
While the Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, in a 2011 speech, stated that ‘there is no 
question of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the Convention’ and ‘the 
government is not intending to limit or erode the application [of] any of the rights and 
freedoms in the Convention’, it nevertheless aims to ‘redress’ certain balances made 
domestically.25 At the domestic level, Grieve suggested that this might be achieved by 
better definition of the requirements of section 2 HRA, and possibly a right of rebuttal 
allowing the Supreme Court to challenge a decision of the ECtHR.26 The danger for 
privacy law is therefore that a new provision (similar to section 12(4) HRA) could be 
enacted, giving greater weight to Article 10. A new version of section 2, possibly 
compelling the judiciary to depart from Strasbourg jurisprudence in a range of 
circumstances, could give practical domestic effect to such a rebalancing clause.27 
 
The Commission on a Bill of Rights failed to reach a consensus about whether the UK 
should have a Bill of Rights, but did agree that nothing should be altered until after the 
outcome of the Scottish referendum on independence in 2014.28 However, the majority 
of the panel agreed that Britain should have a new Bill of Rights in principle, with some 
individual members suggesting that rights could be more clearly defined and the balance 
adjusted between them. To a large extent, the Commission avoided confronting the 
likelihood that rebalancing clauses, contained in a British Bill of Rights, would eventually 
lead to the UK being in breach of its treaty obligations under the ECHR. The 
Conservative view appears to be that a Bill of Rights, together with reform of the 
ECtHR, could result in greater Parliamentary autonomy on human rights matters without 
the need for the UK to withdraw from the ECHR.  
                                                 
24 O Bowcott, Privacy law should be made by MPs, not judges, says David Cameron’ Guardian (21 April 
2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/apr/21/cameron-superinjunctions-parliament-should-
decide-law> accessed 30 January 2012. 
25 D Grieve, ‘Attorney General: European Convention on Human Rights-Current Challenges’ (London, 
October 2011) 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/NewsCentre/Speeches/Pages/AttorneyGeneralEuropeanConventio
nonHumanRights%E2%80%93currentchallenges.asp> accessed 25 May 2012. 
26 This suggestion is, no doubt, influenced by the government’s continued reluctance to bring forward 
legislation granting prisoner voting rights, following the ECtHR decision in Greens and MT v United Kingdom 
App no 60041/08 (ECHR 1826, 23 November 2010).  
27 H Fenwick, ‘The Human Rights Act or a British Bill of Rights: Creating a Down-Grading Recalibration 
of Rights Against the Counter-Terror Backdrop?’ [2012] PL 468, 477.  
28 The resignation of Commissioner Michael Pinto-Duschinsky in March 2012 was taken as an indication 
that radical change would not be recommended by the Commission; C Urquhart, ‘Bill of Rights 
Commissioner Resigns over Bypass of Commons’ Guardian (11 March 2012) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/11/uk-bill-of-rights-kenneth-clarke> accessed 11 March 
2012. 
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The Brighton Declaration on reform of the ECHR did not include a ‘democratic 
override’ option for Member States and, although the Preamble to the Convention is to 
be amended to place greater emphasis on subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation,29 
the version adopted is a weaker version than an earlier draft.30 Thus, the Conservative 
anti-ECHR and HRA rhetoric is yet to deliver results.31 While reform may not be 
imminent, and the Bill of Rights Report failed to deliver concrete recommendations, it is 
likely that the Conservative Party, in its next election manifesto, will put forward 
proposals concerning the rebalancing of rights, with the potential to significantly impact 
upon privacy law in the future if it was to win the election and, for example, repeal or 
amend the HRA, and grant free speech priority in a Bill of Rights. Thus, depending on 
which party wins the next general election, the future of domestic privacy protection is 
somewhat uncertain. 
 
In contrast, questions raised by the Leveson Inquiry about the relationships between 
politicians and media organisation, in light of the 2011 phone-hacking scandal, might 
discourage politicians from taking steps to grant greater protections to the media. The 
public outrage following the 2011 revelations would suggest that there is no public mood 
in support of enhancing the powers of the press. The Leveson Report,32 published in 
November 2012, recommended replacement of the PCC with a new independent, 
regulatory body, underpinned by legislation, with the power to impose sanctions for 
breaches of its code of practice. While the implementation of these recommendations is 
still uncertain, the weight of public opinion supporting full implementation may make 
available an alternative route for the recognition of privacy rights.33  
 
The recent Joint Committee report on privacy and injunctions concluded that, in light of 
the most recent privacy cases; ‘the courts are now striking a better balance between the 
right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression, based on the facts of the 
                                                 
29 The precise wording of the amendments to the Preamble remain to be seen. 
30 M Elliott, ‘The Brighton Declaration: Where Now for the Human Rights Act and the Bill of Rights 
Debate?’ (UK Constitutional Law Group, 25 April 2012) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/blog/> 
accessed 30 April 2012. 
31 Fenwick, ‘The Human Rights Act or a British Bill of Rights’ (n 27). 
32 The Leveson Inquiry, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press – Report (2012) 
<http://www.officialdocuments.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780.pdf> accessed 3 December 
2012. 
33 See, for example, the petition set up by the ‘Hacked Off’ campaign; available at 
<http://hackinginquiry.org/news/sign-the-petition-implement-leveson-support-the-victims/> accessed 
15 January 2013. 
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individual case’.34 At present, there appears to be no great pressure pushing the judiciary 
in the direction either of enhanced privacy or speech protection. Therefore, despite the 
uncertainty about the future of domestic rights protection under a Bill of Rights, the 
greatest imminent risk to the future of privacy law may be as result of the indirect 
influence of these debates on the Strasbourg Court.35 As this thesis has argued, such an 
influence may have already resulted in an acceptable degree of alignment between the 
levels of privacy protection achieved by the Strasbourg and domestic courts. However, a 
significant gulf remains between the way in which the balance between privacy and free 
speech is struck by English courts and the balance demanded by the justifications 
underpinning the concept of informational autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions (2010-12, HL 273, HC 1443) [32]. 
35 See above at p 108. 
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